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Summary
We provide a framework in a generalization of Go¨del-Bernays set theory for performing
class forcing. The forcing theorem states that the forcing relation is a (definable) class
in the ground model (definability lemma) and that every statement that holds in a class-
generic extension is forced by a condition in the generic filter (truth lemma). We prove
both positive and negative results concerning the forcing theorem. On the one hand, we
show that the definability lemma for one atomic formula implies the forcing theorem for
all formulae in the language of set theory to hold. Furthermore, we introduce several
properties which entail the forcing theorem. On the other hand, we give both counterex-
amples to the definability lemma and the truth lemma. In set forcing, the forcing theorem
can be proved for all forcing notions by constructing a unique Boolean completion. We
show that in class forcing the existence of a Boolean completion is essentially equivalent
to the forcing theorem and, moreover, Boolean completions need not be unique.
The notion of pretameness was introduced to characterize those forcing notions which
preserve the axiom scheme of replacement. We present several new characterizations of
pretameness in terms of the forcing theorem, the preservation of separation, the existence
of nice names for sets of ordinals and several other properties. Moreover, for each of the
aforementioned properties we provide a corresponding characterization of the Ord-chain
condition.
Finally, we prove two equiconsistency results which compare models of ZFC (with large
cardinal properties) and models of second-order arithmetic with topological regularity
properties (and determinacy hypotheses). We apply our previous results on class forcing
to show that many important arboreal forcing notions preserve the Π11-perfect set property
over models of second-order arithmetic and also give an example of a forcing notion which
implies the Π11-perfect set property to fail in the generic extension.
Zusammenfassung
Wir fu¨hren Klassenforcing im axiomatischen Rahmen einer Verallgemeinerung von Go¨del-
Bernays-Mengenlehre ein. Das Forcing-Theorem besagt, dass die Forcingrelation eine
(definierbare) Klasse im Grundmodell ist (Definierbarkeitslemma), und dass jede Aus-
sage in einer generischen Erweiterung von einer Bedingung im generischen Filter erzwun-
gen wird (Wahrheitslemma). Wir beweisen sowohl positive als auch negative Resultate
u¨ber das Forcing-Theorem. Einerseits zeigen wir, dass das Definierbarkeitslemma fu¨r
eine einzige atomare Formel reicht, um das Forcing-Theorem fu¨r alle Formeln in der
Sprache der Mengenlehre zeigen. Außerdem stellen wir mehrere kombinatorische Eigen-
schaften von Klassenforcings vor, welche das Forcing-Theorem implizieren. Andrerseits
pra¨sentieren wir Gegenbeispiele fu¨r das Definierbarkeitslemma sowie fu¨r das Wahrheit-
slemma im Kontext von Klassenforcing. Im Mengenforcing ist das Forcing-Theorem eine
Konsequenz der Existenz einer eindeutigen Booleschen Vervollsta¨ndigung. Wir zeigen,
dass im Klassenforcing die Existenz einer Booleschen Vervollsta¨ndigung im Wesentlichen
a¨quivalent zum Forcing-Theorem ist, und dass Boolesche Vervollsta¨ndiungen im Allge-
meinen nicht eindeutig sind.
Pretameness ist eine Eigenschaft von Klassenforcings, welche definiert wurde um die
Erhaltung des Ersetzungsaxioms zu charakterisieren. Wir beweisen mehrere neue Charak-
terisierungen von Pretameness anhand des Forcing-Theorems, der Erhaltung des Ausson-
derungsaxioms, der Existenz von Nice Names fu¨r Mengen von Ordinalzahlen sowie weit-
eren Eigenschaften von Klassenforcings. Des Weiteren verwenden wir alle diese Eigen-
schaften um die Ord-Kettenbedingung zu charakterisieren.
Zu guter Letzt geben wir zwei A¨quikonsistenzresultate an, welche Modelle von ZFC
(mit grossen Kardinalzahlen) und Modelle der zweistufigen Arithmetik mit topologis-
cher Regularita¨t (und Determiniertheit) vergleichen. Wir wenden unsere Resultate u¨ber
Klassenforcing an um nachzuweisen, dass zahlreiche wichtige Beispiele von Baumforcings
die Π11-perfekte-Teilmengeneigenschaft u¨ber Modelle der zweistufigen Arithmetik erhal-
ten. Andrerseits erla¨utern wir ein Beispiel eines Klassenforcings, welches die Π11-perfekte-
Teilmengeneigenschaft in generischen Erweiterungen zersto¨rt.
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Chapter 0
Introduction
This thesis is mainly concerned with class forcing and its applications to second order
arithmetic. The starting point of this research project was the unpublished paper [KM07]
in which it is shown that within a model of second-order arithmetic (SOA) with sufficient
topological regularity, Go¨del’s constructible universe L is in fact a model of ZFC. Con-
versely, given a countable transitive model M of ZFC, using class forcing to collapse all
cardinals to ω, one obtains a model of SOA in which full projective topological regularity
holds; i.e. every projective set of reals satisfies the perfect set property (PSP), the Baire
property and is Lebesgue measurable. This is essentially an adaptation of Solovay’s proof
[Sol70] that by collapsing an inaccessible cardinal, the inner model L(R) has the topolog-
ical regularity properties mentioned above. This works, since OrdM is very similar to an
inaccessible cardinal. A very natural question was thus to ask whether the methods used
can be generalized to compare models of SOA with additional determinacy hypotheses
and models of ZFC with large cardinals. The first step here is to consider Π11-determinacy
on the one hand, and inner models with sharps for sets of ordinals on the other hand. We
have solved this problem by proving that ZFC+“every set of ordinals has a sharp” has
the same consistency strength as SOA + Π11-determinacy+Π
1
2-PSP.
Since the theory SOA + Π11-PSP is equiconsistent with ZFC, it can be considered
a candidate for an alternative axiomatization of mathematics. Second-order arithmetic
provides a very natural theory which – in many ways – can be conceived as closer to
“real” mathematics than ZFC which breaks down everything to one predicate, namely
the ∈-relation. This lies in the fact that the focus is laid on the natural numbers and
reals, and arithmetic functions such as addition and multiplication are included in the
language. However, the method of forcing which has been used to solve many important
problems such as Hilbert’s first problem1 (the Continuum Hypothesis), has proven to be
a very powerful tool in set theory. Namely, if M is a countable transitive model of ZFC
and M [G] is a (set) forcing extension of M , then it is again a model of ZFC. This has
motivated me to investigate whether this can be extended to SOA+ Π11- PSP . However,
in second- order arithmetic it can easily be checked that the only set-sized forcing notion
is given by Cohen forcing, and therefore one should consider class forcing instead. This
has lead to many foundational questions about class forcing.
We now take one step back and recall the development of the method of forcing. It was
1see [Hil00]
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first used by Paul Cohen in [Coh63] to construct a model of ZFC where the Continuum
Hypothesis fails. The general idea is that one defines some set-sized partial order P in a
model M of set theory and adds a generic filter G, i.e. a filter whose intersection with
every dense subset of P that is an element of M is non-empty. The new model M [G] then
satisfies again the axioms of ZFC and has additional properties which are “forced” by the
elements of G. However, there are many important statements which cannot be decided
using set-sized partial orders. One example is the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis
(GCH) which states that for every ordinal α, 2ℵα = ℵα+1. Easton has shown in [Eas70]
that using class-sized partial orders instead of set-sized ones, one can force not only the
GCH but also its failure by forcing arbitrary values of the continuum function. However,
one can easily see that the axioms of ZFC are – in general – not preserved under class
forcing. In particular, the axiom schemes of separation and replacement, as well as the
power set axiom may fail in class-generic extensions. This easy observation has lead to the
question whether and under what conditions other fundamental properties of set forcing
carry over to class forcing. This meant opening Pandora’s box, since there was hardly
any previous research about these foundational topics.
As a first step, in a joint project with Peter Holy, Philipp Lu¨cke, Ana Njegomir
and Philipp Schlicht, we have gathered many counterexamples to classical results in set
forcing. One such result is the so-called forcing theorem, which states both that the
forcing relation is definable in the ground model (the definability lemma) and that every
statement which holds in a generic extension is forced by a condition in the generic filter
(the truth lemma). We have presented counterexamples to both the definability and the
truth lemma. Other examples of properties that may fail for class forcing include the
existence of a (unique) Boolean completion, the property of producing the same generic
extensions as dense suborders and the existence of nice names for sets of ordinals. Most
of these results are given in the joint paper [HKL+16]. However, a failure of any of the
aforementioned properties is problematic, since the resulting models will fail to satisfy
many desirable statements and many classical proofs in set forcing cannot be transferred to
class forcing. Therefore, as a second step we have investigated which forcing notions fulfill
all of those properties. Sy Friedman has introduced in [Fri00] the notion of pretameness
which essentially characterizes the preservation of replacement. It has turned out that
pretameness can, in fact, be characterized by all fundamental properties of class-sized
forcing notions that we have considered so far. The results of this project are presented in
the paper [HKS16a] which is joint with Peter Holy and Philipp Schlicht. Further research
has focused on the preservation of separation in class forcing extensions and can be found
in [HKS16b]. Finally, we use our general results on class forcing to prove that for a large
class of forcing notions the Π11-PSP is preserved. However, this fails to hold in general.
The outline given above shows how the various topics considered in this thesis are
interrelated and which motivation lead us to investigate them. However, this chronological
introduction does not correspond to the structure of the thesis. In the following, we briefly
summarize the results presented in each chapter. Most results of Chapters 1-4 form part
of the joint papers [HKL+16],[HKS16b] and [HKS16a].
The first chapter outlines a general setting for class forcing. Notably, we work in
a second-order context which allows for more classes than just the definable ones. We
consider countable transitive models of the form M = 〈M, C〉 of GB− which essentially
2
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consists of the axioms of ZF− for sets, the scheme of collection which allows class parame-
ters, as well as foundation, extensionality and first-order class comprehension for classes.
This generalizes the classical setting of models M of (a subtheory of) ZFC equipped with
the classes which are definable over M , models of Go¨del-Bernays set theory GB (resp
GBC, if one assumes the existence of a global well-order) and Kelley-Morse class theory
KM. We introduce several strengthenings of our general setting which are required for
many proofs in the later chapters, among them the existence of a set-like well-order2 and
a class version of dependent choice. We provide a detailed account on class forcing and
present some examples of class-sized forcing notions such as the partial order for forcing
a global well-order, the forcing notion Col(ω,Ord) which collapses the ordinals to ω and
Easton forcing.
In Chapter 2 we are concerned with the forcing theorem. In a slightly informal way,
we define the forcing theorem as follows.
Definition. Let M = 〈M, C〉 be a model of GB− and let ϕ(v0, . . . , vm−1) denote a formula
in the language L∈ of set theory with class name parameters.
(1) We say that a partial order P ∈ C satisfies the definability lemma for ϕ over M if
{〈p, σ0, . . . , σm−1〉 ∈M | p  ϕ(σ0, . . . , σm−1)} ∈ C.
(2) We say that P satisfies the truth lemma for ϕ over M if for all P-names σ0, . . . , σm−1
and every filter G which is P-generic over M with M [G] |= ϕ(σG0 , . . . , σGm−1), there is
p ∈ G with p  ϕ(σ0, . . . , σm−1).
(3) We say that P satisfies the forcing theorem for ϕ over M if P satisfies both the
definability lemma and the truth lemma for ϕ over M.
In Theorem 2.1.5 we show that every notion of class forcing which satisfies the defin-
ability lemma for one of the atomic formulae “v0 = v1” and “v0 ∈ v1” already satisfies
the forcing theorem for all L∈-formulae with class parameters. In Sections 2.2, 2.3 and
2.4 we present three properties which imply the forcing theorem to hold. The first one is
given by pretameness as defined below.
Definition. A partial order P is said to be pretame for M = 〈M, C〉 |= GB−, if for every
p ∈ P and for every sequence of dense classes 〈Di | i ∈ I〉 ∈ C with I ∈M , there is q ≤P p
and 〈di | i ∈ I〉 ∈M such that for every i ∈ I, di ⊆ Di and di is predense in P below q.
Pretameness was introduced by Sy Friedman in [Fri00] in order to characterize those
partial orders which preserve the axiom scheme of replacement. The second property is the
so-called set decision property which characterizes those forcing notions which do not add
any new sets. Thirdly, approachability by projections is a combinatorial property which
generalizes the property of being the union of set-sized complete subforcings. Finally, in
Section 2.5 we present both failures of the definability lemma (see Corollary 2.5.4) and the
truth lemma (see Theorem 2.5.11). The idea is that we add a set-sized binary relation E
on ω by forcing such that 〈ω,E〉 is isomorphic to the ground model 〈M,∈〉. The forcing
theorem would then imply the existence of a first-order truth predicate which, however,
is impossible in the case that the classes are just the definable ones.
2i.e. a global well-order whose initial segments are set-sized
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An alternative approach to forcing is given by considering Boolean-valued models.
This relies on the fact that in set forcing, ever partial order can be embedded into a
complete Boolean algebra, its so-called Boolean completion, which has the same generic
extensions as the original partial order. Moreover, the Boolean completion of a set-sized
partial order is unique up to isomorphisms. Chapter 3 investigates to what extent these
results carry over to the context of class forcing. In Section 3.2 we show that in class
forcing, the existence of a Boolean completion is essentially equivalent to the forcing
theorem. In Section 3.3 we prove that in Kelley-Morse class theory KM every class-sized
partial order has a Boolean completion. This provides an alternative proof of a result
in [Ant15] which states that in KM every class-sized partial order satisfies the forcing
theorem. Our proof makes use of the fact that in KM one can perform recursion for
proper classes. In Section 3.4 we show that unions of set-sized complete subforcings
always have a Boolean completion. Finally, in Section 3.5 we prove that unlike in set
forcing, Boolean completions of class-sized partial orders need not be unique.
Chapter 4 contains the main results of this thesis. It shows how one can characterize
pretameness in terms of many properties which are always satisfied in the context of set
forcing but may fail for class forcing, such as the preservation of the axiom scheme of
separation, the forcing theorem, the existence of a Boolean completion and the existence
of nice names for sets of ordinals. Moreover, many of the above mentioned properties have
a stronger counterpart which is equivalent to the Ord-chain condition, i.e. the statement
that all antichains are set-sized.
Notation. Let M |= GB− and let Ψ be some property of a partial order P ∈ C for M =
〈M, C〉. We say that P densely satisfies Ψ if every notion of class forcing Q for M, for
which there is a dense embedding in C from P into Q, satisfies the property Ψ.
The following two theorems summarize the results of Chapter 4. Regarding the results
of Theorem 1 below, (1) is (in a slightly less general context) due to Sy Friedman (see
[Fri00]).
Theorem 1. Let M = 〈M, C〉 be a countable transitive model of GB− such that C contains
a set-like well-order of M , and let P be a class-sized partial order in C. The following
properties (over M) are equivalent to the pretameness of P over M, where we additionally
require the non-existence of a first-order truth predicate for (4) and (5), and for (7) we
assume that M |= KM, which is notably incompatible to the assumptions used for (4) and
(5).
(1) P preserves GB−/collection/replacement.
(2) P satisfies the forcing theorem and preserves separation.
(3) P satisfies the forcing theorem and does not add a cofinal/surjective/bijective function
from some γ ∈ OrdM to OrdM .
(4) P densely satisfies the forcing theorem.
(5) P densely has a Boolean completion.
(6) P satisfies the forcing theorem and produces the same generic extensions as Q for
every forcing notion Q such that C contains a dense embedding from P into Q.3
3More precisely, if pi : P→ Q is a dense embedding in C andG isQ-generic, thenM [G] = M [pi−1[G]∩P].
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(7) P densely has the property that every set of ordinals in any of its generic extensions
has a nice name.
Theorem 2. Let M = 〈M, C〉 be a countable transitive model of GBC and let P be a
class-sized partial order in C that satisfies the forcing theorem. The following properties
(over M) are equivalent:
(1) P satisfies the Ord-cc.
(2) P satisfies the maximality principle.4
(3) P densely has a unique Boolean completion.
(4) P has a Boolean completion B such that every subclass of B in C has a supremum in
B.
(5) If there are Q, pi ∈ C such that pi is a dense embedding from P to Q and σ ∈ MQ,
then there is τ ∈MP with 1Q MQ σ = pi(τ).
(6) P densely has the property that whenever 1P MP σ ⊆ αˇ for some σ ∈ MP and
α ∈ OrdM then there is a nice P-name τ such that 1P MP σ = τ .
Chapter 5 is dedicated to comparing second order arithmetic with additional topolog-
ical regularity and determinacy hypotheses with models of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory.
In Section 5.1 we recall the proof that second order arithmetic is equiconsistent with
ZFC−. In the next section, we show – following [KM07] – that models of SOA + Π11-PSP
have inner models of ZFC, where for a collection Γ of definable classes of reals Γ-PSP is
the statement that every uncountable class of reals in Γ has a perfect subclass. Building
on this, we prove that models of SOA + Π11-Det + Π
1
2-PSP have inner models of ZFC
#,
the theory ZFC enhanced with the statement that every set of ordinals has a sharp. In
Section 5.3 we use a class version of the Le´vy collapse to prove the converse to the pre-
viously mentioned results, showing the equiconsistency of SOA + Π11-PSP with ZFC and
SOA + Π11-Det + Π
1
2-PSP with ZFC
#. Last but not least, in Section 5.4 we investigate
class forcing over models of SOA with dependent choice.5 In particular, we conclude from
results of Castiblanco and Schlicht [CS16] that for a large class of pretame forcing notions,
the Π11-perfect set property is preserved, but there is also a pretame forcing notion P such
that in every P-generic extension the Π11-PSP fails. This essentially uses reshaping and
almost disjoint coding.
Finally, in Chapter 6 we present a selection of open questions that we find particularly
interesting for further research.
Our set-theoretical notation is standard and follows standard textbooks on set theory
such as [Jec03] and [Kan09].
4See Definition 4.2.6.
5All models obtained by collapsing the ordinals of a model of ZFC using the class version of the Le´vy
collapse satisfy dependent choice.
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Chapter 1
A general setting for class forcing
In this chapter, we outline the axiomatic frameworks that are adequate for class forcing
and introduce the basic concepts of class forcing. In the end, we present several examples
of forcing notions which will accompany us throughout this thesis.
1.1 Axiomatic frameworks for class forcing
In the following, we will present several foundational (second-order) frameworks of set
theory.
1.1.1 Subsystems of ZFC
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZFC) is the most commonly used axiomatization of set the-
ory. We will, however, often work with subsystems of ZFC. In particular, we are interested
in ZF−, the theory obtained from ZFC by deleting both the power set axiom and the axiom
of choice. In this context, one has to be careful, since without the power set axiom, the
different formulations of the axioms of replacement and choice are no longer equivalent.
For more details on this topic, consult [GHJ11].
By ZF− we mean the axioms of extensionality, foundation, pairing, union, infinity and
the axiom schema of collection which we will specify below. By L∈ we denote the language
of set theory, i.e. the first-order language with equality and the binary predicate symbol
∈.
Definition 1.1.1. Let ϕ(x, x0, . . . , xn−1), ψ(x, y, x0, . . . , xn−1) be L∈-formulae. We define
the following axiom schemata:
(1) ∀x0 . . . ∀xn∀a∃y∀x [x ∈ y ↔ x ∈ a ∧ ϕ(x, x0, . . . , xn−1)] (Separation).
(2) ∀x0 . . . ∀xn∀a [∀x ∈ a∃!y ψ(x, y, x0, . . . , xn−1)→
∃b∀x ∈ a∃!y ∈ b ψ(x, y, x0, . . . , xn−1)] (Replacement).
(3) ∀x0 . . . ∀xn∀a [∀x ∈ a∃y ψ(x, y, x0, . . . , xn−1)→
∃b∀x ∈ a∃y ∈ b ψ(x, y, x0, . . . , xn−1)] (Collection).
It follows from an easy argument that collection implies replacement and replacement
implies separation. Moreover, if the power set axiom holds, then replacement implies
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collection. This implication may, however, fail in the absence of the power set axiom.
For examples of models where replacement holds but collection fails, consult [GHJ11]. In
order to avoid such pathological models, in ZF− we therefore include the strongest axiom,
namely collection.
We will also be interested in the theory ZFC−, the theory ZF− enhanced by adding a
choice principle. Here again, we have to be careful which principle we would like to add,
since in ZF− not all commonly used choice principles are equivalent. This is discussed in
detail in [Zar82]. For the sake of completeness, we state two of the main choice principles.
Definition 1.1.2. We define the following axioms.
(1) ∀x [∅ /∈ x→ ∃f : x→ ⋃x(∀y ∈ x f(y) ∈ y)] (axiom of choice),
(2) Every set can be well-ordered (well-ordering principle).
Since the well-ordering principle is the strongest form of choice – in particular, it
implies the axiom of choice as well as Zorn’s lemma – in ZF−, we denote by ZFC− the
theory obtained from ZF− by adding the well-ordering principle. Moreover, ZF is the
theory ZF− enhanced by the power set axiom and, correspondingly, ZFC is the theory
ZFC− enhanced by the power set axiom.
When we perform class forcing over a model of ZF−, we will always restrict ourselves
to those classes which are definable over the given model. It will become clear that this
is just a special case of the setting presented in 1.1.3.
1.1.2 Second-order arithmetic
Second-order arithmetic (SOA) axiomatizes the natural numbers (first-order part) as well
as sets of natural numbers (second-order part) which are considered as reals. The lan-
guage of SOA (denoted L2) is a two-sorted language which uses lowercase letters n,m, . . .
for variables denoting natural numbers and capital letters X, Y, . . . for sets of natural
numbers, i.e. reals. Furthermore, there are first-order constants 0, 1, first-order binary
function symbols +, ∗, first-order binary relation symbols <,= and a binary relation sym-
bol ∈ between first- and second-order variables to denote elementhood.
The axioms of SOA also have a first-order part which consists of the axioms of Robinson
arithmetic (see [Rob50]) and the following second-order axioms resp. schemes:
(1) ∀X [0 ∈ X ∧ ∀n (n ∈ X → n+ 1 ∈ X)→ ∀n (n ∈ X)] (induction axiom).
(2) For any L2-formula ϕ(n) such that X is not free in ϕ:
∃X∀n [n ∈ X ↔ ϕ(n)] (axiom of comprehension)
(3) For any L2-formula ϕ(n,X):
∀n∃X ϕ(n,X)→ ∃X∀nϕ(n, (X)n) (axiom of choice)
where (X)n = {m|(n,m) ∈ X} and ( , ) denotes Go¨del pairing which is definable in
SOA. Clearly, (X)n exists by comprehension.
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Remark 1.1.3. In the scheme of comprehension, the assumption that X does not appear
as a free variable of ϕ is significant because otherwise one could define the set
∃X∀n(n ∈ X ↔ n /∈ X)
which leads to Russell’s paradox.
1.1.3 Go¨del-Bernays set theory
The simplest setting to perform class forcing is to work in (a subsystem) of ZFC and
consider just the definable classes. However, it is more natural to work in a setting which
allows for more second-order objects. This leads us to Go¨del-Bernays set theory GB and
its weakenings and strengthenings. As in the context of ZFC, we are interested in a theory
which does not include the power set axiom.
Following [HKL+16] we denote by GB− the theory in the two-sorted language L2∈ with
(lowercase) variables for sets and (uppercase) variables for classes, with the set axioms
given by ZF− with class parameters allowed in the axiom schemata of separation and
collection, and the class axioms given by extensionality and foundation for classes as well
as first-order class comprehension as defined below.
Definition 1.1.4. By first-order class comprehension we denote the following axiom
schema. For every L∈-formula ϕ(x,X0, . . . , Xn−1) with class parameters X0, . . . , Xn−1
but without class quantifiers,
∀X0 . . . ∀Xn−1∃Y ∀x [x ∈ Y ↔ ϕ(x,X0, . . . , Xn−1)].
By GB we denote the theory GB− enhanced with the power set axiom. Frequently,
we need to add choice either for sets of for classes. The weakest form is to just add the
set version of choice; the theory obtained from GB− (resp. GB) by adding the axiom of
choice shall simply be denoted GBc− (resp. GBc). Furthermore, we denote by GBC the
theory GB enhanced by the axiom of global choice. Here again, there are many different
versions which are not all equivalent in GB−.
Definition 1.1.5. By the principle of global choice we mean the statement.
∃F : M \ {∅} →M ∀x(x 6= ∅ → F (x) ∈ x),
where M is the class of all sets.
A variant of the axiom of global choice is the existence of certain global well-orders.
Definition 1.1.6. Let M = 〈M, C〉 be a model of GB−.
(1) By a global well-order for M we mean a well-order ≺∈ C of M .
(2) We say that a global well-order ≺ for M is set-like, if for every set x ∈ M , we have
{y ∈M | y ≺ x} ∈M .
Note that if ≺ is a set-like well-order then its ordertype is OrdM . Conversely, it is easy
to check that every well-order of ordertype OrdM is set-like.
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The following observation is folklore and is also noted in [Ham14b].
Fact 1.1.7. Let M = 〈M, C〉 be a model of GB. Then the following statements are
equivalent:
(1) M satisfies global choice.
(2) There is a bijection M → OrdM in C.
(3) C contains a global well-order.
(4) C contains a set-like well-order of M .
(5) C contains a global well-order of ordertype OrdM .
Proof. We start by proving that (1) implies (2). Assume that F : M \ {∅} → M is a
global choice function. We recursively define a bijective map G : OrdM → M as follows.
Suppose that G(β) is given for all β < α. Now let γ ∈ OrdM be the minimal ordinal such
that Vγ * {G(β) | β < α}. Then put G(α) = F (Vγ \ {G(β) | β < α}). By construction,
G is injective. To see that G is also surjective, suppose that x ∈M . But then x ∈ Vα for
some ordinal α. Now if x /∈ ran(G) then ran(G) ⊆ Vα, a contradiction. Next we prove
that (2) implies (4). Suppose that F : M → OrdM is a bijection. Then we can well-order
M by
x ≺ y ⇐⇒ F (x) < F (y).
By construction, ≺ is set-like. Notice that as remarked above, (4) and (5) are equivalent.
Furthermore, (4) implies (3), so it remains to check that (1) follows from (3). Let ≺ be a
global well-order in C. Then we can define a global choice function F by taking F (x) to
be the ≺-least element of x for every nonempty set x ∈M .
The following folklore result states that the consistency strength of GBC is that of
ZFC.
Remark 1.1.8. If M is a transitive model of ZFC and Def(M) denotes the collection of
classes which are definable over M , then 〈M,Def(M)〉 is a model of GB. This shows
that GBC is conservative over ZFC, i.e. every statement that GBC proves about sets can
already be proven in ZFC. To see that adding the axiom of global choice to GB does not
enhance the consistency strength, note that a global well-order can be added using class
forcing. This shall be discussed in Section 1.3.2.
Furthermore, when performing class forcing over models of GB− we sometimes need
additional assumptions on our models. The next definition was introduced in [HKL+16].
Definition 1.1.9. We say that a model 〈M, C〉 of GB− satisfies representatives choice, if
for every equivalence relation E ∈ C there is A ∈ C and a surjective map pi : dom(E)→ A
in C such that 〈x, y〉 ∈ E if and only if pi(x) = pi(y).
Representatives choice is useful to obtain partial orders from preorders. More precisely,
suppose that representatives choice holds in M = 〈M, C〉 |= GB− and let P = 〈P,≤P〉 ∈ C
be a preorder. By considering the equivalence relation
p ≈ q iff p ≤P q ∧ q ≤P p,
we obtain a partial order Q ∈ C and a surjective map pi : P → Q in C such that for all
p, q ∈ P, p ≈ q if and only if pi(p) = pi(q).
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Clearly, representatives choice follows from the existence of a global well-order. Fur-
thermore, if M satisfies the power set axiom, then we also obtain representatives choice,
since by Scott’s trick we have sets
[p] = {q ∈ P | q ≈ p ∧ ∀r [q ≈ r → rnk(q) ≤ rnk(r)]} ∈M
for p ∈ P, where for x ∈M , rnk(x) denotes the von Neumann rank of x.
A stronger assumption that we will frequently make generalizes both the existence of
a set-like well-order and the power set axiom.
Definition 1.1.10. A model M = 〈M, C〉 of GB− has a hierarchy if there is C ∈ C such
that
(1) C ⊆ OrdM ×M ;
(2) For each α ∈ OrdM , Cα = {x ∈M | ∃β < α(〈β, x〉 ∈ C)} ∈M ;
(3) If α < β in OrdM then Cα ⊆ Cβ;
(4) M =
⋃
α∈OrdM Cα.
If C defines a hierarchy on M , then the C-rank of x ∈ M , denoted rnkC(x), is the least
α ∈ OrdM such that x ∈ Cα+1.
The simplest examples of GB−-models which have a hierarchy are models of GB, i.e.
models of GB− which satisfy the power set axiom. Their hierarchy is provided by the
von Neumann hierarchy C. In that case, we simply write rnk(x) for rnkC(x). A second
example is given by models M = 〈M, C〉 |= GB− such that C contains a set-like well-order
≺. Then
C = {〈α, x〉 | α ∈ OrdM ∧ x ≺ α}
witnesses that M has a hierarchy.
Remark 1.1.11. If M |= GB− has a hierarchy and C contains a well-order of M then C
contains a set-like well-order of M . To see this, let C ∈ C be a hierarchy on M and let
≺∈ C be a well-order of M . Then we obtain a set-like well-order C of M by stipulating
x C y if and only if rnkC(x) < rnkC(y) or rnkC(x) = rnkC(y) = α for some α ∈ OrdM and
x ≺ y.
Remark 1.1.12. Observe that if M does not have a hierarchy, then the existence of global
well-order of M in C does not imply that C contains a global well-order of ordertype OrdM .
To see this, consider a countable transitive model N of ZFC+¬CH such that H(ω1)N has a
definable well-order. Note that assuming the existence of a countable transitive model of
ZFC, the existence of such a model N is guaranteed by [Har77]. Now let M = H(ω1)
N and
let C denote Def(M). Then 〈M, C〉 |= GB− and C contains a well-order of M . However,
since CH fails in N , C cannot contain a well-order of M of ordertype OrdM .
Another choice scheme that we will sometimes require is the following.
Definition 1.1.13. (1) Let κ be a cardinal in M and ϕ(x, y,X0, . . . , Xn−1) an L∈-
formula with class parameters X0, . . . , Xn−1. Then DCκ(ϕ) states that
∀~x∃y ϕ(~x, y,X0, . . . , Xn−1)→ ∀z∃~x [x0 = z ∧ ∀i < κϕ(~x  i, xi, X0, . . . , Xn−1)],
where ~x denotes a sequence 〈xi | i < j〉 for some j ≤ κ.
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(2) By DCκ we denote the scheme that for every L∈-formula ϕ with class parameters,
DCκ(ϕ) holds.
(3) The dependent choice scheme DC states that for every M -cardinal κ, DCκ holds.
Note that in [GHJ11] it is shown that in ZFC−, DCω is equivalent to the reflection
principle which states that for any formula ϕ and any set x there is a transitive set y such
that x ⊆ y and ϕ is absolute between M and y. In ZFC, the reflection principle clearly
holds witnessed by the von Neumann hierarchy. However, it is an open question whether
it holds in ZFC−, posed by Zarach in [Zar96].
We will denote by GBdc− the theory GB− enhanced with the axiom of choice (for sets)
and DC.
1.1.4 Kelley-Morse class theory
Go¨del-Bernays class theory allows only first-order class comprehension, i.e. the quantifi-
cation in the comprehension axiom is restricted to sets. If we omit this constraint, we
obtain Kelley-Morse class theory (KM). The resulting theory is no longer conservative
over ZFC and its consistency strength exceeds that of ZFC.
More precisely, the set axioms of KM are given by extensionality, foundation, pairing,
union, infinity and power set. Furthermore, KM includes the class axioms of foundation
and extensionality for classes, global choice as well as replacement and class comprehension
as defined below.
Definition 1.1.14.
(1) If F is a class function and x is a set then, {F (y) | y ∈ x} is a set (Replacement).
(2) If ϕ(x,X0, . . . , Xn−1) is a second-order formula with class parameters in which quan-
tification is allowed both over sets and classes, then
∀X0 . . . ∀Xn−1∃Y ∀x [x ∈ Y ↔ ϕ(x,X0, . . . , Xn−1)] (class comprehension).
In the literature there can be found alternative axiomatizations of KM, the most
common amongst which replaces the axioms of replacement and global choice by an axiom
called limitation of size which postulates that a class C is a proper class if and only if
it can be mapped injectively into the universe of all sets. However, both axiomatizations
can be shown to be equivalent (see [Git14]). The advantage of Kelley-Morse class theory
is that it allows full induction and recursion, even for formulae with class quantifiers.
Concerning the consistency strength of KM, it is well known that KM proves Con(ZFC).
The idea of the proof is that in KM one always has a first-order truth predicate.1 On
the other hand, if κ is an inaccessible cardinal then it is straightforward to check that
〈Vκ,Vκ+1〉 is a model of KM.
1.2 Class forcing
We now outline a general setting for class forcing in a second-order context. We will,
in general, force over models of GB−. This approach is convenient, since it generalizes
1see [Ham14a]; an alternative proof of the existence of a truth predicate is also given by corollary
3.3.3).
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forcing over models of ZFC (with the classes given by the definable ones) as well as models
of KM.
From now on, we fix a model V of ZFC. By a countable transitive model of GB− (or
some other second-order theory extending GB−) we mean a model M = 〈M, C〉 of GB−
such that M is transitive and both M and C are countable in V. For any recursively
enumerable theory T extending GB−, we say that “M is a model of T” to abbreviate
the statement that M satisfies every axiom of T in V with respect to some formalized
satisfaction relation (as in [Dra74, Chapter 3.5]). Note that, in general, the assumption
that such a model V of ZFC containing a transitive countable model M of T exists is
stronger than the consistency of T. However, if T ⊇ ZF−, then the results of this thesis
can also be proven in the setting of [Kun80, Ch. VII, §9, Approach (1b)], where one
works with a language extending L∈ by a constant symbol M˙ and a model of a theory
that extends T by the axiom scheme stating that every axiom of T holds relativized to
M˙. The consistency of this theory is equivalent to the consistency of T. Nevertheless,
we have chosen our approach because it provides more intuitive arguments and easier
formulations.
The following account on class forcing is the one presented in [HKL+16].
We fix a countable transitive model M = 〈M, C〉 of GB−. By a notion of class forcing
(for M) we mean a preorder P = 〈P,≤P〉 such that P,≤P ∈ C, i.e. P is reflexive and
transitive. If not mentioned otherwise, we will further assume that P has a ≤P-maximal
element denoted by 1P.
2 If P is additionally antisymmetric, we shall call P a partial order.
We will frequently identify P with its domain P and may thus write p ∈ P instead of
p ∈ P . We call elements of P conditions of P.
Definition 1.2.1. Let P = 〈P,≤P〉 be a notion of class forcing for M and p, q ∈ P.
(1) We say that p is stronger than q or that p extends q, if p ≤P q.
(2) We say that p and q are compatible, denoted p ‖P q, if there is r ∈ P with r ≤P p, q.
(3) We say that p and q are incompatible, denoted p⊥Pq, if p and q are not compatible.
Definition 1.2.2. Let P = 〈P,≤P〉 be a notion of class forcing for M and let D ⊆ P.
Then we say that D is
(1) dense in P, if for every p ∈ P there is q ≤P p with q ∈ D.
(2) predense in P, if for every p ∈ P there is q ∈ D which is compatible with p.
(3) open in P, if whenever p ∈ D and q ≤P p then q ∈ D.
(4) dense below p ∈ P (resp. predense below p), if for every q ≤P p there is r ∈ D with
r ≤P q (resp. r ‖P q).
Definition 1.2.3. Let P = 〈P,≤P〉 be a notion of class forcing.
(1) We say that a class A ⊆ P is an antichain, if all elements of A are incompatible.
(2) An antichain A of P is said to be maximal , if there is no antichain B ⊆ P in C with
B ⊇ A.
Definition 1.2.4. Let P = 〈P,≤P〉 be a notion of class forcing.
2Given a preorder P without a maximal element, we can define another one by placing a new element
1P on top. Forcing with this new preorder coincides with forcing with the original one.
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(1) A class G ⊆ P is said to be a filter , if it satisfies the following two properties:
(a) If p ∈ G and q ≥P p then q ∈ G (upwards closed).
(b) If p, q ∈ G then there is r ∈ G with r ≤P p, q (directed).
(2) A filter G ⊆ P is said to be P-generic over M, if it meets every dense subclass of P
which is in C.
In the case that M is of the form 〈M,Def(M)〉 for some ZF−-model M , we will simply
say that G is P-generic over M .
There are many equivalent ways to define genericity of a filter. The following useful
fact is the analogue of a folklore result for set forcing over models of ZFC. However, in
order to transfer this to class forcing, we need global choice instead of the axiom of choice.
Fact 1.2.5. Let P be a notion of class forcing forM and G ⊆ P a filter. Then the following
statements are equivalent:
(1) G is P-generic over M.
(2) G meets every dense open subclass of P which is in C.
(3) G meets every predense subclass of P which is in C.
(4) G meets every subclass of P in C which is (pre)dense below some condition p ∈ G.
Moreover, if M satisfies global choice, then (1)-(4) are also equivalent to
(5) G meets every maximal antichain of P which is in C.
Proof. The equivalence of (1)-(4) and the implication from (1) to (5) can be shown in the
same way as for set forcing. It remains to check that (5) implies (1). Let G be a filter
which satisfies (5) and let D ⊆ P be a dense class which lies in C. Using global choice,
we can choose an antichain A ⊆ D which is maximal in D and hence in P. Since G has
nonempty intersection with A, it also meets D.
Note that as in the context of set forcing, P-generic filters never exist in the ground
model M. However, since we assume both M and C to be countable in V, the collection of
all dense subclasses of P which are in C is countable in V, and so by a standard argument
we can find a filter in V which is P-generic over M.
In the following, we fix a notion of class forcing P = 〈P,≤P〉 forM. We call σ a P-name
if all elements of σ are of the form 〈τ, p〉, where τ is a P-name and p ∈ P. Define MP to
be the class of all P-names that are elements of M and define CP to be the collection of
all P-names that are elements of C. In the following, we will usually call the elements of
MP simply P-names and we will call the elements of CP class P-names. If σ ∈ MP is a
P-name, we define
rankσ = sup{rank τ + 1 | ∃p ∈ P(〈τ, p〉 ∈ σ)}
to be its name rank.
Now we show how to obtain class-generic extensions. Given a P-filter G over M and
a P-name σ, we define the G-evaluation of σ as
σG = {τG | ∃p ∈ G(〈τ, p〉 ∈ σ)},
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and similarly we define ΓG for Γ ∈ CP. Moreover, if G is P-generic over M, then we
set M [G] = {σG | σ ∈MP} and C[G] = {ΓG | Γ ∈ CP}, and call M[G] = 〈M [G], C[G]〉 a
P-generic extension of M.
The following basic observation shows that M[G] is indeed an extension of M [G]. For
this, we need to define some canonical names. If x ∈M then we define by recursion
xˇ = {〈yˇ,1P〉 | y ∈ x}.
Similarly, we define Cˇ for C ∈ C. Furthermore, we put
G˙ = {〈pˇ, p〉 | p ∈ P}.
Fact 1.2.6. The following statements hold for every notion of class forcing P for M and
for every filter G which is P-generic over M.
(1) If x ∈M then xˇG = x. In particular, M ⊆M [G].
(2) If C ∈ C then CˇG = C and moreover, G˙G = G. Therefore, C ∪ {G} ⊆ C[G].
Proof. Both statements follow from easy inductive arguments.
Given an L2∈-formula ϕ(v0, . . . , vm−1, V0, . . . , Vn−1), set names ~σ ∈ (MP)m and class
names ~Γ ∈ (CP)n, we write
p MP ϕ(σ0, . . . , σm−1,Γ0, . . . ,Γn−1)
to denote that for every P-generic filter G over M with p ∈ G,
M[G] |= ϕ(σG0 , . . . , σGm−1,ΓG0 , . . . ,ΓGn−1).
Whenever the context is clear, we will omit the superscript. In case the model M is of
the form 〈M,Def(M)〉, we will often write p MP ϕ for p MP ϕ.
Next we present two easy observations that hold for all notions of class forcing.
Lemma 1.2.7. Let P be a notion of class forcing for M. Then the following statements
hold:
(1) If p MP ϕ and q ≤P p then q MP ϕ.
(2) If G is P-generic over M, then M [G] is transitive and OrdM [G] = OrdM .
Proof. For (1) suppose that p MP ϕ and q ≤P p. But then every P-generic filter G with
q ∈ G also contains p by upwards closure and so M[G] |= ϕ.
For the second statement, note that every element of M[G] is of the form σG for some
σ ∈ MP. Now if x ∈ σG then there is 〈τ, p〉 ∈ σ such that p ∈ G and x = τG ∈ M [G].
This shows that M [G] is transitive. For the second statement, let σ ∈ MP such that
σG ∈ OrdM [G]. Observe that rnk(σG) ≤ rnk(σ), hence we may assume that every element
of σG is in OrdM and so σG ∈ OrdM .
When forcing over models of ZFC, a fundamental result in set forcing is that the axioms
of ZFC are always preserved. It will become clear in Section 1.3 that in class forcing this
is not the case. However, some axioms are always preserved.
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Definition 1.2.8. Since we will frequently use names for ordered pairs, we introduce the
notation
op(σ, τ) = {〈{〈σ,1P〉},1P〉, 〈{〈σ,1P〉, 〈τ,1P〉},1P〉}
for σ, τ ∈ MP and α ∈ Ord. Clearly, op(σ, τ) is the canonical name for the ordered pair
〈σG, τG〉 ∈M [G].
Lemma 1.2.9. Any class-generic extension of a model of GB− satisfies all single axioms
of ZF−, that is all axioms of ZF− except for possibly instances of separation, replacement
and collection, and it satisfies extensionality and foundation for classes.
Proof. Extensionality and foundation are clear both for sets and classes, since M[G] is
an element of V |= ZFC. Infinity is also obvious and pairing is clear by Definition 1.2.8
above. Regarding unions, we consider weak union as the relevant axiom of ZF−, that is
the existence of a superset of
⋃
x for every x. The existence of
⋃
x is then an instance of
the axiom of separation3. To verify weak union, let P be a notion of class forcing and let
σ ∈MP be a P-name. Let G be P-generic over M. Consider τ = ⋃ dom(σ). Then we are
done, since σG ⊇ ⋃ τG.
In the context of set forcing, we often encounter the notion of complete and dense
embeddings of forcing notions because many properties of forcing notions are preserved
under such embeddings. We will analyze which results can be generalized to class forcing.
Definition 1.2.10. Let P and Q be notions of class forcing and let pi : P→ Q be a map
in C. We say that pi is an
(1) embedding , if for all p, q ∈ P, if p ≤P q then pi(p) ≤Q pi(q), and if p⊥Pq then
pi(p)⊥Qpi(q).
(2) complete embedding , if it is an embedding with the property that for every maximal
antichain A ∈ C of P, pi′′A is a maximal antichain of Q.
(3) dense embedding , if it is an embedding and pi′′P is dense in Q.
In particular, if pi is the identity map, we call P a subforcing of Q.
Note that every dense embedding is complete. Given an embedding pi : P → Q in C,
we can lift it to a map pi∗ : MP →MQ defined recursively by
pi∗(σ) = {〈pi∗(τ), pi(p)〉 | 〈τ, p〉 ∈ σ}.
The next result is the same as for set forcing and their proof shall therefore be omitted.
Lemma 1.2.11. Suppose that pi : P→ Q is an embedding in C of notions of class forcing
for M.
(1) If pi is a complete embedding and H is Q-generic over M, then
pi−1[H] = {p ∈ P | pi(p) ∈ H}
is P-generic over M.
3We do not know whether this instance can fail in a generic extension.
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(2) If pi is a dense embedding and G is P-generic over M, then the upwards closure
H = {q ∈ Q | ∃p ∈ G(pi(p) ≤P q)}
of pi′′G in Q is Q-generic over M.
In the context of set forcing, it holds that if pi : P→ Q is a dense embedding, then P
and Q produce the same generic extensions. In class forcing, however, this may fail (see
Section 4.5). Nevertheless, we are often interested in which properties of forcing notions
are preserved under dense embeddings.
Notation. Let M = 〈M, C〉 |= GB− and let Ψ be some property of a notion of class forcing
P for M. We say that P densely satisfies Ψ if every notion of class forcing Q for M, for
which there is a dense embedding in C from P into Q, satisfies the property Ψ.
Frequently, in particular in Chapter 4, we need the following assumption on forcing
notions.
Definition 1.2.12. We say that a notion of class forcing P for M is separative, if for all
p, q ∈ P with p P q there is r ≤P p such that r is incompatible with q.
In Section 3.1.3 we will show that, given a non-separative notion of class forcing P, we
can map P surjectively to its so-called separative quotient S(P) in such a way that P and
S(P) have the same generic extensions.
Our choice of considering preorders rather than partial orders is due to the reason that
in the case of a two-step iteration P∗Q˙ of notions of class forcing, as defined in [Fri00] (see
also Chapter Lemma 2.2.15 of this thesis), we will have conditions of the form 〈p, q˙〉 for
p ∈ P and p forcing that q˙ ∈ Q˙. In general, there will be distinct pairs 〈p, q˙0〉 and 〈p, q˙1〉
such that p MP q˙0 = q˙1, i.e. one naturally obtains a preorder that is not antisymmetric.
However, in some contexts it will become crucial for our orderings to be antisymmetric.
In that case we will usually assume that the ground model M satisfies representatives
choice, since given a preorder P = 〈P,≤P〉 ∈ C, by considering the equivalence relation
p ≈ q ⇐⇒ p ≤P q ∧ q ≤P p,
we obtain a partial order Q ∈ C and a surjective map pi : P → Q in C such that for all
p, q ∈ P, p ≈ q if and only if pi(p) = pi(q).
1.3 Examples
In this section we introduce several notions of class forcing which we will use in the
upcoming chapters. First we need the following notation.
Notation. Let P be a separative notion of class forcing, let σ be a P-name and let p be a
condition in P. Then we define the p-evaluation of σ to be
σp = {τ p | ∃q ∈ P (〈τ, q〉 ∈ σ ∧ p ≤P q)}.
Observe that we will generalize this notation in Section 2.3 to non-separative forcing
notions.
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1.3.1 Variants of collapse forcings
The following examples of notions of class forcing will frequently be used to motivate our
results, especially in Chapter 4.
Definition 1.3.1. Let M = 〈M, C〉 be a countable transitive model of GB−.
(1) Let Col(ω,Ord)M denote the partial order Col(ω,OrdM), i.e. Col(ω,Ord)M is the
partial order whose conditions are finite partial functions p : ω
par−−→ OrdM ordered by
reverse inclusion.
(2) Define Col∗(ω,Ord)M to be the (dense) suborder of Col(ω,Ord)M consisting of all
conditions p with dom(p) ∈ ω.
(3) Let Col≥(ω,Ord)M be the notion of forcing whose conditions are finite partial func-
tions p : ω
par−−→ OrdM ∪ {≥ α | α ∈ OrdM}, where ≥ α is an element of M which is
not in OrdM for every α ∈ OrdM , and whose ordering is given by p ≤ q if and only
if dom(p) ⊇ dom(q) and for every n ∈ dom(q), either
• p(n) = q(n) or
• q(n) is ≥ α for some α ∈ OrdM and there is an ordinal β ≥ α such that
p(n) ∈ {β,≥ β}.
In the case that the context is clear, we will omit the superscripts.
Note that all of these partial orders are definable over the corresponding model M .
The next lemma gives some basic properties of the different collapse forcings defined
above.
Lemma 1.3.2. Let M = 〈M, C〉 be a countable transitive model of GB−.
(1) If G is a Col(ω,Ord)M -generic filter over M , then for every ordinal in M there is a
surjection from a subset of ω onto that ordinal in M [G].
(2) If G is a Col∗(ω,Ord)M -generic filter over M , then M = M [G].
(3) No non-trivial maximal antichain of Col(ω,Ord)M or Col∗(ω,Ord)M is an element
of M .
(4) If M is a model of ZFC, then no non-trivial complete suborder of Col(ω,Ord)M or of
Col∗(ω,Ord)M is an element of M .
(5) Col≥(ω,Ord)M is the union of Ord
M -many set-sized complete subforcings.
Proof. To see (1), pick λ ∈ OrdM . Given α ∈ OrdM , define
Dα = {p ∈ Col(ω,Ord)M | ∃n ∈ dom(p) [p(n) = α]}.
Then each Dα is dense in Col(ω,Ord)
M and definable over M and hence Dα ∈ C. This
implies that if G is Col(ω,Ord)M -generic over M , then for every α ∈M ∩Ord there is an
n ∈ ω with {〈n, α〉} ∈ G. This shows that
σ = {〈op(nˇ, αˇ), {〈n, α〉}〉 | α < λ, n ∈ ω}
is a name for a surjection from a subset of ω onto λ.
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Next we prove (2). Let σ be a Col∗(ω,Ord)M -name in M . Then ran(p) ⊆ rank(σ)
holds for every condition p in tc(σ) ∩ Col∗(ω,Ord)M . If we define
D = {p ∈ Col∗(ω,Ord)M | rank(σ) ∈ ran(p)},
then D is dense in Col∗(ω,Ord)M and definable over M . Moreover, by the above obser-
vation, we have σG = σp ∈M , whenever G is an Col∗(ω,Ord)M -generic filter over M and
p ∈ D ∩G, because such p either extends or is incompatible to any condition in tc(σ).
For (3), let Col denote either Col(ω,Ord)M or Col∗(ω,Ord)M . Assume that A ∈ M
is an antichain of Col which is not equal to {1}. Pick a ∈ A. Now for any b ∈ A \ {a},
the domains of a and b cannot be disjoint by incompatibility. Define c ∈ Col with
dom(c) = dom(a) and for every n ∈ dom(c), let c(n) = sup{b(n) | b ∈ A}+ 1. Hence c is
incompatible with every element of A, showing that A is not maximal.
Condition (4) follows from the above results because our assumptions imply that set-
sized partial orders in M contain non-trivial maximal antichains.
Finally, we verify (5). Let for every α ∈ OrdM , Col≥(ω, α) denote the subforcing of
Col≥(ω,Ord
M) consisting of finite partial functions p : ω
par−−→ α ∪ {≥ β | β ≤ α} with the
induced ordering. Clearly,
Col≥(ω,Ord)M =
⋃
α∈OrdM
Col≥(ω, α).
It remains to check that for every α ∈ OrdM , Col≥(ω, α) is a complete subforcing of
Col≥(ω,Ord)M . Let A be a maximal antichain of Col≥(ω, α) and let p ∈ Col≥(ω,Ord)M .
Consider the condition p¯ ∈ Col≥(ω, α) which is obtained from p by replacing p(n) by ≥ α
whenever p(n) ≥ α or p(n) is of the form ≥ β for some β > α. Since A is a maximal
antichain, there is a ∈ A such that a and p¯ are compatible. Let q¯ ∈ Col≥(ω, α) be a
common strengthening of p¯ and a. But then the condition q obtained from q¯ by replacing
q¯(n) by p(n) for every n ∈ dom(p) such that q¯(n) is of the form ≥ α witnesses that p and
a are compatible.
The collapse forcings will play an important role throughout this thesis, since they
are simple counterexamples to many properties satisfied by set-sized forcing notions but
not class-sized ones. Examples include the existence of a unique Boolean completion, the
property of generating the same extensions as dense subforcings or the existence of nice
names for sets of ordinals.
1.3.2 Forcing a global well-order
Given a countable transitive model M of GB, we can extend M to a model of GBC without
adding any new sets. There are several simple ways to achieve this; we will, however,
present only one of them.
For a countable transitive model M = 〈M, C〉 of GB−, let WM denote the forcing
notion consisting of injective functions p : α→M for some ordinal α, ordered by reverse
inclusion. Note that WM is definable over M . As usual, we may omit the superscript if
it is clear from the context which model is referred to.
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Lemma 1.3.3. Let M = 〈M, C〉 be a countable transitive model of GB−.
(1) WM is < κ-closed for every M-cardinal κ4.
(2) If G is WM -generic over M then M [G] = M .
(3) If G is WM -generic over M then
⋃
G is a bijection between OrdM and M .
Proof. For (1), let κ be an M -cardinal and 〈pi | i < κ〉 a ≤W-descending sequence of
conditions. Then
⋃
i<κ pi is also in WM . The second condition follows in a similar way as
property (2) in Lemma 1.3.2 using the density of
D = {p ∈WM | rank(σ) ∈ dom(p)}
for a given WM -name because if p ∈ D ∩ G then σG = σp, since the domain of every
condition in tc(σ) ∩WM is smaller than dom(p). The last statement is a consequence of
standard density arguments.
Remark 1.3.4. The proof of property (2) in Lemma 1.3.3 shows that we can define the
forcing relation of WM over M by
p MW σ ∈ τ ⇐⇒ ∀q ≤W p (rank(σ ∪ τ) ∈ dom(q)→ σq ∈ τ q).
This idea will be generalized in Section 2.3 in order to prove that every forcing notion
which doesn’t add any new sets satisfies the forcing theorem5.
Other ways to force a set-like well-order of M include adding a Cohen subset of OrdM
or adding a set-like well-order using initial segments as conditions.
1.3.3 Friedman’s forcing F
The following notion of class forcing due to Sy Friedman is mentioned in [Sta03, Remark
1.8]. It will be crucial for the proofs for the failure of the forcing theorem in Section 2.5.
Definition 1.3.5. Let M = 〈M, C〉 be a countable transitive model of GB−. Define FM
to be the partial order whose conditions are triples p = 〈dp, ep, fp〉 satisfying
(1) dp is a finite subset of ω,
(2) ep is a binary acyclic relation on dp,
(3) fp is an injective function with dom(fp) ∈ {∅, dp} and ran(fp) ⊆M ,
(4) if dom(fp) = dp and i, j ∈ dp, then we have i ep j if and only if fp(i) ∈ fp(j),
and whose ordering is given by
p ≤FM q ⇐⇒ dq ⊆ dp ∧ ep ∩ (dq × dq) = eq ∧ fq ⊆ fp.
Note that FM is definable over M .
Lemma 1.3.6. The set of all conditions p in FM with dom(fp) = dp is dense.
4A notion of (class) forcing P is < κ-closed for some M -cardinal κ, if for every ≤P-descending sequence
〈pi | i < λ〉 with λ < κ there is q ∈ P with q ≤P pi for all i < λ.
5See Definition 2.1.1.
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Proof. Pick p ∈ FM with dom(fp) = ∅ 6= dp. We inductively define (using that ep is
acyclic) a function f as follows. For every j ∈ dp let
f(j) = {f(i) | i ep j} ∪ {{∅, j}}.
Using that ∅ 6∈ range(f), it is easy to verify inductively that p¯ = 〈dp, ep, f〉 satisfies
conditions (3) and (4) above, and hence is an extension of p in FM with dom(fp¯) = dp¯.
Remark 1.3.7. The reason why the restriction on dom(f) in property (3) of Definition
1.3.5 is necessary is because otherwise Lemma 1.3.6 fails: Consider
p = 〈{i, j, k}, {〈i, j〉, 〈j, k〉}, {〈i, 0〉, 〈k, 1〉}〉.
In order to extend p such that the third coordinate has domain {i, j, k}, one would have
to map j to some x such that 0 ∈ x and x ∈ 1 which is clearly absurd.
Lemma 1.3.8. If M = 〈M, C〉 is a countable transitive model of GB− and G is an FM -
generic filter over M, then there is a binary relation E on ω such that E ∈M [G] and the
models 〈ω,E〉 and 〈M,∈〉 are isomorphic in V.
Proof. Define an FM -name E˙ ∈M by setting
E˙ = {〈op(ˇi, jˇ), pi,j〉 | i, j ∈ ω, i 6= j},
where pi,j denotes the condition in FM with dpi,j = {i, j}, epi,j = {〈i, j〉} and fpi,j = ∅. Let
G be an FM -generic filter overM and put E = E˙G ∈M [G]. Note that E = ⋃{ep | p ∈ G}.
Define F =
⋃{fp | p ∈ G}. By Lemma 1.3.6, the sets Dn = {p ∈ FM | n ∈ dom(fp)} are
dense in FM . Since these sets are definable over M , we can conclude that F is injective
and that dom(F ) = ω. In order to see that F is surjective, we claim that for every x ∈M ,
the set {p ∈ FM | x ∈ ran(fp)} is dense. In order to show this, let p = 〈dp, ep, fp〉 ∈ FM
such that x /∈ ran(fp). Using Lemma 1.3.6, we may assume that dom(fp) = dp. Choose
j ∈ ω \ dp and define dq = dp ∪ {j}, eq = ep ∪ {〈i, j〉 | fp(i) ∈ x} ∪ {〈j, i〉 | x ∈ fp(i)} and
fq = fp ∪ {〈j, x〉}. Then q = 〈dq, eq, fq〉 is an extension of p with x ∈ ran(fq).
It remains to check that F is an isomorphism between the models 〈ω,E〉 and 〈M,∈〉.
Take i, j ∈ ω such that 〈i, j〉 ∈ E, i.e. pi,j ∈ G. By the above computations, there is a
condition p ∈ G with i, j ∈ dom(fp). We then have 〈i, j〉 ∈ ep and by (4) in Definition
1.3.5 we have F (i) = fp(i) ∈ fp(j) = F (j). For the converse, suppose that x, y ∈M such
that x ∈ y. By the above computations, there is a condition p ∈ G and i, j ∈ dp with
F (i) = fp(i) = x ∈ y = fp(j) = F (j). By (4) in Definition 1.3.5, this implies 〈i, j〉 ∈ ep
and therefore 〈i, j〉 ∈ E.
1.3.4 The class version of the Le´vy collapse
The next forcing notion that we present is a class version of the Le´vy collapse. Recall
that the Le´vy collapse as described in [Kan09, Chapter 10] is used to construct Solovay’s
model [Sol70] where every set of reals is Lebesgue measurable, has the Baire property and
the perfect set property. This is essentially achieved by collapsing an inaccessible cardinal
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to ω1. The Le´vy collapse that we introduce here is an analogue, where the inaccessible is
replaced by the height of the model OrdM .
Let M be a countable transitive model of ZFC. We will force over the GBc-model
M = 〈M,Def(M)〉.
Definition 1.3.9. For γ ∈ OrdM ∪{OrdM} we denote by Col(ω,< γ)M the partial order
whose conditions are functions p : dom(p)→ γ satisfying
• dom(p) is a finite subset of γ × ω
• for all 〈α, n〉 ∈ dom(p), p(α, n) < α,
ordered by reverse inclusion. Note that for γ = OrdM , Col(ω,< γ)M is a proper class
forcing notion, and for γ ∈ OrdM it is set-sized.
Col(ω,< Ord)M has similar properties as its set-sized analogue.
Lemma 1.3.10. Let P = Col(ω,< Ord)M . Then the following statements hold:
(1) For γ ∈ OrdM , Pγ = Col(ω,< γ) is a complete subforcing of P.
(2) If G is P-generic over M , then M [G] contains a surjection fγ : ω  γ for each
γ ∈ OrdM .
(3) If G is P-generic over M , then M [G] =
⋃
γ∈OrdM M [Gγ], where Gγ = G ∩ Pγ is the
induced Pγ-generic filter.
Proof. For (1), note that if A is a maximal antichain in Pγ and p ∈ P, then p¯ = p  γ×ω ∈
Pγ. In particular, there is a ∈ A which is compatible with p¯, witnessed by q¯ ∈ Pγ. But
then q = q¯ ∪ p  [γ,OrdM)× ω witnesses that p and a are compatible.
Let γ ∈ OrdM . We claim that
f˙γ = {〈op(nˇ, αˇ), pγn,α〉 | n ∈ ω, α < γ} ∈MP,
where pγn,α = {〈〈γ, n〉, α〉}, is a name for a surjection from ω onto γ. Let G be P-generic
over M . That f˙Gγ is functional is clear, since for α 6= β, pγn,α and pγn,β are incompatible.
Note that for each n ∈ ω, the class
Dn = {p ∈ P | 〈α, n〉 ∈ dom(p)} ∈ Def(M)
is dense in P. But then there is p ∈ G ∩ Dn, so p(γ, n) = α for some α < γ and so
p ≤P pγn,α. In particular, 〈n, α〉 ∈ f˙Gγ . A similar argument using the density of
Dα = {p ∈ P | ∃n ∈ ω [〈γ, n〉 ∈ dom(p) ∧ p(γ, n) = β]} ∈ C
for α < γ, shows that f˙Gα is surjective.
For the third statement, note that P =
⋃
γ∈OrdM Pγ. If G is P-generic over M, then
by (1) and Lemma 1.2.11, Gγ is Pγ-generic. In particular, every P-name is a Pγ-name for
some ordinal γ, and σG = σGγ .
Using Lemma 1.3.10 we may conclude that if G is P-generic over M for P = Col(ω,<
Ord)M , then in M [G] the power set axiom fails. To see this, suppose otherwise. Then
there is a P-name σ for the power set of ω. By condition (3) in Lemma 1.3.10, σ is a
Pγ-name for some M -cardinal γ. Since Pγ satisfies the γ-cc by standard arguments, it
preserves all cardinals ≥ γ. But by (2), P adds a surjection from ω onto γ and so in M [G]
there is a well-order of ω of ordertype γ which can be coded by a real x. But x cannot
be an element of σG, a contradiction.
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1.3.5 Easton forcing
Easton forcing is the forcing notion introduced by Easton in [Eas70] in order to force
almost arbitrary values of the continuum function. Let M = 〈M, C〉 be a fixed countable
transitive model of GBc with M |= GCH.
Definition 1.3.11. An Easton function for M is a class function F : dom(F )→ CardM
in C such that for all κ, λ ∈ dom(F ),
(1) κ is a regular cardinal,
(2) cf(F (κ)) > κ,
(3) if κ < λ then F (κ) ≤ F (λ).
Definition 1.3.12. Let F ∈ C be an Easton function. The associated Easton forcing PF
is the notion of class forcing whose conditions are functions p with dom(p) ⊆ dom(F )
such that for each κ ∈ dom(p), p(κ) ∈ Add(κ, F (κ)) and for all regular cardinals λ,
|dom(p)∩ λ| < λ, where Add(κ, F (κ)) is the forcing notion for adding F (κ)-many Cohen
subsets of κ.6
Definition 1.3.13. Let F be an Easton function for M, p ∈ PF and λ a regular cardinal.
Then we define
p≤λ = p  λ+ and p>λ = p  Ord \ λ+.
Furthermore, let
P≤λF = {p≤λ | p ∈ PF} and P>λF = {p>λ | p ∈ PF}.
Remark 1.3.14. If p ∈ PF then p = p≤λ ∪ p>λ. In particular, this shows that PF is
isomorphic to P≤λF × P>λF .
Lemma 1.3.15. Let F be an Easton function for M and λ a regular M-cardinal. Then
P>λF is λ+-closed.
Proof. Let 〈pi | i < λ〉 be a descending sequence in P>λF . Let p =
⋃
i<λ pi. Then dom(p) =⋃
i<λ dom(pi) ⊆ Ord \ λ+. Now if κ ∈ dom(p), then κ ≥ λ+ and so
|dom(p(κ))| = |
⋃
i<λ
dom(pi(κ))| < κ
since κ is regular.
Moreover, if κ ≥ λ+ is a regular cardinal, then
|dom(p) ∩ κ| = |
⋃
i<λ
dom(pi) ∩ κ| < κ.
This shows that p ∈ P>λF and p ≤P>λ pi for each i < λ.
6For M -cardinals κ, λ with λ ≥ 1, conditions in Add(κ, λ) are partial functions from λ × κ to 2 of
cardinality < κ, ordered by reverse inclusion.
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Lemma 1.3.16. Let F be an Easton function for M. For every regular M-cardinal λ,
P≤λF satisfies the λ+-cc7.
Proof. For p ∈ P≤λF let
d(p) =
⋃
{{κ} × dom(p(κ)) | κ ∈ dom(p) ∩ λ+}.
Then by assumption, |d(p)| < λ. Now suppose that A ⊆ P≤λF is an antichain of size λ+.
Since M |= GCH, λ<λ = λ and so we can apply the ∆-System Lemma8. There is B ⊆ A
of size λ+ such that
{d(p) | p ∈ B}
forms a ∆-system with root r, i.e. for all p, q ∈ B with p 6= q, d(p) ∩ d(q) = r. So |r| < λ
and using the GCH we have 2|r| ≤ λ. But then there is C ⊆ B of size λ+ such that for
all p, q ∈ C and for all 〈κ, x〉 ∈ r, p(κ)(x) = q(κ)(x). But then all elements of C are
compatible, a contradiction.
The idea is that PF adds F (κ)-many Cohen subsets of κ for every κ ∈ dom(F ) and
hence in the generic extension we will obtain 2κ = F (κ). Moreover, we shall see that all
axioms of ZFC are preserved. However, at this point we have not yet developed enough
tools to prove this in detail. The remaining discussion of Easton forcing is therefore
deferred to Section 2.2.
7A notion of (class) forcing has the κ-cc for some M -cardinal κ, if every antichain has cardinality < κ.
8see [Jec03, Theorem 9.18]
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The forcing theorem
A fundamental result in the context of set forcing is the so-called forcing theorem. It
consists of two parts, the first of which states that the forcing relation is definable over
the ground model, and the second part postulates that every formula which is true in
some generic extension M [G] is forced by some condition in the generic filter G. We
will generalize the statement of the forcing theorem to our second-order framework and
present both positive and negative results related to the forcing theorem.
2.1 The forcing theorem
In the following, we state the forcing theorem and prove that the forcing theorem for all
formulae can be reduced to one atomic instance. Moreover, we introduce an infinitary
quantifier-free language and show that the forcing theorem for atomic formulae already
implies the forcing theorem for such infinitary formulae.
In this section, we fix a countable transitive model M = 〈M, C〉 of GB− and a notion
of class forcing P = 〈P,≤P〉.
Definition 2.1.1. Let ϕ ≡ ϕ(v0, . . . , vm−1, V0, . . . , Vn−1) be an L2∈-formula.
(1) We say that P satisfies the definability lemma for ϕ over M, if
{〈p, σ0, . . . , σm−1〉 ∈ P × (MP)m | p MP ϕ(σ0, . . . , σm−1,Γ0, . . . ,Γn−1)} ∈ C
holds for all ~Γ ∈ (CP)n.
(2) We say that P satisfies the truth lemma for ϕ over M, if for all σ0, . . . , σm−1 ∈ MP,
~Γ ∈ (CP)n and every filter G which is P-generic over M with
M[G] |= ϕ(σG0 , . . . , σGm−1,ΓG0 , . . . ,ΓGn−1),
there is a p ∈ G with p MP ϕ(σ0, . . . , σm−1,Γ0, . . . ,Γn−1).
(3) We say that P satisfies the forcing theorem for ϕ over M, if P satisfies both the
definability lemma and the truth lemma for ϕ over M.
Furthermore, we will simply say that P satifies the forcing theorem over M, if P satisfies
the forcing theorem for all L∈-formulae with class parameters.
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In set forcing, the forcing theorem is crucial to prove that separation is preserved;
given a formula ϕ(x, y) and names σ, µ ∈ MP in some set-sized forcing notion P, we can
simply take the name
pi = {〈τ, q〉 | ∃p ≥P q [〈τ, p〉 ∈ σ ∧ q MP ϕ(τ, µ)]}
as a witness for the set {x ∈ σG | ϕ(x, µG)}. However, this proof fails in class forcing,
since pi becomes a class name. Nevertheless, the forcing theorem implies the preservation
of the corresponding class axiom, namely first-order class comprehension.
Lemma 2.1.2. If P is a notion of class forcing for M which satisfies the forcing theorem,
then every P-generic extension of M satisfies first-order class comprehension.
Proof. Let G be P-generic over M and let ϕ(x, ~y, ~C) be a first-order formula with set
parameters ~y in M [G] and class parameters ~C in C[G]. Choose names ~σ in MP and ~Γ in
CP for ~C. Then
{〈τ, p〉 | p MP ϕ(τ, ~σ, ~Γ)} ∈ CP
is a class name for {x ∈M [G] | ϕ(x, ~y, ~C)}.
2.1.1 Reducing the forcing theorem to atomic formulae
Our goal is to prove that the definability for one atomic formula already implies the forcing
theorem for all L∈-formulae with class parameters, thus proving Theorem 2.1.5. The first
step to achieve this is to show that the definability lemma for one atomic formula already
implies the truth lemma. The proofs of Lemma 2.1.3 and Theorem 2.1.5 are essentially
the same as the ones given in [HKL+16, Lemma 4.2, Theorem 4.3].
Lemma 2.1.3. Assume that P satisfies the definability lemma for “v0 ∈ v1” or “v0 = v1”
over M. Then P satisfies the forcing theorem for all atomic L∈-formulae.
Proof. Suppose first that the definability lemma holds for “v0 ∈ v1”. We denote by p M,∗P
σ ⊆ τ the statement that for all 〈ρ, r〉 ∈ σ and for all q ≤P p, r, the class
Dρ,τ = {s ∈ P | s MP ρ ∈ τ} ∈ C
is dense below q in P. Furthermore, let p M,∗P σ = τ denote that p 
M,∗
P σ ⊆ τ and
p M,∗P τ ⊆ σ. We show by induction on the lexicographic order on pairs 〈rank(σ) +
rank(τ), rank(σ)〉 that the following hold for each p ∈ P:
(1) p MP σ ∈ τ if and only if the class
Eσ,τ = {q ∈ P | ∃〈ρ, r〉 ∈ τ [q ≤P r ∧ q M,∗P σ = ρ]} ∈ C
is dense below p in P.
(2) p MP σ ⊆ τ if and only if p M,∗P σ ⊆ τ . In particular, p MP σ = τ if and only if
p M,∗P σ = τ .
(3) There is a dense subclass of P in C that consists of conditions p in P such that either
p MP σ ∈ τ or p MP σ /∈ τ .
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(4) There is a dense subclass of P in C that consists of conditions p in P such that either
p MP σ ⊆ τ or p MP σ * τ .
To start the induction, note that if rank(σ) + rank(τ) = 0, then (1)–(4) trivally hold.
Observe that (3) implies that the truth lemma holds for “v0 ∈ v1”. Furthermore, (4)
implies the truth lemma for “v0 ⊆ v1” and hence also for equality. Suppose now that (1)–
(4) are satisfied for all pairs of names 〈σ¯, τ¯〉 in MP for which 〈rank(σ¯) + rank(τ¯), rank(σ¯)〉
is lexicographically less than 〈rank(σ) + rank(τ), rank(σ)〉, that is rank(σ¯) + rank(τ¯) ≤
rank(σ) + rank(τ) and in case of equality, we have that rank(σ¯) < rank(σ).
In order to prove (1), pick a condition p ∈ P with p MP σ ∈ τ and q ≤P p. Let G be
P-generic over M with q ∈ G. Then σG ∈ τG by assumption and hence there is 〈ρ, r〉 ∈ τ
with r ∈ G and σG = ρG. By our inductive assumption, property (4) yields a condition
s ∈ G with s MP σ = ρ which by (2) is equivalent to s M,∗P σ = ρ. Since G is a filter,
there is t ∈ G with t ≤P q, r, s. In particular, t ∈ Eσ,τ . For the other direction, suppose
that Eσ,τ is dense below p. Let G be P-generic over M with p ∈ G. By density of Eσ,τ
we can take q ∈ G and 〈ρ, r〉 ∈ τ such that q ≤P r and q M,∗P σ = ρ. Then r ∈ G and so
ρG ∈ τG. Thus by our inductive assumption, condition (2) implies that σG = ρG ∈ τG.
For (2), suppose first that p MP σ ⊆ τ , let 〈ρ, r〉 ∈ σ and let q ≤P p, r. Take a
P-generic filter G with q ∈ G. Then ρG ∈ σG ⊆ τG. By our inductive assumption, we
can find s ∈ G so that s MP ρ ∈ τ . Given any q∗ ≤P q, by strengthening s if necessary,
we can find such s ≤P q∗, as desired. Conversely, assume that p M,∗P σ ⊆ τ and let G be
P-generic over M with p ∈ G. Let 〈ρ, r〉 ∈ σ with r ∈ G. We have to show that ρG ∈ τG.
Let q ∈ G be a common strengthening of p and r. Then by assumption, the class Dρ,τ is
dense below q. By genericity, we can take s ∈ Dρ,τ ∩G. Using our inductive assumption,
this shows that ρG ∈ τG, as desired.
For (3), consider the class
D = {p ∈ P | ∀〈ρ, r〉 ∈ τ ∀q ≤P p, r (q 1MP σ = ρ)}.
Then our inductive assumptions imply that D ∈ C. Moreover, condition (1) states that
D is nonempty below every p ∈ P with p 1MP σ ∈ τ . Hence it suffices to show that
p MP σ /∈ τ for every p ∈ D, since then D ∪ {p ∈ P | p MP σ ∈ τ} ∈ C is a dense class of
conditions deciding σ ∈ τ . So take p ∈ D and suppose that p 1MP σ /∈ τ . Then there is
a P-generic filter G containing p such that σG ∈ τG. Then there must be 〈ρ, r〉 ∈ τ with
r ∈ G and σG = ρG. By our inductive assumption, we can find q ∈ G with q MP σ = ρ.
By possibly strengthening q using that G is a filter, we may assume that q ≤P p, r. But
this contradicts that p ∈ D.
In order to verify (4), we define
E = {p ∈ P | ∃〈ρ, r〉 ∈ σ [p ≤P r ∧ ∀q ≤P p (q 1MP ρ ∈ τ)]}.
As above, E is in C inductively, and it is nonempty below every condition which does not
force σ ⊆ τ . As in the proof of (3) it remains to check that p MP σ * τ for each p ∈ E.
Assume, towards a contradiction, that there is p ∈ E with p 1MP σ * τ . Then there is a
P-generic filter with p ∈ G and σG ⊆ τG. Let 〈ρ, r〉 witness that p ∈ E. Then r ∈ G and
so ρG ∈ σG ⊆ τG. Using (3) inductively, we obtain q ∈ G with q MP ρ ∈ τ . But then
there is s ≤P p, q, contradicting that p ∈ E.
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If the definability lemma holds for “v0 = v1”, we can define the P-forcing relation for
“v0 ∈ v1” by stipulating (as above) that p MP σ ∈ τ if and only if the class
{q ∈ P | ∃〈ρ, r〉 ∈ τ (q ≤P r ∧ q MP σ = ρ)} ∈ C
is dense below p.
Lemma 2.1.4. Suppose that P satisfies the forcing theorem for ϕ over M. Then the
following statements hold:
(1) P satisfies the definability lemma for ¬ϕ. Moreover, p MP ¬ϕ if and only if for all
q ≤P p, q 1MP ϕ.
(2) The class Eϕ = {p ∈ P | p MP ϕ ∨ p MP ¬ϕ} is dense in P.
(3) P satisfies the truth lemma for ¬ϕ.
Proof. For the first statement, suppose first that p MP ¬ϕ. Now if there is q ≤P p with
q MP ϕ then we have q MP ϕ and q MP ¬ϕ, a contradiction. Conversely, suppose that
the righthand-side holds and let G be P-generic over M with p ∈ G. If M[G] |= ϕ then
by the truth lemma for ϕ there is q ∈ G with q MP ϕ. Since G is directed, there is r ∈ G
with r ≤P p, q. But then r MP ϕ, contradicting our assumption on p.
For (2), suppose that p 1MP ¬ϕ. Then by (1) there is q ≤P p such that q MP ϕ and so
q ∈ Eϕ.
Finally, we show that P satisfies the truth lemma for ¬ϕ. Suppose that G is P-generic
over M with M[G] |= ¬ϕ. By (1) and (2), the class Eϕ is in C and is dense in P, so there
must be p ∈ G ∩ Eϕ. In particular, p MP ¬ϕ.
Theorem 2.1.5. If P satisfies the definability lemma either for “v0 ∈ v1” or for “v0 = v1”
over M, then P satisfies the forcing theorem for every L∈-formula with class parameters
over M.
Proof. By the previous lemma, we already know that P satisfies the forcing theorem for
“v0 ∈ v1” and “v0 = v1”.
Let us next consider the atomic formula “v0 ∈ V1” involving one class variable V1. Let
σ ∈MP and Γ ∈ CP. We claim that p MP σ ∈ Γ if and only if the class
D = {q ∈ P | ∃〈τ, r〉 ∈ Γ (q ≤P r ∧ q MP σ = τ)}
is dense below p. Note that D ∈ C since the definability lemma holds for equality. First
assume that p MP σ ∈ Γ and let q ≤P p. Let G be a P-generic filter with q ∈ G. Then
σG ∈ ΓG, i.e. there is 〈τ, r〉 ∈ Γ such that r ∈ G and σG = τG. By the truth lemma
for “v0 = v1”, there is s ∈ G such that s MP σ = τ . But then every t ≤P q, r, s is in D.
Conversely, if D is dense in P and G is P-generic over M with p ∈ G, then we find q ≤P p
in D ∩ G. By definition of D there is 〈τ, r〉 ∈ Γ such that q ≤P r and q P σ = τ . Thus
using that q, r ∈ G we get σG = τG ∈ ΓG. For the truth lemma, suppose that G is a
P-generic filter with σG ∈ ΓG. Then there is 〈τ, r〉 ∈ Γ with r ∈ G such that σG = τG.
By the truth lemma for equality, there is p ∈ G below r with p MP σ = τ .
Now we turn to the formula “V0 = V1”, where both V0 and V1 are class variables. As
in the case of set names, we define first the forcing relation for “V0 ⊆ V1”. More precisely,
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we check for Σ,Γ ∈ CP and p ∈ P that p MP Σ ⊆ Γ if and only if for all 〈σ, r〉 ∈ Σ and for
all q ≤P p, r the class
Dσ,Γ = {s ∈ P | s MP σ ∈ Γ} ∈ C
is dense below q in P. Given that statement, we can define p MP Σ = Γ by p MP Σ ⊆ Γ
and p MP Γ ⊆ Σ. To prove the claim, suppose first that p MP Σ ⊆ Γ and let 〈σ, r〉 ∈ Σ
and q ≤P p, r. Now if G is P-generic over M with q ∈ G then σG ∈ ΣG ⊆ ΓG, so by the
truth lemma for “v0 ∈ V1” there is s ∈ G with s MP σ ∈ Γ. Since G is a filter, there
is t ∈ G with t ≤P q, s. In particular, t ∈ Dσ,Γ. For the converse, let G be a P-generic
filter with p ∈ G and let 〈σ, r〉 ∈ Σ with r ∈ G. Then there is q ∈ G with q ≤P p, r. By
assumption and using the genericity of G, we can choose s ∈ G with s MP σ ∈ Γ. But
then σG ∈ ΓG. Since σG was an arbitrary element of ΣG, this proves the claim. Similarly,
it suffices to show the truth lemma for “V0 ⊆ V1”. Now note that by Lemma 2.1.4 the
class
D = {p ∈ P | p MP Σ ⊆ Γ ∨ ∃〈σ, r〉 ∈ Σ (p ≤P r ∧ p MP σ /∈ Γ)}
is in C. It suffices to check that D is dense. Let p ∈ P with p 1MP Σ ⊆ Γ. Then there is
a P-generic filter G containing p with ΣG * ΓG. In particular, there is 〈σ, r〉 ∈ Σ with
r ∈ G and σG /∈ ΓG. Since the truth lemma holds for σ ∈ Γ, it also holds for σ /∈ Γ by
Lemma 2.1.4. In particular, there must be q ≤P p, r in G with q MP σ /∈ Γ.
For composite L∈-formulae with class parameters we can define the forcing relation
by the usual recursion:
p MP ϕ ∧ ψ ⇐⇒ p MP ϕ and p MP ψ
p MP ¬ϕ ⇐⇒ ∀q ≤P p (q 1MP ϕ)
p MP ∀xϕ(x) ⇐⇒ ∀σ ∈MP (p MP ϕ(σ)).
We have to verify the above equivalences and that the truth lemma holds for the respective
formulae. For conjunctions this is clear and for negations this follows from Lemma 2.1.4.
Let p MP ∀xϕ(x) and σ ∈MP. Again, if p 1MP ϕ(σ), then there is a P-generic filter G
such that p ∈ G and M [G] |= ¬ϕ(σG). Since the truth lemma holds for ¬ϕ, there must
be some q ≤P p in G which forces ¬ϕ(σ). But then it is impossible that p MP ϕ(σ). The
converse is trivial. In order to check the truth lemma, let G be P-generic over M such
that M [G] |= ∀xϕ(x). We claim that the class
E = {p ∈ P | p MP ∀xϕ(x) ∨ ∃σ ∈MP [p MP ¬ϕ(σ)]} ∈ C
is dense. Suppose that p 1MP ∀xϕ(x). Then there is a P-generic filter G with p ∈ G such
that M[G] |= ∃x¬ϕ(x). In particular, there must be σ ∈ MP such that M[G] |= ¬ϕ(σG).
Using the truth lemma for ¬ϕ(σ), there is q ∈ G with q MP ¬ϕ(σ). Since G is directed,
there is r ∈ G with r ≤P p, q. In particular, we have r ∈ E, proving that E is dense.
Therefore, there is p ∈ G ∩ E. Since M [G] |= ∀xϕ, it follows that p MP ∀xϕ.
Corollary 2.1.6. Suppose that M |= KM and P is a notion of class forcing which satisfies
the definability lemma either for “v0 ∈ v1” or for “v0 = v1” over M. Then P satisfies the
forcing theorem for every L2∈-formula over M.
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Proof. By the recursion given in the proof of Theorem 2.1.5 remains to check that P
satisfies the forcing theorem for formulae of the form ∀Xϕ(X), where X is a class variable.
But as in the case of universal quantifiers restricted to sets, we have
p MP ∀Xϕ(X)⇐⇒ ∀Γ ∈ CP [p MP ϕ(Γ)].
Note that this definition is possible, since KM allows us to perform class recursion.
Another useful application of Theorem 2.1.5 is the following observation.
Lemma 2.1.7. Suppose that pi : P → Q is a dense embedding with the property that for
all p, q ∈ P, p ≤P q if and only if pi(p) ≤Q pi(q). If G is P-generic over M and H is
the upwards closure of pi′′G in Q, then σG = pi∗(σ)H for every σ ∈ MP. Moreover, if Q
satisfies the forcing theorem then so does P.
Proof. Let G be P-generic over M and let H denote the upwards closure of pi′′G in Q.
By Lemma 1.2.11, H is Q-generic over M. We show by induction on the name rank
that for every σ ∈ MP, σG = pi∗(σ)H . Suppose that this holds for every τ ∈ MP with
rank(τ) < rank(σ). Then we have
pi∗(σ)H = {pi∗(τ)H | ∃p [〈pi∗(τ), pi(p)〉 ∈ pi∗(σ) ∧ pi(p) ∈ H]}
= {τG | ∃p [〈τ, p〉 ∈ σ ∧ ∃q ∈ G (pi(q) ≤Q pi(p))]}
= {τG | ∃p [〈τ, p〉 ∈ σ ∧ ∃q ∈ G (q ≤P p)]}
= {τG | ∃p ∈ G (〈τ, p〉 ∈ σ)} = σG.
For the second claim, note that by Theorem 2.1.5 it is enough to check that for p ∈ P
and σ, τ ∈ MP, p MP σ ∈ τ if and only if pi(p) MQ pi∗(σ) ∈ pi∗(τ). Suppose first that
p MP σ ∈ τ and let H be Q-generic with pi(p) ∈ H and let G denote pi−1[H]. By Lemma
1.2.11, G is P-generic over M and p ∈ G. This implies that pi∗(σ)H = σG = τG = pi∗(τ)H
as desired. The converse is analogous.
Note that in the second statement of Lemma 2.1.7 the converse may fail, i.e. if P
satisfies the forcing theorem it does not always hold that Q does so as well. We will prove
this in Section 4.2. Furthermore, Q-generic extensions can be strictly larger then their
P-generic counterpart. This shall be discussed in 4.5.
2.1.2 The forcing theorem for infinitary formulae
In the following, we introduce an infinitary language and prove that the forcing theorem
for atomic L∈-formulae already implies the forcing theorem for infinitary formulae in
the language specified below. This language, that may be of independent interest, is an
important tool for our negative results in Section 2.5 as well as to provide an alternative
characterization of the forcing theorem in terms of the existence of a Boolean completion
in Section 3.2.
Let LOrd,0 denote the infinitary quantifier-free language that allows for set-sized con-
junctions and disjunctions. By LOrd,0(P,M) we denote the language of such infinitary
quantifier-free formulae in the forcing language of P over M that allows reference to the
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generic predicate G. More precisely, its constants are all elements of MP, and it has an
additional predicate G˙. We define LOrd,0(P,M) and the class FmlOrd,0(P,M) of Go¨del
codes of LOrd,0(P,M)-formulae by simultaneous recursion:
(1) Atomic LOrd,0(P,M)-formulae are of the form σ = τ, σ ∈ τ or pˇ ∈ G˙ for σ, τ ∈ MP
and p ∈ P, where G˙ = {〈pˇ, p〉 | p ∈ P} ∈ CP is the canonical class name for the
generic filter. Go¨del codes of atomic LOrd,0(P,M)-formulae are given by
ppˇ ∈ G˙q = 〈0, p〉
pσ = τq = 〈1, σ, τ〉
pσ ∈ τq = 〈2, σ, τ〉.
(2) If ϕ is an LOrd,0(P,M)-formula, then so is ¬ϕ, and its Go¨del code is given by
p¬ϕq = 〈3, pϕq〉.
(3) If I ∈ M and for every i ∈ I, ϕi is an LOrd,0(P,M)-formula such that 〈pϕiq | i ∈
I〉 ∈M , then so are ∨i∈I ϕi and ∧i∈I ϕi and their Go¨del codes are given by
p
∨
i∈I
ϕiq = 〈4, I, {〈i, pϕiq〉 | i ∈ I}〉
p
∧
i∈I
ϕiq = 〈5, I, {〈i, pϕiq〉 | i ∈ I}〉.
Now define FmlOrd,0(P,M) ∈ C to be the class of all Go¨del codes of infinitary formulae in
the forcing language of P over M . If G is a P-generic filter overM and ϕ is an LOrd,0(P,M)-
formula, then we write ϕG for the formula obtained from ϕ by replacing each P-name σ
occurring in ϕ by its evaluation σG, and by evaluating G˙ as G. Note that ϕG is a formula
in the infinitary language LOrd,0 with an additional predicate for the generic G. Given an
LOrd,0(P,M)-formula ϕ and p ∈ P, we write p MP ϕ to denote that M[G] |= ϕG whenever
G is a P-generic filter over M with p ∈ G.
Definition 2.1.8. We say that P satisfies the uniform forcing theorem for LOrd,0(P,M)-
formulae over M, if
{〈p, pϕq〉 ∈ P × FmlOrd,0(P,M) | p MP ϕ} ∈ C
and P satisfies the truth lemma for every LOrd,0(P,M)-formula ϕ over M, i.e. for every
P-generic filter G over M, if M[G] |= ϕG then there is p ∈ G such that p MP ϕ.
The following lemma will allow us to infer that the uniform forcing theorem for infini-
tary formulae is equivalent to the forcing theorem for equality.
Lemma 2.1.9. There is an assignment
FmlOrd,0(P,M)→MP ×MP, pϕq 7→ 〈νpϕq, µpϕq〉
such that {〈pϕq, νpϕq, µpϕq〉 | pϕq ∈ FmlOrd,0(P,M)} ∈ C and
(2.1) 1P MP ϕ↔ νpϕq = µpϕq
for every LOrd,0(P,M)-formula ϕ.
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Proof. We will argue by induction that, given names νψ and µψ satisfying (2.1) for every
proper subformula ψ of ϕ, we can, uniformly in pϕq, define νpϕq and µpϕq such that (2.1)
holds.
Observe that since ¬∧i∈I ϕi ≡ ∨i∈I ¬ϕi and ¬∨i∈I ϕi ≡ ∧i∈I ¬ϕi we can assume that
all formulae are in negation normal form, i.e. the negation operator is applied to atomic
formulae only. Next, due to the equivalences
σ 6= τ ≡ σ * τ ∨ τ * σ,
σ * τ ≡
∨
〈pi,p〉∈σ
(pi /∈ τ ∧ pˇ ∈ G˙),
σ /∈ τ ≡
∧
〈pi,p〉∈τ
(σ 6= pi ∨ pˇ /∈ G˙),
we can further suppose that the only negated formulae are of the form pˇ /∈ G˙.
For the atomic cases, let
νppˇ∈G˙q = {〈0ˇ, p〉}, µppˇ∈G˙q = 1ˇ,
νppˇ/∈G˙q = ∅, µppˇ/∈G˙q = {〈0ˇ, p〉},
νpσ=τq = σ, µpσ=τq = τ,
νpσ∈τq = τ, µpσ∈τq = τ ∪ {〈σ,1P〉}.
It is easy to check that (2.1) holds for all atomic formulae.
If ϕ is a conjunction of the form
∧
i∈I ϕi and νpϕiq, µpϕiq have already been defined for
i ∈ I, let
νpϕq = {〈op(νpϕiq, iˇ),1P〉 | i ∈ I} and
µpϕq = {〈op(µpϕiq, iˇ),1P〉 | i ∈ I}.
If G is P-generic over M and M[G] |= ϕG, then M[G] |= ϕGi for all i ∈ I. By assumption,
this means that νGpϕiq = µ
G
pϕiq for every i ∈ I, thus also νGpϕq = µGpϕq. The converse is
similar.
Next suppose that ϕ is of the form
∨
i∈I ϕi. Let ν¯pϕiq = op(νpϕiq, iˇ) and µ¯pϕiq =
op(µpϕiq, iˇ) for each i ∈ I. Let
pipϕq = {〈op(ν¯pϕiq, µ¯pϕiq),1P〉 | i ∈ I} ∪ {〈op(ν¯pϕiq, ν¯pϕiq),1P〉 | i ∈ I},
νipϕq = pipϕq \ {〈op(ν¯pϕiq, µ¯pϕiq),1P}.
Now we define
νpϕq = {〈νipϕq,1P〉 | i ∈ I}
µpϕq = νpϕq ∪ {〈pipϕq,1P〉}.
If G is P-generic and M[G] |= ϕG there is some i ∈ I such that M[G] |= ϕGi . By induction,
this implies that M[G] |= νGpϕiq = µGpϕiq. Thus piGpϕq = (νipϕq)G and νGpϕq = µGpϕq. For the
converse, suppose that there is a generic G such that M[G] |= ¬ϕG, hence for every i ∈ I,
M[G] |= ¬ϕGi . But then in M [G], for every i ∈ I, we have νGpϕiq 6= µGpϕiq. Therefore piGpϕq is
not of the form (νipϕq)
G for any i ∈ I, which shows that piGpϕq ∈ µGpϕq \ νGpϕq.
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Corollary 2.1.10. If P satisfies the definability lemma either for “v0 ∈ v1” or “v0 = v1”
over M, then P satisfies the uniform forcing theorem for LOrd,0(P,M)-formulae over M.
Proof. Due to Lemma 2.1.3 we may assume that P satisfies the forcing theorem for
“v0 = v1” over M. By Lemma 2.1.9 for every LOrd,0(P,M)-formula ϕ there are P-names
νpϕq and µpϕq such that {〈pϕq, νpϕq, µpϕq〉 | pϕq ∈ FmlOrd0(P,M)} ∈ C and 1P MP ϕ ↔
νpϕq = µpϕq. Therefore, we can define the forcing relation for LOrd,0(P,M)-formulae by
stipulating
p MP ϕ⇐⇒ p MP µpϕq = µpϕq.
This proves the uniform forcing theorem for LOrd,0(P,M)-formulae over M.
2.1.3 Products
We prove a class version of the product lemma. This is essentially an adaptation of [Fri00,
Lemma 2.27] to our setting. For the sake of completeness, we nevertheless provide a full
proof.
Lemma 2.1.11 (Product lemma). Suppose that M is a countable transitive model of GB−
and P and Q are notions of class forcing for M. Then the following statements hold for
R = P×Q.
(1) If G is P-generic over M and H is Q-generic over M[G], then G × H is R-generic
over M.
(2) If K is R-generic over M, then K is of the form G×H, where G is P-generic over
M. Moreover, if P satisfies the forcing theorem over M, then H is Q-generic over
M[G].
Proof. Suppose first that G is P-generic over M and H is Q-generic over M[G]. It is easy
to check that G×H is a filter. We claim that G×H is R-generic over M. Suppose that
D ∈ C is a dense subclass of R. We claim that
DQ = {q ∈ Q | ∃p ∈ G (〈p, q〉 ∈ D)}
is dense in Q. First note that DQ = {〈qˇ, p〉 | 〈p, q〉 ∈ D}G, so DQ ∈ C[G]. In order to
prove its density, fix q ∈ Q and consider
DqP = {p ∈ P | ∃q¯ ≤Q q (〈p, q¯〉 ∈ D)} ∈ C.
Then DqP is dense by density of D. Choose p ∈ G ∩DqP and q¯ ≤Q q such that 〈p, q¯〉 ∈ D.
Then q¯ ∈ DQ proving that DQ is dense. Take now q ∈ H ∩ DQ and p ∈ G such that
〈p, q〉 ∈ D. Then 〈p, q〉 ∈ (G×H) ∩D and so G×H is R-generic over M.
For the second claim, suppose that K is R-generic over M. We define
G ={p ∈ P | ∃q (〈p, q〉 ∈ K)}
H ={q ∈ Q | ∃p (〈p, q〉 ∈ K)}.
It is obvious that K ⊆ G × H. For the converse, suppose that 〈p, q〉 ∈ G × H. Choose
p¯ ∈ P and q¯ ∈ Q such that 〈p, q¯〉, 〈p¯, q〉 ∈ K. Since K is a filter, there is 〈p˜, q˜〉 ∈ K
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with 〈p˜, q˜〉 ≤R 〈p, q¯〉, 〈p¯, q〉. In particular, 〈p˜, q˜〉 ≤R 〈p, q〉 and so 〈p, q〉 ∈ K. Next,
we show that G is P-generic over M. Let DP ⊆ P be a dense class in C. Consider
D = {〈p, q〉 | p ∈ DP} ∈ C. Clearly, D is dense in R and so there is 〈p, q〉 ∈ K ∩ D. In
particular, p ∈ G ∩ DP. Suppose now that P satisfies the forcing theorem. We have to
verify that H is Q-generic over M[G]. Let EQ ⊆ Q be a dense class in C[G], hence there
are a name E˙Q ∈ CP and a condition p ∈ G such that p MP “ E˙Q is dense”. Consider
E = {〈p¯, q〉 | p¯ MP qˇ ∈ E˙Q} ∈ C.
Observe that E is a dense subset of R below 〈p,1Q〉. Let 〈p¯, q〉 ∈ K ∩E. Then p¯ ∈ G and
so q ∈ H ∩ E˙GQ = H ∩ EQ proving the density of EQ.
Notice that we do not know whether the product of two forcing notions which satisfy
the forcing theorem over some countable transitive model M = 〈M, C〉 |= GB− satisfies
the forcing theorem over M. The canonical attempt would be to dfine the forcing relation
for P×Q by
〈p, q〉 MP×Q σ ∈ τ ⇐⇒ p MP “ qˇ M[G˙]Q σ? ∈ τ ?”,
where for σ ∈MP×Q, σ? is a P-name for a Q-name defined by the recursion
σ? = {〈op(τ ?, qˇ), p〉 | 〈τ, 〈p, q〉〉 ∈ σ}.
This is, however, problematic since it is not clear whether Q still satisfies the forcing
theorem over M[G]. For further discussion of this topic, consult Question 4.
2.2 Pretameness
Pretameness was introduced by Sy Friedman in [Fri00] as a property of class-sized forcing
notions which not only implies the forcing theorem but also characterizes the preserva-
tion of GB− over models with a hierarchy. Before we are able to state the definition of
pretameness, we need the following notation.
Convention. Suppose that M = 〈M, C〉 is a model of GB−. Given a sequence of the
form ~C = 〈Ci | i ∈ I〉 with Ci ∈ C for i ∈ I and I ∈ C, we identify ~C with its code
{〈c, i〉 | i ∈ I ∧ c ∈ Ci}. In particular, we say that the sequence ~C is an element of C if its
code is in C.
Definition 2.2.1. A notion of forcing P for M is pretame for M = 〈M, C〉 |= GB−, if for
every p ∈ P and for every sequence of dense classes 〈Di | i ∈ I〉 ∈ C with I ∈ M , there
is q ≤P p and 〈di | i ∈ I〉 ∈ M such that for every i ∈ I, di ⊆ Di and di is predense in P
below q.
2.2.1 Pretameness implies the forcing theorem
The following theorem is an easy adaptation of [Fri00, Theorem 2.18] to our generalized
setting. For the benefit of the reader, we nevertheless include its proof.
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Theorem 2.2.2 (Sy Friedman). Let M = 〈M, C〉 be a countable transitive model of GB−
with a hierarchy, and let P be a notion of class forcing for M. If P is pretame over M
then P satisfies the forcing theorem over M.
Proof. Suppose that C = 〈Cα | α ∈ OrdM〉 witnesses that M has a hierarchy. Observe
first that by Theorem 2.1.5 it suffices to check the definability of the forcing relation of P
for atomic formulae. To achieve this, we construct a class function
F : P×MP ×MP × 2→M × 2
in C such that for p ∈ P and σ, τ ∈ MP, F (p, σ, τ, i) = 〈d, j〉 for some nonempty set
d ⊆ {q ∈ P | q ≤P p} and for all q ∈ d, q decides either σ ∈ τ (in case i = 0) or σ = τ
(in case i = 1) either positively (if j = 1) or negatively (if j = 0).1 Given such F , we can
define the P-forcing relation by
p MP σ ∈ τ ⇐⇒ ∀q ≤P p ∃d F (q, σ, τ, 0) = 〈d, 1〉
and similarly for p MP σ = τ .
We are left with defining such a function F by induction on
〈rank(σ) + rank(τ), rank(σ)〉,
ordered lexicographically. If rank(σ) + rank(τ) = 0, we simply put F (p, σ, τ, 0) = 〈{p}, 0〉
and F (p, σ, τ, 1) = 〈{p}, 1〉. Suppose now that rank(σ) + rank(τ) > 0. We start with
defining F (p, σ, τ, 0). By induction, we may assume that for all pi ∈ dom(τ) and for all
q ∈ P, F (q, σ, pi, 1) has already been defined. There are two cases:
Case 1. There exist 〈pi, r〉 ∈ τ and q ≤P p, r such that F (q, σ, pi, 1) = 〈d, 1〉 for some d ∈
M . Let α ∈ OrdM be the minimal C-rank of such a set d. Then put F (p, σ, τ, 0) = 〈e, 1〉,
where
e =
⋃
{d ∈ Cα+1 | ∃〈pi, r〉 ∈ τ ∃q ≤P p, r F (q, σ, pi, 1) = 〈d, 1〉}.
Case 2. Suppose we are not in Case 1. For each 〈pi, r〉 ∈ τ , consider
Dpi,r =
⋃
{d ∈M | ∃q ≤P p, r F (q, σ, pi, 1) = 〈d, 0〉} ∪ {q ≤P p | q⊥Pr}.
We show that each Dpi,r is dense below p. Let q ≤P p. We want to find s ≤P q in
Dpi,r. If q⊥Pr then we are done. Otherwise take s ≤P q, r. Since we are not in Case
1, F (s, σ, pi, 1) = 〈d, 0〉 for some d ∈ M \ {∅}. Since d is nonempty, we may pick some
condition t ∈ d. Then t ∈ Dpi,r and t ≤P s ≤P q.
By pretameness, there are conditions q ≤P p and 〈dpi,r | 〈pi, r〉 ∈ τ〉 ∈ M such that each
dpi,r is a subset of Dpi,r which is predense below q. Let α ∈ OrdM be minimal such that
there is such q in Cα+1. Then put F (p, σ, τ, 0) = 〈e, 0〉 where
e ={q ∈ Cα+1 ∩ P | ∃ 〈dpi,r | 〈pi, r〉 ∈ τ〉 ∈M (each dpi,r ⊆ Dpi,r is predense below q)}.
1If for example F (p, σ, τ, 0) = 〈d, 1〉, then for all q ∈ d, q P σ ∈ τ .
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Now we define F (p, σ, τ, 1). Again, we may inductively assume that for every pi ∈
dom(σ ∪ τ) and for every q ∈ P, F (q, pi, σ, 0) and F (q, pi, τ, 0) have already been defined.
As above, we make a case distinction:
Case 1. There exist 〈pi, r〉 ∈ σ ∪ τ , a condition q ∈ P that is stronger than both p and
r, i ∈ 2, d, e ∈ M and s ∈ d such that F (q, pi, σ, 0) = 〈d, i〉 and F (s, pi, τ, 0) = 〈e, 1 − i〉.
Then let α ∈ OrdM be the minimal C-rank of such a set e. Let F (p, σ, τ, 1) = 〈f, 0〉,
where
f =
⋃
{e ∈ Cα+1 | ∃〈pi, r〉 ∈ σ ∪ τ ∃q ≤P p, r ∃i ∈ 2∃d ∈M ∃s ∈ d
(F (q, pi, σ, 0) = 〈d, i〉 ∧ F (s, pi, τ, 0) = 〈e, 1− i〉)}.
Case 2. Suppose that we are not in Case 1. For each 〈pi, r〉 ∈ σ ∪ τ let
Dpi,r =
⋃
{e | ∃q ≤P r ∃i ∈ 2 ∃d∃s ∈ d (F (q, pi, σ, 0) = 〈d, i〉∧
F (s, pi, τ, 0) = 〈e, i〉)} ∪ {q ∈ P | q⊥Pr}.
Since Case 1 fails, each Dpi,r is dense below p. By pretameness there exist q ≤P p and
〈dpi,r | 〈pi, r〉 ∈ σ ∪ τ〉 ∈M such that each dpi,r ⊆ Dpi,r is predense below q. Let α ∈ OrdM
be the least C-rank of such a condition q. Then put F (p, σ, τ, 0) = 〈f, 1〉 for
f ={q ∈ Cα+1 ∩ P | ∃〈dpi,r | 〈pi, r〉 ∈ σ ∪ τ〉 ∈M (each dpi,r ⊆ Dpi,r is predense below q)}.
This finishes the construction of F . It remains to check that F satisfies our desired
properties. We proceed by induction. Suppose that F (p, σ, τ, 0) = 〈e, 1〉. We have to
verify that for every q ∈ e, q MP σ ∈ τ . Take q ∈ e and a P-generic filter G with q ∈ G.
Since we are in Case 1, there is 〈pi, r〉 ∈ τ and s ≤P p, r with F (s, σ, pi, 1) = 〈d, 1〉 for some
d and q ∈ d. Then q ≤P s and so s ∈ G. But by induction, since rank(pi) < rank(τ),
q MP σ = pi and so σG = piG ∈ τG.
Secondly, assume that F (p, σ, τ, 0) = 〈e, 0〉 and let q ∈ e and G be P-generic over M
with q ∈ G. Now by Case 2 there is a sequence 〈dpi,r | 〈pi, r〉 ∈ τ〉 of sets dpi,r ⊆ Dpi,r
in M which are predense below q. Suppose for a contradiction that M [G] |= σG ∈ τG.
Then there is 〈pi, r〉 ∈ τ with r ∈ G and σG = piG. Since dpi,r is predense below q, there
is s ∈ dpi,r ∩ G. Then s is compatible with r and so there are d ∈ M and t ≤P r with
F (t, σ, pi, 1) = 〈d, 0〉 and s ∈ d. By induction, s MP σ 6= pi, contradicting that σG = piG.
The proof that F (p, σ, τ, 1) is as desired follows in a similar way.
The next theorem is a version of a theorem of Sy Friedman [Fri00, Lemma 2.19], that
we adjusted to our generalized setting.
Theorem 2.2.3. Let M = 〈M, C〉 be a model of GB− with a hierarchy witnessed by
〈Cα | α ∈ OrdM〉. If P is pretame for M and G is P-generic over M then M[G] satisfies
GB− and has a hierarchy. Moreover, if M satisfies the axiom of choice (resp. global
choice), then so does M[G].
Proof. Suppose that P is pretame and that G is P-generic over M. By Lemma 1.2.9, the
only non-trivial set axioms are separation and collection. Moreover, collection implies
separation. Note that by Theorem 2.2.2, P satisfies the forcing theorem.
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To see that M[G] satisfies collection, assume that
M[G] |= ∀x ∈ σG ∃y ϕ(x, y,ΓG),
where σ ∈ MP, Γ ∈ CP and ϕ is an L∈-formula with one class parameter. By the truth
lemma there is p ∈ G such that p MP ∀x ∈ σ ∃y ϕ(x, y,Γ). For each 〈pi, r〉 ∈ σ, the class
Dpi,r = {s ∈ P | [s ≤P p, r ∧ ∃µ ∈MP (s MP ϕ(pi, µ,Γ))] ∨ s⊥Pr} ∈ C
is dense below p in P. By pretameness there is q ∈ G which strengthens p and there are
sets dpi,r ⊆ Dpi,r for each 〈pi, r〉 ∈ σ such that each dpi,r ∈ M is predense below q. Using
collection in M, there is a set x ∈ M such that for each 〈pi, r〉 ∈ σ and for each s ∈ dpi,r
there is µ ∈ x such that s MP ϕ(pi, µ,Γ). Now put
τ = {〈µ, s〉 | µ ∈ x ∧ ∃〈pi, r〉 ∈ σ [s ∈ dpi,r ∧ s P ϕ(pi, µ,Γ)]}.
By construction, M[G] |= ∀x ∈ σG ∃y ∈ τG ϕ(x, y,ΓG).
First-order class comprehension follows from Lemma 2.1.2 using the forcing theorem.
The other class axioms of GB− are trivial. Furthermore, we can define a hierarchy 〈Dα |
α ∈ OrdM〉 in C[G] by
Dα = {x ∈M[G] | ∃σ ∈MP ∩ Cα(σG = x)} = {〈σ,1〉 | σ ∈ Cα}G ∈M [G]
for every α ∈ OrdM . Finally, if ≺ is a global well-order of M in C then
x C y ⇐⇒ ∃σ ∈MP[x = σG ∧ ∀τ ∈MP(y = τG → σ ≺ τ)]
defines a global well-order of M [G] in C[G]. The proof that if the axiom of choice is
preserved is analogous.
Remark 2.2.4. Note that in the proof of Theorem 2.2.3, if we know that P satisfies the
forcing theorem, we do not require M to have a hierarchy in order to show that GB− is
preserved.
2.2.2 Examples
In this section we present several examples of pretame and non-pretame notions of class
forcing.
Example 2.2.5. Col(ω,Ord) is not pretame. To see this, consider the dense classes
Dn = {p ∈ Col(ω,OrdM) | n ∈ dom(p)}
for all n ∈ ω. Suppose that there exist a condition q ∈ Col(ω,OrdM) and 〈dn | n ∈ ω〉 ∈M
such that each dn is a subset of Dn which is predense below q. Now let
α = sup{ran(p) | p ∈
⋃
n∈ω
dn}.
Let n ∈ ω such that n /∈ dom(q) and consider r = q∪{〈n, α+1〉}. Then r is incompatible
with every element of dn. Nevertheless, it will follow from Lemma 2.4.3 that Col(ω,Ord
M)
satisfies the forcing theorem.
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Definition 2.2.6. A notion of class forcing P for M is said to be distributive over M =
〈M, C〉 |= GB−, if for every sequence 〈Di | i ∈ I〉 ∈ C of open dense subclasses of P with
I ∈M and for every p ∈ P there is q ≤P p such that q ∈
⋂
i∈I Di.
Example 2.2.7. If P is distributive over some countable transitive model M = 〈M, C〉 |=
GB− then P is pretame for M.
Proof. Let 〈Di | i ∈ I〉 be a sequence of dense classes in C and p ∈ P. For each i ∈ I,
we define Ei to be the downwards closure of Di, i.e. q ∈ Ei if and only if there is r ∈ Di
with q ≤P r. Then every Ei is open dense in P. By distributivity of P there is q ≤P p
with q ∈ ⋂i∈I Ei. Using collection, we can pick a set 〈di | i ∈ I〉 in M such that each di
is a subset of Di with the property that q ≤P r for all r ∈ di. In particular, di is predense
below q.
Definition 2.2.8. A notion of class forcing P for M = 〈M, C〉 is said to be < Ord-closed ,
if it is < κ-closed for every M -cardinal κ. More precisely, if 〈pi | i < κ〉 ∈ M is a ≤P-
descending sequence of conditions in P for some M -cardinal κ, then there is p ∈ P with
p ≤P pi for every i < κ.
Example 2.2.9. If M = 〈M, C〉 is a model of GBdc−, then every < Ord-closed forcing
notion P for M is distributive over M and hence by Example 2.2.7 also pretame over
M. To see this, suppose that p ∈ P is an arbitrary condition and 〈Di | i ∈ I〉 ∈ C is a
sequence of open dense subclasses of P. Using choice, we may assume that I = κ is an
M -cardinal. Using < Ord-closure and dependent choice, we can define a ≤P-decreasing
sequence 〈pi | i < κ〉 below p such that pi ∈ Di. Then there is q ∈ P with q ≤P pi for all
i < κ and so q ∈ ⋂i<κDi.
Example 2.2.10. If M is a model of ZF andM = 〈M,Def(M)〉, then the class-sized Le´vy
collapse P = Col(ω,< Ord)M is pretame for M. To see this, let I ∈ M and 〈Di | i ∈ I〉
be a sequence of dense classes. For each i ∈ I set dαi = Di ∩ Vα and for α ∈ OrdM we
define F (α) to be the minimal β ∈ OrdM satisfying
∀p ∈ Col(ω,< α)∀i ∈ I ∃q ∈ dβi (q ≤P p).
Then F is a continuous total class function on OrdM . Hence δ = sup{F n(0) | n < ω}
is a fixed point of F . Consider now di = d
δ
i for each i ∈ I. We claim that each dδi is
predense. Let i ∈ I and p ∈ P be an arbitrary condition. Then there is q ∈ di such that
q ≤P p  (δ × ω). In particular, r = p ∪ q is a condition witnessing the compatibility of p
and q.
Example 2.2.11. Suppose that M = 〈M, C〉 is a countable transitive model of GB− and
let W = WM denote the forcing notion for adding a global well-order as defined in Section
1.3.2. Then M |= GBdc− if and only if WM is pretame over M.
To see this, observe first that if M |= GBdc−, then Lemma 1.3.3 and Example 2.2.9
imply that W is pretame. Conversely, suppose that W is pretame and let G be W-generic
overM. SinceW satisfies the forcing theorem, M[G] |= GB−. Note further thatW doesn’t
add any new sets by Lemma 1.3.3, so M [G] = M . Suppose that ϕ(v0, v1) is an L∈-formula
with class parameters such that M |= ∀~x∃y ϕ(~x, y) and let x ∈ M and α ∈ OrdM . Using
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the generic global well-order ≺ in C[G], we define a sequence 〈yi | i < α〉 such that y0 = x
in the following way. Given 〈yj | j < i〉 for i < α, let yi ∈M be the ≺-least element of M
such that M |= ϕ(〈yj | j < i〉, yi). Then ~y = 〈yi | i < α〉 ∈ M since replacement holds in
M[G]. This shows that DC holds. To see that M satisfies the axiom of choice, let x ∈M
be a set. In M[G] we can well-order x using ≺. Since W doesn’t add any new sets, the
well-order already exists in M .
Example 2.2.12. Easton forcing is pretame. Assume that M is a countable transitive
model of GBc+GCH. Let F be an Easton function for M and let P denote PF as defined
in Section 1.3.5. To see that P is pretame for M, let p ∈ P and let 〈Di | i < λ〉 be a
sequence of dense classes below p such that λ is a regular M -cardinal. Let 〈qi | i < λ〉
be an enumeration of P≤λ and let h : λ × λ → λ denote Go¨del pairing. We define a
≤P-descending sequence 〈pi | i < λ〉 of conditions in P such that p≤λi = p≤λ for each i < λ.
• Let p0 = p.
• Given 〈pj | j < i〉, let p¯i =
⋃
j<i pi. Then p¯i ∈ P since P>λ is λ+-closed. Suppose
that i = h(i0, i1). Then choose pi ≤P p¯i with p≤λi = p≤λ such that there is some
ri ∈ Di1 with pi ∪ qi0 ≤P ri, if possible. Otherwise, we put pi = p¯i.
Now let p¯ =
⋃
i<λ pi and di = {rj | rj ∈ Di}. Then di is predense below p¯: Suppose that
r ≤P p¯. Let s ≤P r with s ∈ Di. Let j < λ such that s≤λ = qj. Put k = h(j, i). Then
pk ∪ qj ≤P rk and rk ∈ Di. In particular, s ≤P pk ∪ qj ≤P rk and s ≤P r, so r is compatible
with rk ∈ di.
The following lemma shows that Easton forcing also preserves the power set axiom.
Lemma 2.2.13. [Jec03, Lemma 15.19] Let P and Q be notions of class forcing which
satisfy the forcing theorem over M such that P is λ+-closed and Q satisfies the λ+-cc. If
G×H is P×Q-generic over M, then every function f : λ→M in M [G×H] is in M [H].
In particular,
PM [G×H](λ) = PM [H](λ).
Therefore, Easton forcing preserves GBc. Standard forcing arguments imply that in
the PF -generic extension, where F denotes an Easton function, 2κ becomes F (κ) for every
regular cardinal κ in the domain of F . This allows us, for example, to obtain a model
where 2κ = κ++ for every regular cardinal κ. A detailed proof of the following theorem
can be found in any standard textbook on set theory such as [Jec03].
Theorem 2.2.14 (Easton’s Theorem, [Eas70]). Let M = 〈M C〉 be a countable transitive
model of GBc such that M |= GCH and let F be an Easton function for M. If G is
PF -generic over M, then M [G] |= GBc and for each κ ∈ dom(F ), M [G] |= 2κ = F (κ).
Moreover, PF preserves all cardinals and cofinalities.
2.2.3 Two-step iterations
In this section, we consider two-step iterations of class-sized forcing notions. Note that
for the construction to work, we require the first forcing notion to be pretame, since
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otherwise the intermediate model could fail to be a model of GB−. The following lemma
is an adaptation of [Fri00, Lemma 2.30 (a)] to our setting.
Lemma 2.2.15. Let M = 〈M, C〉 be a countable transitive model of GB− which has a
hierarchy, let P be a pretame notion of class forcing and let Q˙ ∈ CP be a class name for
a preorder. Then we define the two-step iteration of P and Q˙ by
P ∗ Q˙ = {〈p, q˙〉 | p ∈ P ∧ p MP q˙ ∈ Q˙} ∈ CP
equipped with the ordering given by 〈p0, q˙0〉 ≤P∗Q˙ 〈p1, q˙1〉 iff p0 ≤P p1 and p0 MP q˙0 ≤Q˙ q˙1.
If G is P-generic over M and H is Q˙G-generic over M[G], then
G ∗H = {〈p, q˙〉 | p ∈ G ∧ q˙G ∈ H}
is P ∗ Q˙-generic over M.
Proof. We verify first that G ∗ H is a filter. Let 〈p0, q˙0〉, 〈p1, q˙1〉 ∈ P ∗ Q˙. Assume first
that 〈p0, q˙0〉 ∈ G ∗H and 〈p1, q˙1〉 ≥P∗Q˙ 〈p0, q˙0〉. Then p1 ∈ G and p0 MP q˙0 ≤Q˙ q˙1. Since
p0 ∈ G we have q˙0G ≤Q˙G q˙1G. As H is Q˙G-generic over M [G] and q˙0G ∈ H, this implies
that q˙1
G ∈ H. Now suppose that 〈p0, q˙0〉, 〈p1, q˙1〉 ∈ G ∗ H. Since G is a filter, there
is r ≤P p0, p1 in G. Similarly, using that q˙0G, q˙1G ∈ H we can find q˙ ∈ MP such that
q˙G ≤Q˙G q˙0G, q˙1G. Since P satisfies the truth lemma, there must be p ≤P r in G such that
p MP q˙ ≤Q˙ q˙0, q˙1. Hence 〈p, q˙〉 ∈ G ∗H and 〈p, q˙〉 ≤P∗Q˙ 〈p0, q˙0〉, 〈p1, q˙1〉.
In order to check genericity, let D be a dense subclass of P ∗ Q˙ which is in C. Then
E = {q˙G | ∃p ∈ G (〈p, q˙〉 ∈ D)}
is in C[G]. We claim that E is dense in Q˙G. Let q˙G ∈ Q˙G and put
D(q˙) = {p ∈ P | p MP q˙ /∈ Q˙ ∨ ∃r˙ [(p MP r˙ ≤Q˙ q˙) ∧ 〈p, r˙〉 ∈ D]}.
Since P satisfies the forcing theorem, D(q˙) ∈ C. We show that it is dense in P. Let p ∈ P
and suppose that p 1MP q˙ /∈ Q˙. Using the forcing theorem, we can strengthen p to p0 such
that p0 MP q˙ ∈ Q˙, and therefore we obtain that 〈p0, q˙〉 ∈ P ∗ Q˙. Since D is dense, there
must be 〈p1, r˙〉 ∈ D with 〈p1, r˙〉 ≤P∗Q˙ 〈p0, q˙〉. Thus p1 ∈ D(q˙) proving that D(q˙) is dense.
Now let p ∈ D(q˙)∩G and take r˙ such that p MP r˙ ≤Q˙ q˙ and 〈p, r˙〉 ∈ D. Then r˙G ≤Q˙G q˙G
and r˙G ∈ E. Hence E is dense in Q˙G. This implies that D meets G ∗H.
Remark 2.2.16. Notice that if P is pretame for some countable transitive GB−-model M
with a hierarchy and 1P MP “ Q˙ is pretame for M[G˙]”, then the two-step iteration P ∗ Q˙
is pretame for M. To see this, observe that by Theorem 2.2.3, P ∗ Q˙ preserves GB−.
Moreover, it will follow from Lemma 4.3.5 that pretameness is in fact equivalent to the
preservation of GB− over models with a hierarchy. In particular, this implies that P ∗ Q˙
is pretame.
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2.3 The set decision property
In this section, we introduce a simple combinatorial property which implies the forcing
theorem. Moreover, we will show that this property exactly characterizes those notions
of forcing which do not add any new sets.
Definition 2.3.1. Let M = 〈M, C〉 be a countable transitive model of GB− and let P be
a notion of class forcing for M. Let G˙ denote the canonical P-name for the generic filter.
(1) If p ∈ P and σ is a P-name, then we define the p-evaluation of σ by
σp = {τ p | ∃q ∈ P [〈τ, q〉 ∈ σ ∧ ∀r ≤P p (r ‖P q)]}.
(2) Given conditions p and q in P, we write p ≤∗P q iff ∀r ≤P p (r ‖P q) (equivalently,
p MP q ∈ G˙). Note that if P is separative, then p ≤∗P q if and only if p ≤P q.
(3) If A ⊆ P is a set of conditions and p ∈ P, we write p⊥PA or p ≤∗P A if ∀a ∈ A (p⊥Pa)
or ∀a ∈ A (p ≤∗P a) respectively.
(4) If A ⊆ P is a set of conditions and p ∈ P, then p decides A (we write p ∼P A) if for
every a ∈ A, either p ≤∗P a or p⊥Pa.
(5) We say that P has the set decision property , if for every p ∈ P and every set A ⊆ P
in M , there is an extension q ≤P p of p such that q decides A.
Note that if p decides A, then p decides for every condition in A whether it lies in the
generic filter or not, i.e. p decides G˙ ∩ Aˇ.
Example 2.3.2. Assuming that M is a model of GBdc−, every <Ord-closed notion of
class forcing P for M has the set decision property: Let p ∈ P and let A ⊆ P be a set
of conditions. Using the axiom of choice, we can enumerate A as {ai | i < κ} for some
M -cardinal κ. Using dependent choice, we can find a sequence 〈pi | i < κ〉 of conditions
such that for every i < j < κ, pj ≤P ai, or pj⊥Pai with the following properties.
• It holds that p0 = p.
• If pi ‖P ai, then pi+1 is stronger than both pi and ai, if possible, and otherwise,
pi+1 = pi.
• For a limit ordinal α, pα is stronger than pi for all i < α. Such pα exists by < Ord-
closure of P.
Now let q ∈ P be a condition stronger than every pi for i < κ. By construction, q decides
A.
Example 2.3.3. The forcing notion P = Col(ω,Ord)M satisfies the set decision property:
Suppose that A ∈ M is a subset of P and p ∈ P. Let α = sup{range(q) | q ∈ A}+ 1 and
n = dom(p). Then q = p ∪ {〈n, α〉} decides A: Assume that a ∈ A. If dom(a) ≤ n then
either q⊥Pa or a = q  n and hence q ≤P a. Otherwise, n ∈ dom(a) and by construction
a(n) < α + 1 = q(n) and so q⊥Pa.
Lemma 2.3.4. Let M be a countable transitive model of GB−. Then every class forcing
P for M with the set decision property satisfies the forcing theorem and does not add new
sets, that is M [G] = M whenever G is P-generic over M.
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Proof. By Theorem 2.1.5, to verify the forcing theorem it is enough to check that the
definability lemma holds for “v0 = v1”. Let σ, τ ∈ MP. Let A = P ∩ tc(σ ∪ τ) and let
p ∈ P. Then it follows from the set decision property that
p MP σ = τ ⇐⇒ ∀q ≤P p (q ∼P A→ q P σ = τ).
But if q ∼P A and q ∈ G then σq = σG (this in particular implies that σG ∈M and hence
that P does not add new sets), thus we obtain q MP σ = τ iff σq = τ q. Consequently,
p MP σ = τ can be defined by ∀q ≤P p (q ∼P A→ σq = τ q).
Lemma 2.3.5. Let M be a countable transitive model of GB− and let P be a notion of
class forcing for M which adds no new sets. Then P has the set decision property.
Proof. Let A ⊆ P be a set of conditions in M and let p ∈ P. We have to find q ≤P p such
that q ∼P A. Assume for a contradiction that no such q exists.
Since M is countable in V, we can enumerate in V all elements of C that are dense
subsets of P by 〈Dn | n ∈ ω〉 and all subsets of A which are elements of M by 〈xn | n ∈ ω〉.
Let σ = {〈aˇ, a〉 | a ∈ A}. We will find a P-generic filter G such that σG 6∈ M , which
clearly contradicts our assumption on P. For this we define a ≤P-decreasing sequence of
conditions 〈qn | n ∈ ω〉 below p and a sequence 〈an | n ∈ ω〉 of conditions in A. Let
q0 = p. Given qn, note that by our assumption it cannot be the case that qn ≤∗P xn and
qn⊥P(A \ xn). Hence there is an ∈ A such that either an ∈ xn and qn 6≤∗P an or an /∈ xn
and qn ‖P an. In the first case we pick r ≤P qn such that r⊥Pan. In the second case,
we strengthen qn to r ≤P qn, an. Now take qn+1 ≤P r such that qn+1 ∈ Dn. Finally, this
means that G = {q ∈ P | ∃n ∈ ω (qn ≤P q)} is a P-generic filter. But since P doesn’t
add any new sets and since 1P MP σ ⊆ Aˇ, there must be some n ∈ ω such that σG = xn.
But we have that either an ∈ xn and an⊥Pqn+1, thus an /∈ σG, or an /∈ xn but qn+1 ≤P an
implying that an ∈ σG. We have thus reached a contradiction.
Putting together Lemmata 2.3.4 and 2.3.5 we obtain
Corollary 2.3.6. Every class forcing which does not add new sets satisfies the forcing
theorem.
2.4 Approachability by projections
In this section, we fix a countable transitive model M = 〈M, C〉 of GB−. We define a fairly
weak combinatorial condition on notions of class forcing that implies the forcing theorem
to hold. In particular, this property is satisfied by the forcing notions Col(ω,Ord)M ,
Col∗(ω,Ord)M and Col≥(ω,Ord)M from Section 1.3.
Definition 2.4.1. We say that a class forcing P = 〈P,≤P〉 for M is approachable by
projections , if it can be written as a continuous, increasing union P =
⋃
α∈OrdM Pα for a
sequence 〈Pα | α ∈ OrdM〉 ∈ C of notions of set forcing Pα = 〈Pα,≤Pα〉, where ≤Pα is the
ordering on Pα induced by P, for which there exists a sequence of maps 〈piα+1 | α ∈ OrdM〉
so that piα+1 : P→ Pα+1, {〈α, p, piα+1(p)〉 | α ∈ OrdM , p ∈ P} ∈ C and for every α ∈ OrdM ,
the following hold:
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(1) piα+1(1P) = 1P,
(2) ∀p, q ∈ P [p ≤P q → piα+1(p) ≤P piα+1(q)],
(3) ∀p ∈ P∀q ≤Pα+1 piα+1(p)∃r ≤P p [piα+1(r) ≤P q],
(4) ∀p ∈ Pα ∀q ∈ P [piα+1(q) ≤P p→ q ≤P p] and
(5) piα+1 is the identity on Pα.
Note that the first three properties simply state that piα+1 is a projection; this was the
motivation for the choice of our terminology. It follows from the definition that each piα+1
is a dense embedding and thus pi′′α+1G is a Pα+1-generic filter whenever G is a P-generic
filter.
Lemma 2.4.2. If P =
⋃
α∈OrdM Pα is approachable by projections with projections piα+1 :
P → Pα+1 and G is P-generic over M, then M [G] ⊆
⋃
α∈OrdM M [pi
′′
α+1G], and the latter
is a union of set-generic extensions of M .
Proof. If σ is a P-name, then there is α ∈ OrdM such that σ is already a Pα-name.
Since piα+1 is dense, Gα+1 = pi
′′
α+1G is Pα+1-generic. By property (5) of Definition 2.4.1,
σG = σGα+1 ∈M [Gα+1].
Lemma 2.4.3. Col(ω,Ord)M , Col∗(ω,Ord)M and Col≥(ω,Ord)M are approachable by
projections.
Proof. Let P = Col(ω,Ord)M and let Pα = Col(ω, α). Furthermore, take piα+1 to be the
map that, for p ∈ Col(ω,Ord)M , replaces the value of p(n) by α whenever p(n) > α.
Conditions (1), (2) and (5) of Definition 2.4.1 are trivially satisfied. For (3) let p ∈
Col(ω,Ord)M and q ∈ Col(ω, α+ 1) such that q ≤Pα+1 piα+1(p). Then r = p ∪ {〈n, q(n)〉 |
n ∈ dom(q) \ dom(p)} satisfies r ≤P p and piα+1(r) ≤P q. For (4), consider p ∈ Col(ω, α)
and q ∈ Col(ω,Ord)M such that piα+1(q) ≤P p. Suppose n ∈ dom(p) ∩ dom(q). Since
p ∈ Col(ω, α), p(n) < α and hence q(n) = piα+1(q)(n) = p(n). Thus q ≤P p. The
arguments for Col∗(ω,Ord)M and Col≥(ω,Ord)M are similar.
Theorem 2.4.4. If P is approachable by projections, then the forcing relation for “v0 =
v1” is definable. Therefore, by Theorem 2.1.5, P satisfies the forcing theorem for every
L∈-formula with class parameters.
Proof. Fix any ordinal α ∈ M . We will show by induction on the name rank that the
forcing relation for “v0 ⊆ v1”, restricted to names that only mention conditions in Pα, is
definable. Then the forcing relation for “v0 = v1” is definable by p MP σ = τ if and only
if p MP σ ⊆ τ and p MP τ ⊆ σ. It will be easy to see that this is uniform in α, thus
implying the desired statement. For the sake of legibility, we will omit the superscript M
in the notation of the forcing relation.
For σ, τ ∈MPα and p ∈ P define p ∗P σ ⊆ τ if and only if
∀〈ρ, s〉 ∈ σ∀q ≤P p∃r ≤P q [r ≤P s→ ∃〈pi, t〉 ∈ τ(r ≤P t ∧ r ∗P ρ = τ)].
Similiarly, let piα+1(p) ∗,α+1P σ ⊆ τ denote the same formula as above but where p is
replaced by piα+1(p), ∗P is replaced by ∗,α+1P and all quantifiers over P are restricted to
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Pα+1. Furthermore, p ∗P σ = τ is an abbreviation for p ∗P σ ⊆ τ and p ∗P τ ⊆ σ and
similarly for ∗,α+1P .
We will show by induction on the rank of Pα-names that
p ∗P σ ⊆ τ if and only if piα+1(p) ∗,α+1P σ ⊆ τ.(2.2)
The right-hand side is clearly definable with parameter α, since Pα+1 is a set-sized forcing
notion. Moreover, by the usual proof, p ∗P σ ⊆ τ if and only if p P σ ⊆ τ . This shows
that assuming (2.2), the forcing relation for “v0 ⊆ v1” restricted to Pα-names is definable.
Assume first that p P σ ⊆ τ and let 〈ρ, s〉 ∈ σ and q¯ ≤Pα+1 piα+1(p). By (3) there is
q ≤P p such that piα+1(q) ≤P q¯. By assumption there is r ≤P q witnessing p ∗P σ ⊆ τ .
Using (2), piα+1(r) ≤P q¯. Now if r P s, then piα+1(r) P s by (4). Otherwise, assume that
〈pi, t〉 ∈ τ such that r ≤P t and r ∗P ρ = pi. Again by (2) and (5) we have piα+1(r) ≤P t
and inductively, piα+1(r) ∗,α+1P ρ = pi.
For the converse, suppose piα+1(p) ∗,α+1P σ ⊆ τ and let 〈ρ, s〉 ∈ σ. Let q ≤P p. By (2)
we have piα+1(q) ≤P piα+1(p) and thus there is r¯ ≤Pα+1 piα+1(q) witnessing piα+1(p) ∗,α+1P
σ ⊆ τ . Using (3), choose r ≤P q such that piα+1(r) ≤P r¯. Now if r¯⊥Pα+1s, then also r⊥Ps
because if t ≤P r, s, then piα+1(t) ≤P r¯, s by (2) and (5). So assume that r¯ and s are
compatible and take u¯ ∈ Pα+1 such that u¯ ≤P r¯, s. Hence again using that piα+1(p) ∗P
σ ⊆ τ there is v¯ ≤Pα+1 u¯ such that v¯ ≤P s and there is 〈pi, t〉 ∈ τ such that v¯ ≤P t and
v¯ ∗,α+1P ρ = pi. Now since v¯ ≤Pα+1 piα+1(q) there exists v ≤P q such that piα+1(v) ≤P v¯, so
piα+1(v) ∗,α+1P ρ = τ . Then by (4) we get that v ≤P s, t and inductively, v ∗P ρ = τ .
The following lemma shows that the converse does not hold in general.
Lemma 2.4.5. Suppose that M is a countable transitive model of ZFC. There is a tame
notion of class forcing for M = 〈M,Def(M)〉 which is not approachable by projections.
Proof. Let P be Jensen coding, as described in [BJW82]. Then P is a tame notion of
forcing, i.e. it preserves ZFC. Without loss of generality, we may assume that M |= GCH;
otherwise we can ensure this by previously forcing GCH using a variant of Easton forcing
(see [Eas70]). Then the extension of M is M [G] = L[x] for some real x which is not
contained in any set forcing extension of M , so by Lemma 2.4.2, P cannot be approachable
by projections.
Lemma 2.4.6. There is a notion of class forcing which is an increasing union of set-sized
complete subforcings but not pretame.
Proof. By Lemma 1.3.2, the forcing notion Col≥(ω,Ord)M is an increasing union of set-
sized complete subforcings, but it is not pretame since it adds a cofinal function from ω
to the ordinals (see Lemma 4.2.1); alternatively one can prove the latter in the same way
as for Col(ω,Ord)M (see Example 2.2.5).
2.5 Failures of the forcing theorem
In set forcing, it is a standard result that every forcing notion satisfies the forcing theorem.
This, however, does not carry over to class forcing. In this section we show that both the
definability and the truth lemma may fail for class forcing.
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2.5.1 A failure of the definability lemma
The main goal of this section is to show that the definability lemma does not hold for
every notion of class forcing. More precisely, we will show that if the definability lemma
holds for FM (as defined in Section 1.3.3) for some transitive countable model M = 〈M, C〉
of GB−, then C contains a first-order truth predicate for M . In particular, if the ground
model is of the form M = 〈M,Def(M)〉, where M is a countable transitive model of ZF−,
then Tarski’s theorem on the undefinability of truth2 implies that FM does not satisfy
the definability lemma over M. Furthermore, we will prove that for certain models M of
ZFC its forcing relation is not even M -amenable. Whenever it is clear from context which
model is referred to, we write F for FM . Unless stated otherwise, M = 〈M, C〉 will denote
an arbitrary countable transitive model of GB−.
Following [Dra74, Chapter 3.5], we let Fml ⊆ <ωω denote the set of all codes for
L∈-formulae. Since we work inside some model V of set theory and we use these codes
inside countable transitive models that are elements of V together with the corresponding
formalized satisfaction relation, we may assume that each element of Fml is the Go¨del
number pϕq of an L∈-formula ϕ. For k ∈ ω, let Fmlk denote the set of all Go¨del numbers
for formulae with free variables among {v0, . . . , vk−1}. For the sake of simplicity, we will
assume that every L∈-formula ϕ is in the following normal form: Whenever ∃vkψ is a
subformula of ϕ, then the free variables of ψ are among {v0, . . . , vk}.
Definition 2.5.1. A relation T ⊆ Fml1 ×M is a first-order truth predicate for M , if
〈pϕq, x〉 ∈ T ⇐⇒ 〈M,∈〉 |= ϕ(x)
holds for every pϕq ∈ Fml1 and every x ∈M .
Let G be an F-generic filter over M and let E and F be defined as in the proof of
Lemma 1.3.8. Then
T = {〈pϕq, x〉 ∈ Fml1 ×M | 〈ω,E〉 |= ϕ(F−1(x))} ⊆M
is a first-order truth predicate for M and, by Tarski’s Undefinability Theorem, T cannot
be defined over M by a first-order formula. In the following, we will show that definability
of the forcing relation for F would lead to a first-order definition of T .
Notation. If ~x = x0, . . . , xk−1 is a sequence in M , we say that a sequence ~n = n0, . . . , nk−1
in ω is appropriate for ~x, if for all i, j < k, xi = xj if and only if ni = nj. We inductively
define p~x~n ∈ F as follows, whenever ~n is a sequence of natural numbers which is appropriate
for ~x.
(1) If k = 0, then p∅∅ = 1F.
(2) If ~n, nk is appropriate for ~x, xk, given p = p
~x
~n, let p
~x,xk
~n,nk
be the condition q ∈ F with
domain dq = dp ∪ {nk}, fq = fp ∪ {〈nk, xk〉} and
eq = ep ∪ {〈nk, ni〉 | i ∈ ~n ∧ xk ∈ xi} ∪ {〈ni, nk〉 | i ∈ ~n ∧ xi ∈ xk}.
2Tarski’s Theorem proved first in [Tar36] states that the is truth of formulae in some structure is not
first-order definable over that structure; see also [Jec03, Theorem 12.7].
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Clearly, we obtain that whenever ~x extends ~y, ~n extends ~m and ~n is appropriate for
~x, then p~x~n ≤F p~y~m. Furthermore, we define p~x to be the condition p~x~n, where ~n is the
lexicographically smallest sequence which is appropriate for ~x.
Before we proceed to prove that the definability lemma can fail for F, we need a
translation from L∈-formulae to Lω1,0(F,M)-formulae so that we can apply Corollary
2.1.10, where Lω1,0(F,M)-formulae are LOrd,0(F,M)-formulae in which all conjunctions
and disjunctions are countable.
Notation. Inductively, we assign to every L∈-formula ϕ whose free variables are among
{v0, . . . , vk−1} and all sequences ~n = n0, . . . , nk−1 of natural numbers an Lω1,0(F,M)-
formula ϕ∗~n as follows:
(vi = vj)
∗
~n = (nˇi = nˇj)
(vi ∈ vj)∗~n = (op(nˇi, nˇj) ∈ E˙)
(¬ϕ)∗~n = (¬ϕ∗~n)
(ϕ ∨ ψ)∗~n = (ϕ∗~n ∨ ψ∗~n)
(∃vkϕ)∗~n = (
∨
i∈ω
ϕ∗~n,i).
If ~n = 0, . . . , k − 1, then we simply write ϕ∗ for ϕ∗~n and if ~x is a sequence in M and ~n is
such that p~x = p~x~n, then we write ϕ
∗
~x for ϕ
∗
~n. In particular, if v0 is the only free variable of
ϕ, then ϕ∗x is ϕ
∗.
The next lemma is the key ingredient to obtain a first-order truth predicate T for
M. We will use the translation of L∈-formulae to Lω1,0(F,M)-formulae to define truth by
〈M,∈〉 |= ϕ(x) if and only if 〈ω,E〉 |= ϕ(n), where n = F (x), if and only if px MF ϕ∗x.
Lemma 2.5.2. For every L∈-formula ϕ with free variables among {v0, . . . , vk−1} and for
all ~x = x0, . . . , xk−1 ∈M , the following conditions hold:
(1) M |= ϕ(~x) if and only if p~x MF ϕ∗~x.
(2) M |= ¬ϕ(~x) if and only if p~x MF ¬ϕ∗~x.
Proof. First, we verify that for every formula ϕ with free variables in {v0, . . . , vk−1} and
for all ~n ∈ ωk appropriate for ~x,
p~x MF ϕ∗~x ⇐⇒ p~x~n MF ϕ∗~n.(2.3)
Let p~x MF ϕ∗~x and let ~m be such that p~x = p~x~m. Consider the automorphism pi on F that
for every condition p = 〈dp, ep, fp〉 replaces every mi appearing in dp, ep and dom(fp) by
ni. Clearly, pi(p
~x) = p~x~n and so p
~x
~n MF ϕ∗~n. The converse follows in the same way.
Working in V, we now verify (1) and (2) by induction on the complexity of formulae.
Observe that it suffices to check only that M |= ϕ(~x) implies p~x MF ϕ∗~x and that M |=
¬ϕ(~x) implies p~x MF ¬ϕ∗~x, since the backwards directions of (1) and (2) immediately
follow from the forward directions of (2) and (1) respectively.
For equations this is obvious. Suppose now that M |= x ∈ y. Let G be generic over M
with px,y ∈ G. Then by definition of px,y, 〈0, 1〉 ∈ E implying that M[G] |= ((v0 ∈ v1)∗)G.
The converse is similar.
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For negations, both (1) and (2) follow directly from the induction hypothesis.
We turn to disjunctions. Assume that M |= (ϕ ∨ ψ)(~x). Without loss of generality,
assume that M |= ϕ(~x). Then inductively, we get that p~x MF ϕ∗~x. But then clearly p~x MF
(ϕ ∨ ψ)∗~x. Conversely, assume that M |= ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ)(~x). This means that M |= ¬ϕ(~x) and
M |= ¬ψ(~x). By assumption, this means that p~x MF ¬ϕ∗~x ∧ ¬ψ∗~x, hence p~x MF ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ)∗~x.
Suppose now that M |= ∃vkϕ(~x, vk). Then there is y ∈ M such that M |= ϕ(~x, y).
This means that p~x,y MF ϕ∗~x,y. Let ~n be the sequence such that p~x = p~x~n. Now observe that
by (2.3), we have for every i ∈ ω such that ~n, i is appropriate for ~x, y that p~x,y~n,i MF ϕ∗~n,i.
Take an F-generic filter G over M with p~x = px~n ∈ G. By a density argument, there is
i ∈ ω such that ~n, i is appropriate for ~x, y and p~x,y~n,i ∈ G. By assumption, this implies that
M[G] |= (ϕ∗~n,i)G, hence also M[G] |= ((∃vkϕ)∗~x)G.
Assume now that M |= ¬∃vkϕ(~x, vk). Then for every y ∈ M , M |= ¬ϕ(~x, y). Let ~n
be the sequence in ωk with p~x = p~x~n. We have to show that p
~x  ¬∨i∈ω ϕ∗~n,i. Let G be
F-generic over M with p~x ∈ G and suppose for a contradiction that M[G] |= (∨i∈ω ϕ∗~n,i)G.
Then there is i ∈ ω such that M[G] |= (ϕ∗~n,i)G. Furthermore, there must be some y ∈ M
such that p~x,y~n,i ∈ G. However, since M |= ¬ϕ(~x, y), p~x,y MF ¬ϕ∗~x,y and therefore by (2.3),
p~x,y~n,i MF ¬ϕ∗~n,i which is absurd.
For the rest of this section, we will assume, without loss of generality, that whenever
ϕ has exactly one free variable vi, then i = 0.
Theorem 2.5.3. If F satisfies the definability lemma for “v0 ∈ v1” or for “v0 = v1” over
M, then C contains a first-order truth predicate for M .
Proof. If the definability lemma holds either for “v0 ∈ v1” or for “v0 = v1”, then F satisfies
the uniform forcing theorem for LOrd,0(F,M)-formulae as a consequence Corollary 2.1.10.
But then by Lemma 2.5.2,
T = {〈pϕq, x〉 | pϕq ∈ Fml1, x ∈M, px MF ϕ∗} ∈ C
is a first-order truth predicate for M .
Theorem 2.5.3 implies that the definability lemma fails whenever C does not contain
a first-order truth predicate for M . An important class of such models is the following.
Corollary 2.5.4. If M is a countable transitive model of ZF− and M = 〈M,Def(M)〉
then FM does not satisfy the definability lemma over M.
Proof. Let M be a countable transitive model of ZF−. Assume, towards a contradiction,
that the class {〈p, σ, τ〉 | p MF σ = τ} is definable over M . Then FM satisfies the defin-
ability lemma for atomic formulae over M. By Theorem 2.5.3, there is a first-order truth
predicate for M that is first-order definable over M . This contradicts Tarski’s theorem
on the undefinability of truth.
We can even do better and find fixed names ν and µ ∈ MF such that the forcing
theorem for ν = µ implies the existence of a first-order truth predicate.
Lemma 2.5.5. There exist µ, ν ∈MF and {〈pϕq, qpϕq〉 | pϕq ∈ Fml1} ∈M such that
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(1) If ϕ has one free variable and x ∈ M , then M |= ϕ(x) iff for all r ≤F px, qpϕq,
r MF µ = ν.
(2) If ϕ is a sentence, then M |= ϕ iff qpϕq MF µ = ν.
Proof. Since the proof of (2) is a simplified version of the proof of (1), we only verify (1).
Choose an antichain {qn | n ∈ ω} ⊆ F such that for every n ∈ ω, 0 /∈ dom(qn), e.g. take
qn = 〈{1, . . . , n+ 1}, {〈1, n+ 1〉}, ∅〉.
Consider the names νpϕ∗q, µpϕ∗q as defined in Lemma 2.1.9. We will only consider non-
atomic formulae, since all atomic formulae with at most one free variable are either tau-
tologically true or false. The proof of Lemma 2.1.9 shows that for pϕq ∈ Fml1 with ϕ
non-atomic, all elements of νpϕ∗q, µpϕ∗q are of the form 〈τ,1F〉 for some τ ∈ MF. Let
k : ω → Fml1 be a bijection and let j : ω → Fmlω1,0(F,M) be given by j(n) = pϕ∗q,
where k(n) = pϕq. Now set
ν = {〈τ, qn〉 | 〈τ,1F〉 ∈ νj(n)}
µ = {〈τ, qn〉 | 〈τ,1F〉 ∈ µj(n)}.
This yields that qn MF ν = νj(n) and qn MF µ = µj(n) for each n ∈ ω. Moreover, since
0 /∈ dom(qn), px0 and qn are compatible for every x ∈ M and n ∈ ω. For pϕq ∈ Fml1, we
put
qpϕq = q
k−1(pϕq).
To check (1), suppose first that M |= ϕ(x) for some L∈-formula ϕ and x ∈M . Let r ∈ F
be such that r ≤F px, qpϕq. Since r ≤F qpϕq, r MF ν = νpϕ∗q ∧ µ = µpϕ∗q. On the other
hand, since r ≤F px, Lemma 2.5.2 implies that r MF ϕ∗, i.e. by Lemma 2.1.9, r MF ν = µ.
Conversely, assume that M |= ¬ϕ(x). By (1) applied to the negation of ϕ, we have that
for all r ≤F px, qp¬ϕq, r MF µ = ν. Since px and qp¬ϕq are compatible, such r exists.
Now let pi be the automorphism on F which for p = 〈dp, ep, fp〉 swaps all occurrences of
k−1(p¬ϕq) and k−1(pϕq) in dp, ep and dom(fp). Then pi(qp¬ϕq) ≤F qpϕq and pi(px) = px.
In particular, pi(r) ≤F px, qpϕq and so pi(r) MF ν = νpϕ∗q ∧ µ = µpϕ∗q. Moreover, since
pi(r) ≤F px, by Lemma 2.5.2 we obtain pi(r) MF ¬ϕ∗. Finally, by Lemma 2.1.9, this proves
that pi(r) MF µpϕ∗q 6= νpϕ∗q and so pi(r) MF µ 6= ν.
Corollary 2.5.6. There exist ν, µ ∈ MF such that if {p ∈ F | p MF µ = ν} ∈ C, then C
contains a first-order truth predicate for M . In particular, {p ∈ F | p MF µ = ν} is not
first-order definable over M .
In the remainder of this section, we show that amenability of the forcing relation for
the forcing F can consistently fail.
Definition 2.5.7. Let 〈M,∈〉 be an ∈-structure and C ∈ P(M). Then we say that C is
M-amenable, if for every set x ∈M , C ∩ x ∈ is an element of M .
To prove the non-amenability of the F-forcing relation, we will work with models all
of whose ordinals are first-order definable.
Definition 2.5.8. An ∈-structure 〈M,∈〉 is said to be
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(1) a Paris model , if each ordinal in M is definable in M by a L∈-formula without
parameters.
(2) pointwise definable, if every element of M is definable by a L∈-formula without
parameters.
Note that the existence of a countable transitive model of ZFC yields the existence
of a countable transitive Paris model satisfying the axioms of ZFC – this follows from
[HLR13, Theorem 11], where it is shown that every countable transitive model of ZFC
has a pointwise definable class forcing extension. However, for our purpose, it is enough
to consider Paris models. In Theorem 2.5.12 we provide a simplified argument to verify
(the weaker statement) that certain countable transitive models of ZFC have class forcing
extensions which are Paris models.
We will work with a countable, transitive Paris model M |= ZF−. Note that the least
α such that Lα |= ZF− is such a model.
Lemma 2.5.9. Let M be a countable transitive Paris model with M |= ZF−. Then
X = {qpϕq | pϕq ∈ Fml0, qpϕq MF µ = ν}
is not an element of M , where qpϕq, µ, ν are as in Lemma 2.5.5.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that X ∈M . Observe that for every L∈-sentence,
(2.4) M |= ϕ ⇐⇒ qpϕq ∈ X.
Consider C = {pϕq | qp∃!x∈Ordϕ(x)q ∈ X}. Since X ∈ M , so is C. Observe that we can
order the elements of C by
pϕq ≺ pψq ⇐⇒ qp∃x,y∈Ord[x<y∧ϕ(x)∧ψ(y)]q ∈ X.
As a consequence of (2.4), we know that 〈C,≺〉 has order type OrdM , a contradiction.
In particular, this shows that the F-forcing relation need not be amenable over the
ground model.
Corollary 2.5.10. If M is a countable transitive Paris model with M |= ZF−, then the
FM -forcing relation for “v0 = v1” is not M-amenable.
2.5.2 A failure of the truth lemma
In the following, we show that the truth lemma can consistently fail for class forcing.
Note that by Lemma 2.1.9, if we find a notion of class forcing P and an infinitary formula
for which the truth lemma fails, then we automatically obtain that it fails for “v0 = v1”.
To see this, suppose that ϕ is an LOrd,0(P,M)-formula such that P does not satisfy the
truth lemma for ϕ. Assume towards a contradiction that the truth lemma for “v0 = v1”
holds and assume that that G is P-generic with M [G] |= ϕG. Then by Lemma 2.1.9,
M [G] |= µGpϕq = νGpϕq and thus there is p ∈ G with p MP µpϕq = νpϕq. But then p also
forces ϕ.
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If P is any notion of class forcing that satisfies the forcing theorem, we denote by F˙
the canonical class P-name for FM [G] in a P-generic extension M [G]. As an example of the
failure of the truth lemma, we will consider two-step iterations where the second iterand
will be of the form FM [G], where G is generic for the first iterand.
Theorem 2.5.11. Let M = 〈M, C〉 be a countable transitive model of GB− which has a
hierarchy. Let P be a notion of class forcing for M with the following properties:
(a) P is pretame.
(b) There is a P-generic filter G such that M [G] is a Paris model.
(c) For every p ∈ G there is a P-generic filter G¯ such that M [G¯] is not a Paris model.
Then the truth lemma fails for P ∗ F˙.
Proof. We will find an infinitary formula Φ in the language LOrd,0(P ∗ F˙,M) such that if
G ∗ H is P ∗ F˙-generic over M, then ΦG∗H expresses that M [G] is a Paris model. Using
this, we choose G as in (b). Then ΦG∗H holds, while by (c), there cannot be a condition
in G ∗H forcing this, implying that the truth lemma fails for P ∗ F˙.
Given a formula ϕ with exactly one free variable, let Ψpϕq denote the formula
ϕ(v0) ∧ ∀v1 (ϕ(v1) → v1 = v0) ,
i.e. Ψpϕq(x) states that “x is unique such that ϕ(x) holds”. Similarly, let Ω(x) be the
formula expressing that x is an ordinal. If G is P-generic over M , then M [G] is a Paris
model if and only if for all ordinals α ∈M [G] there is ϕ such that M [G] |= Ψpϕq(α). Now
recall that as described in Section 2.5.1, for each ϕ we can assign to Ψpϕq, Ω and n ∈ ω
infinitary formulae (Ψpϕq)
∗
n and Ω
∗
n in the forcing language of FM [G] with the properties
(as in Lemma 2.5.2)
M [G] |= Ψpϕq(x) ⇐⇒ pxn M[G]FM [G] (Ψpϕq)∗n
M [G] |= Ω(x) ⇐⇒ pxn M[G]FM [G] Ω∗n.
However, since we will need infinitary formulae in the forcing language of P ∗ F˙, we have
to modify this approach slightly. For a formula ψ and n ∈ ω, we define ψ∗∗n in the
same way we defined ψ∗n, but we replace every occurence of some condition p ∈ FM [G] by
〈1P, pˇ〉 ∈ P ∗ F˙. Note that this is possible, since for every condition p which appears in
ψ∗n, the function fp is empty, and so p ∈M . Let
Φ =
∧
n∈ω
∨
pϕq∈Fml1
[Ω∗∗n −→ (Ψpϕq)∗∗n ] .
We claim that M [G] is a Paris model if and only if M [G][H] |= ΦG∗H holds for
every (or, equivalently, for some) filter H which is FM [G]-generic over M [G]. Suppose
first that M [G] is a Paris model. Let H be FM [G]-generic over M [G] and n ∈ ω. By a
density argument, there is x ∈ M [G] such that pxn (as defined in M [G]) is in H. Since
M [G] is a Paris model, either M [G] |= ¬Ω(x) or there is some formula ϕ such that
M [G] |= Ψpϕq(x). Let x˙ ∈ MP be a name for x. Since P is pretame, it satisfies the truth
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lemma by Theorem 2.2.2 and hence there is q ∈ P with q MP [Ω(x˙) → Ψpϕq(x˙)]. Let p˙xn
be a P-name for pxn ∈ FM [G]. Then 〈q, p˙xn〉 MP∗F˙ [Ω∗∗n → (Ψpϕq)∗∗n ]. To see this, let G¯ ∗ H¯
be P ∗ F˙-generic over M with 〈q, p˙xn〉 ∈ G¯ ∗ H¯ and put x¯ = x˙G¯. Then M [G¯] |= Ψpϕq(x¯)
and (p˙xn)
G¯ = px¯n. But since p
x¯
n MFM [G¯] (Ψϕ)
∗
n by Lemma 2.5.2, it is easy to see that in
M [G¯][H¯] also ((Ψpϕq)
∗∗
n )
G¯∗H¯ holds. This proves that 〈q, p˙xn〉 MP∗F˙ (Ψpϕq)∗∗n . Now since
〈q, p˙xn〉 ∈ G ∗H, we have established that M [G][H] |= ΦG∗H .
Conversely, suppose that M [G][H] |= ΦG∗H . Let α ∈ M [G] be an ordinal. Let
n ∈ ω such that pαn ∈ H. By assumption, there is pϕq ∈ Fml1 such that M [G][H] |=
((Ψpϕq)
∗∗
n )
G∗H . We want to verify that M [G] |= Ψpϕq(α). If not, we can proceed as before
and obtain q ∈ G such that 〈q, p˙αn〉 MP∗F˙ (¬Ψpϕq)∗∗n , which is contradictory.
By a special case of more general results in [Ena05] and [HLR13] there is a tame3
notion of class forcing P∗ such that for every countable transitive GBc-model of the form
M = 〈M,Def(M)〉, there is a P∗-generic filter G over M such that M [G] is pointwise
definable.
For the benefit of the reader, we will describe a very simple tame notion of class forcing
P and indicate a proof that there is a P-generic extension which is a Paris model over
any countable transitive GBc−-model M = 〈M,Def(M)〉 such that 〈M,∈〉 |= V = L. The
outline of the argument follows the proof of [Ena05, Theorem 2.8] and [HLR13, Theorems
11 and 12].
Theorem 2.5.12. Suppose that M = 〈M,Def(M)〉 is a countable transitive model such
that 〈M,∈〉 |= ZFC + V = L. Then there is a pretame notion of class forcing P for M
which satisfies the forcing theorem and a P-generic vilter such that 〈M [G],∈〉 is a Paris
model.
Proof. P is a two-step iteration, where the first step is to force with C = 〈2<Ord,⊇〉. Note
that C is < Ord-closed and hence does not add new sets by Example 2.3.2 and Lemma
2.3.4. Following the proof of [HLR13, Theorem 12], we show that there is a C-generic filter
U such that all ordinals of M are first-order definable over 〈M,∈, U〉. Let 〈αn | n ∈ ω〉
be an increasing enumeration (in V) of OrdM and let 〈Dn | n ∈ ω〉 be an enumeration of
all dense subsets of C which are definable over M . Since M satisfies V = L, each Dn is
definable from ordinal parameters. Moroever, if ϕn is the formula defining Dn, we may
assume that the parameters occurring in ϕn are among {αi | i < n}. In order to construct
the desired C-generic filter U , we define a ≤C-descending sequence 〈pn | n ∈ ω〉 in the
following way. We start with p0 = 1C.
• Given p2n for some n ∈ ω, let p2n+1 ≤C p2n be an extension of p2n+1 of minimal
length such that p2n+1 ∈ Dn.
• Given p2n+1, let p2n+2 ≤C p2n+1 be the strengthening obtained by concatenating
αn-many 1’s and one 0 to the end of p2n+1.
Finally, let U = {p ∈ C | ∃n ∈ ω (pn ≤C p)}. By construction, U is C-generic over M.
We claim that every ordinal is definable in 〈M,∈, U〉 without parameters. To see this, we
show by induction on n ∈ ω that αn, p2n+1 and p2n+2 are definable without parameters
3Tameness is a strengthening of pretameness defined in [Fri00] which is essentially equivalent to the
preservation of GB.
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in 〈M,∈, U〉. Suppose that n ∈ ω and αi, p2i+1, p2i+2 have already been defined for all
i < n. Then p2n+1 is defined as the least initial segment q of
⋃
U such that q ≤C pn and
M |= ϕn(q). Since all parameters of ϕn are among {αi | i < n}, our inductive hypothesis
implies that this definition does not require any parameters. Furthermore, p2n+2 is defined
as the minimal extension of p2n+1 obtained by adding a string of 1’s and one 0, and αn is
the length of the aforementioned string of 1’s.
The second step is to code the generic U into the continuum function, using an Easton
iteration. We follow the proof of [HLR13, Theorem 11]. By assumption, we have that
〈M,∈〉 |= GCH. Note that we may view U as a class U ⊆ OrdM . We force over M[U ] with
the Easton product Q =
∏
α∈U Add(ℵα,ℵ++α ), i.e. for every regular M -cardinal κ and for
every q ∈ Q, |dom(q)∩κ| < κ. By Example 2.2.12, Q is pretame and therefore it preserves
GB−. Hence it follows from Remark 2.2.16 that C ∗ Q˙ is pretame. Furthermore, if H is
Q-generic over M[U ] then M [U ][H] is a Paris model, since every ordinal is definable in
〈M,∈, U〉 and U is definable over M [U ][H] by α ∈ U iff 2ℵα = ℵ++α .
The forcing notion P described in Theorem 2.5.12 satisfies (a) and (b) over any count-
able transitive model of GBc of the form 〈M,Def(M)〉. We now present two consistent
examples of such models over which P also satisfies condition (c) in the statement of
Theorem 2.5.11.
Example 2.5.13. (1) The simplest possibility is to start with a model M = 〈M, C〉 of
KM. By forcing over the first-order part 〈M,Def(M)〉 of M, we may obtain a P-
generic filter G such that M [G] is a Paris model. On the other hand, we can force
over the KM-model M and choose a filter G¯ which is P-generic over M. Since P is
tame, by [Ant15, Theorem 23] M[G¯] |= KM. But this is a contradiction, since no
model of KM is a Paris model:
Suppose for a contradiction that N = 〈N,D〉 is a model of KM which is a Paris
model. Using that D contains a first-order truth predicate for formulae with one
free variable, it follows that D contains a surjection from ω to OrdN , contradicting
replacement.
(2) If we want to avoid KM, we can instead start with a countable transitive model
〈M,∈〉 of ZFC which has cardinality ℵ1 in L[M ] and which is closed under countable
sequences in L[M ]. Now since the forcing P is σ-closed4 in M , for every p ∈ PM there
is a PM -generic filter Gp over M in L[M ] containing p. Since M is uncountable in
L[M ], no generic extension of the form M [Gp] is a Paris model. Note that it is easy
to obtain such a model M starting in a model of V = L with an inaccessible cardinal
and then forcing with Col(ω, ω1).
4i.e. < ω1-closed
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Boolean completions
One of the standard approaches to set forcing is to force with complete Boolean alge-
bras. The crucial observation is that every partial order can be embedded into a complete
Boolean algebra, its so-called Boolean completion. Moreover, in set forcing, Boolean
completions are always unique up to isomorphisms. In this chapter we investigate to
what extent these results carry over to class forcing. In particular, we will show that
the existence of a Boolean completion is essentially equivalent to the forcing theorem.
Furthermore, we will prove that unions of set-sized complete subforcings always have a
Boolean completion, and that in KM every notion of class forcing has a Boolean comple-
tion. Finally, we prove that in class forcing Boolean completions need not be unique.
3.1 (Pre-)Boolean algebras and completions
We generalize the concept of a Boolean algebra in order to allow for preorders which are
not antisymmetric, and define Boolean completions in the framework of class forcing.
3.1.1 Pre-Boolean algebras
LetM = 〈M, C〉 be a fixed countable transitive model of GB−. The following generalization
of Boolean algebras was already been used by Hamkins and Lo¨we in the context of modal
logic of forcing (see [HL08]).
Definition 3.1.1. A pre-Boolean algebra is a structure of the form
B = 〈B, 0B,1B,¬B,∨B,∧B,≈B〉1
such that the following statements hold for all a, b, c ∈ B:
(1) ≈B is an congruence relation on 〈B, 0B,1B,¬,∨,∧〉.
(2) a ∨ (b ∨ c) ≈B (a ∨ b) ∨ c and a ∧ (b ∧ c) ≈B (a ∧ b) ∧ c (associativity).
(3) a ∨ b ≈B b ∨ a and a ∧ b ≈B b ∧ a (commutativity).
(4) a ∨ (a ∧ b) ≈B a and a ∧ (a ∨ b) ≈B a (absorption).
(5) a ∨ 0B ≈B a and a ∧ 1B ≈B a (identity).
1If the context is clear, we will omit the subscripts of the Boolean operations.
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(6) a ∨ (b ∧ c) ≈B (a ∨ b) ∧ (a ∨ c) and a ∧ (b ∨ c) ≈B (a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ c) (distributivity).
(7) a ∨ ¬a ≈B 1B and a ∧ ¬a ≈B 0B (complements).
Furthermore, we can define a preorder on the domain B by
a ≤B b⇐⇒ a ∨ b ≈B b.
Finally, by B∗ we denote the preorder 〈B \ {b ∈ B | b ≈B 0B},≤B〉 of all elements of B
which are not ≈B-equivalent to 0B. Observe that in B∗, a⊥B∗b if and only if a ∧ b ≈ 0B.
It is clear that Boolean algebras constitute a special case of pre-Boolean algebras.
Definition 3.1.2. A pre-Boolean algebra B is called a Boolean algebra, if its equivalence
relation ≈B is given by =.
Lemma 3.1.3. If B is a pre-Boolean algebra, then B∗ is separative.
Proof. Suppose that a, b ∈ B∗ with a B b. We show that a∧¬b ∈ B∗ because this proves
the claim, since a ∧ ¬b ≤B a and a ∧ ¬b⊥Bb. Note that
a ≈B a ∧ (a ∨ b) ∧ (b ∨ ¬b) ≈B a ∧ (b ∨ (a ∧ ¬b))
≈B (a ∨ (a ∧ ¬b)) ∧ (b ∨ (a ∧ ¬b)) ≈B (a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ ¬b).
Hence if a ∧ ¬b ≈B 0B, then a ≈B a ∧ b contradicting our assumption.
We can characterize suprema in terms of the induced preorder which will result very
useful for performing class forcing with pre-Boolean algebras.
Lemma 3.1.4. If B is a pre-Boolean algebra, then a∨ b ≈B c if and only if a, b ≤B c and
{a, b} is predense in B∗ below c.
Proof. Suppose first that a ∨ b ≈B c. Then a ∧ c ≈B a ∧ (a ∨ b) ≈B a by the absorption
law, so a ≤B c. Similarly, we obtain b ≤B c. Suppose now that d ∈ B∗ with d ≤B c. We
have to check that either a ∧ d 6≈B 0B or b ∧ d 6≈B 0B. If this fails, then we obtain
0B ≈B (a ∧ d) ∨ (b ∧ d) ≈B (a ∨ b) ∧ d ≈B c ∧ d ≈B d,
a contradiction.
Conversely, assume that a, b ≤B c and {a, b} is predense below c. Note first that
(a ∨ b) ∧ c ≈B (a ∧ c) ∨ (b ∧ c) ≈B c ∨ c ≈B c,
so c ≤B a ∨ b. For the other inequality, suppose that c B a ∨ b. By separativity of B∗
there is d ≤B c such that 0B = d ∧ (a ∨ b) = (d ∧ a) ∨ (d ∧ b). But this contradicts our
assumption that {a, b} is predense below c.
Lemma 3.1.4 motivates the following definition.
Definition 3.1.5. A pre-Boolean algebra B is said to be
(1) M-complete, if there is a map supB : P(B) ∩M → B in C such that supB({a, b}) =
a ∨B b and the following conditions hold for each X ∈ P(B) ∩M :
(a) For each b ∈ X, b ≤B supBX,
(b) X is predense below supBX.
(2) C-complete, if there is a map supB : P(B) ∩ C → B which is definable over M and
satisfies the properties above for each X ∈ P(B) ∩ C.
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3.1.2 (Pre-)Boolean completions
Let M = 〈M, C〉 be a countable transitive model of GB− and let P be a notion of class
forcing for M. Unlike in set forcing, in class forcing we distinguish between two variants
of Boolean completions, depending on whether there only exist suprema of subsets of P
which are in M , or whether every subset of P which is an element of C has a supremum.
Definition 3.1.6. Let P be a notion of class forcing for M. A pre-Boolean M-completion
of P in M is an M -complete pre-Boolean algebra
B = 〈B, 0B, 1B,¬B,∨B,∧B,≈B〉
with the following properties:
(1) B, all Boolean operations on B and ≈B are in C.
(2) There is an injective dense embedding i : P→ B∗ in C.
(3) For all p, q ∈ P, p ≤P q if and only if i(p) ≤B i(q).
Similarly, we define a pre-Boolean C-completion of P in M to be a pre-Boolean M -
completion which is additionally C-complete.
Furthermore, a pre-Boolean M -completion of P which is a Boolean algebra is called a
Boolean M-completion of P in M and a Boolean M -completion which is also C-complete
is said to be a Boolean C-completion of P in M.
Remark 3.1.7. If P has a pre-Boolean M -completion B then P is separative. This follows
from the fact that B is separative by Lemma 3.1.3 and condition (3) in Definition 3.1.6
above. Conversely, if P is separative and i : P → Q is any complete embedding, then
condition (3) is always satisfied. Therefore, (3) is equivalent to stipulating that P is
separative.
In set forcing, Boolean completions are unique: If B0 and B1 are both Boolean com-
pletions of P and e0 : P→ B0 and e1 : P→ B1 are dense embeddings, then one can define
an isomorphism from B0 to B1 by setting
f(b) = supB1{e1(p) | p ∈ P ∧ e0(p) ≤B0 b}
for b ∈ B0. Moreover, f fixes P in the sense that f(e0(p)) = e1(p) for every condition
p ∈ P. In class forcing, this proof works only for Boolean C-completions. We will show in
Section 3.5 that Boolean M -completions need not be unique in the following sense.
Definition 3.1.8. We say that a notion of class forcing P has a unique Boolean M-
completion in M, if P has a Boolean M -completion B0 in M and for every other Boolean
M -completion B1 of P in M there is an isomorphism in V between B0 and B1 which fixes
P. Similarly, by replacing M by C in the definition above, we define that P has a unique
Boolean C-completion in M.
As sketched above, we obtain the following.
Lemma 3.1.9. Boolean C-completions of notions of class forcing are always unique.
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3.1.3 The separative quotient
In this section, we fix a ground model M = 〈M, C〉 |= GB− which satisfies represen-
tatives choice. Since non-separative notions of class forcing do not have (pre)-Boolean
completions, we will sometimes have to pass to the so-called separative quotient which
is separative and forcing equivalent to the original forcing notion. The computations in
the present section are adaptations of standard results in set forcing. Accounts on the
separative quotient in set forcing can be found in any textbook about set theory such as
[Jec03].
Fix a notion of class forcing P = 〈P,≤P〉. We define an equivalence relation on P by
stipulating
p ≈P q ⇐⇒ ∀r ∈ P (r ‖P p↔ r ‖P q).
Now using representatives choice, there are S(P) ∈ C and a surjective map pi : P → S(P)
such that for all p, q ∈ P, p ≈P q if and only if pi(p) = pi(q). For notational simplicity, we
write [p] instead of pi(p). Furthermore, we define an order on S(P) by
[p] ≤S(P) [q]⇐⇒ ∀r ∈ P (r ‖P p→ r ‖P q).
Then we have the following properties:
(1) The ordering ≤S(P) is well-defined.
(2) For all p, q ∈ P, p ≤P q implies [p] ≤S(P) [q].
(3) Two conditions p, q ∈ P are compatible in P if and only if [p] and [q] are compatible
in S(P).
(4) S(P) is separative.
The proof of all properties above are standard computations. The following observations
can be found in any standard textbook on set theory. For the sake of completeness, we
nevertheless give full proofs.
Lemma 3.1.10. If G is P-generic over M, then pi′′G is S(P)-generic over M. Conversely,
if H is S(P)-generic over M, then pi−1[H] is P-generic over M.
Proof. Firstly, we assume that G is a P-generic filter and show that pi′′G is S(P)-generic.
For upwards closure, let p ∈ G and [q] ≥S(P) [p]. Clearly, D = {r ∈ P | r ≤P p, q} is dense
below p, hence there must be some r ∈ G with r ≤P p, q. In particular, q ∈ G and hence
[q] ∈ pi′′G. That all elements of pi′′G are compatible follows from the analogous property
for P and condition (3) above. For genericity, suppose that D¯ ∈ C is dense open in S(P).
Let D = pi−1(D¯). We show that D is dense in P. Let p ∈ P. Now by density of D¯, there
is some q ∈ P such that [q] ≤S(P) [p] and [q] ∈ D¯. In particular, p, q are compatible, so we
can take a witness r ≤P p, q. Then by (2), [r] ≤S(P) [q] and since D¯ is open, [r] ∈ D¯. Hence
r ∈ D with r ≤P p. This shows that D is dense. By genericity of P, there is p ∈ D ∩ G
and so [p] ∈ pi′′G ∩ D¯.
Conversely, let H be S(P)-generic and put G = pi−1[H]. Upwards closure is an imme-
diate consequence of (2) and condition (3) implies that G is a filter. It remains to check
that G is generic. Let D be dense in P and set D¯ = pi′′D. We show that D¯ is dense. Let
p ∈ P and q ≤P p such that q ∈ D. Then by (2), [q] ≤S(P) [p] and [q] ∈ D¯. By genericity
of H, there is [p] ∈ H ∩ D¯. In particular, p ∈ G ∩D.
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Next we want to check that P and S(P) generate the same generic extensions and
that the definability lemma for S(P) implies the definability lemma for P. We show by
induction on the rank of σ that for every P-generic filter G and σ ∈MP, pi∗(σ)pi′′G = σG,
where pi∗ is the map on MP induced by pi. Suppose that this holds for every τ ∈MP with
rank(τ) < rank(σ). Let H = pi′′G.
pi∗(σ)H = {pi∗(τ)H | ∃[p] ∈ H [〈pi∗(τ), [p]〉 ∈ pi∗(σ)]}
= {τG | ∃p ∈ G (〈τ, p〉 ∈ σ)}
= σG.
For the second equality, suppose that p ∈ G and τ ∈ dom(σ) such that [p] ∈ H and
〈pi∗(τ), [p]〉 ∈ pi∗(σ). Then there is q ∈ P such that 〈τ, q〉 ∈ σ and p ≈P q. By density
of {r ∈ P | r ≤P p, q} we obtain that q ∈ G. This shows that whenever G is P-generic,
then M [G] ⊆ M [pi′′G]. The other inclusion holds as well by surjectivity of pi. Now if
H is S(P)-generic, then G = pi−1[H] is P-generic and since pi′′G = H, we also have that
M [G] = M [H]. Thus we have shown the following:
Lemma 3.1.11. Suppose that M satisfies representatives choice. Then a notion of class
forcing P for M satisfies the forcing theorem if and only if its separative quotient S(P)
does so. More precisely, if σ, τ ∈MP are P-names and p ∈ P, then
p MP σ ∈ τ ⇐⇒ [p] MS(P) pi∗(σ) ∈ pi∗(τ)
where pi : P→ S(P), p 7→ [p] is as defined above.
3.2 Boolean completions and the forcing theorem
Let M = 〈M, C〉 be a fixed model of GB−. In this section we investigate the relationship
between the forcing theorem and the existence of a (pre)-Boolean M -completion.
3.2.1 Boolean values
Definition 3.2.1 (Boolean values). Let B = 〈B, 0B,1B,¬,∧,∨〉 be an M -complete pre-
Boolean algebra. Then we can compute the Boolean values of LOrd,0(B,M)-formulae as
in the case of set-sized Boolean algebras by
Jpˇ ∈ G˙KB = p,Jσ ∈ τKB = supB{Jσ = piKB ∧ p | 〈pi, q〉 ∈ τ},Jσ = τKB = Jσ ⊆ τKB ∧ Jτ ⊆ σKB,Jσ ⊆ τKB = infB{¬p ∨ Jpi ∈ τKB | 〈pi, p〉 ∈ σ}
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for σ, τ ∈ MB and p ∈ B. Furthermore, we can extend this to infinitary formulae in the
natural way by stipulating
J¬ϕKB = ¬JϕKB,J∨
i∈I
ϕiKB = supB{JϕiKB | i ∈ I},
J∧
i∈I
ϕiKB = infB{JϕiKB | i ∈ I}.
Note that this definition does not require class recursion, since we can define it by recursion
on the well-founded subformula relation. However, we do not - in general - have Boolean
values for all L2∈-formulae, since this would require us to take suprema of proper classes
and hyperclasses of conditions.
Suppose now that B is a C-complete pre-Boolean algebra. Then we can define Boolean
values for all L∈-formulae with class parameters byJσ ∈ ΓKB = supB{Jσ = τKB ∧ p | 〈τ, p〉 ∈ Γ},JΣ = ΓKB = JΣ ⊆ ΓKB ∧ JΓ ⊆ ΣKB,JΣ ⊆ ΓKB = infB{¬p ∨ Jτ ∈ ΓKB | 〈τ, p〉 ∈ Σ},J∀xϕ(x)KB = infB{Jϕ(τ)KB | τ ∈MP},
where Σ,Γ ∈ CP, σ ∈MP and ϕ is a L∈-formula with class parameters. Note that we can
not define Boolean values for formulae of the form ∀Xϕ(X), since then we would have to
take the supremum of a hyperclass of conditions.
Lemma 3.2.2. Let B be an M-complete pre-Boolean algebra and let G be B∗-generic over
M. Then we have for every LOrd,0(B,M)-formula ϕ,
M [G] |= ϕG ⇐⇒ JϕKB ∈ G.(3.1)
Similarly, if B is a C-complete pre-Boolean algebra and G is B∗-generic over M then (3.1)
holds for every L∈-formula with class parameters.
Proof. We first prove (3.1) for atomic formulae. For formulae of the form pˇ ∈ G˙ this
is obvious. For formulae of the form σ ∈ τ and σ = τ we proceed by induction on
the name rank. Suppose now that M [G] |= σG ∈ τG. Then there is 〈pi, p〉 ∈ τ such
that p ∈ G and σG = piG. Inductively, we have that Jσ = piKB ∈ G and hence so isJσ = piKB ∧ p. But then Jσ ∈ τKB ∈ G. Conversely, assume that Jσ ∈ τKB ∈ G. Observe
that {Jσ = piKB ∧ p | 〈pi, p〉 ∈ τ} is predense below Jσ ∈ τKB. By genericity, there is
〈pi, p〉 ∈ τ such that Jσ = piKB ∧ p ∈ G. Consequently, we have that σG = piG ∈ τG as
desired.
Next, assume that σG ⊆ τG and fix 〈pi, p〉 ∈ σ. If ¬p /∈ G, then p ∈ G, since {p,¬p}
is a maximal antichain. But then piG ∈ σG ⊆ τG and by induction, Jpi ∈ τKB ∈ G. Thus
¬p∨ Jpi ∈ τKB ∈ G. Since this holds for every 〈pi, p〉 ∈ σ, Jσ ⊆ τKB ∈ G. For the converse,
let Jσ ⊆ τKB ∈ G and 〈pi, p〉 ∈ σ with p ∈ G. By assumption, ¬p ∨ Jpi ∈ τKB ∈ G and
so Jpi ∈ τKB ∈ G. Inductively, we obtain that piG ∈ τG. For formulae of the form σ = τ ,
(3.1) follows directly from the case σ ⊆ τ .
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If M [G] |= ¬ϕG, then M [G] 6|= ϕG and so JϕKB /∈ G. But this implies that J¬ϕKB =
¬JϕKB ∈ G. The converse is similar.
Suppose that M [G] |= ϕG, where ϕ is a disjunction of the form ∨i∈I ϕi. Then there
exists i0 ∈ I such that M [G] |= ϕGi0 . By induction, Jϕi0KB ∈ G and so JϕKB ∈ G. The
converse follows in the same way using that if {JϕiKB | i ∈ I} is predense below JϕKB. The
conjunctive case is easy and shall thus be omitted.
The proofs for the formulae containing class parameters are similar.
In Section 4.3 we are interested in the preservation of separation. We will show that
separation may fail for class forcing. However, all pre-Boolean algebras preserve simple
instances of separation, namely those given by rudimentary functions.
Definition 3.2.3. A model X is rudimentarily closed if it is closed under the following
functions (the rudimentary functions):
f0(x1, . . . , xk) = xi,
f1(x1, . . . , xk) = xi \ xj,
f2(x1, . . . , xk) = {xi, xj},
f3(x1, . . . , xk) = h(g1(x1, . . . , xk), . . . gl(x1, . . . , xk)), h, gi rudimentary and
f4(x1, . . . , xk) =
⋃
y∈x1
g(y, x2, . . . , xk), g rudimentary.
Lemma 3.2.4. If P is an M-complete pre-Boolean algebra and G is M-generic, then
M [G] is rudimentarily closed.
Proof. Closure under projections and compositions of rudimentary functions is obvious.
Assume that σ, τ ∈ MP. Clearly, {〈ρ, Jρ /∈ τKB ∧ p〉 | 〈ρ, p〉 ∈ σ} is a name for σG \ τG
and {〈σ,1P〉, 〈τ,1P〉} is a name for the unordered pair {σG, τG}. Next, suppose that
g(v0, v1) is a rudimentary function. We have to find a name for
⋃
x∈τG g(x, σ
G). Since g
is rudimentary, for every ρ ∈ dom(τ) there is a P-name piρ,σ for g(ρG, σG). Now put
θ = {〈η, p ∧ q〉 | ∃ρ (〈ρ, p〉 ∈ τ ∧ 〈η, q〉 ∈ piρ,σ)}.
Clearly, θG ⊆ ⋃x∈τG g(x, σG). For the converse, consider 〈ρ, p〉 ∈ τ with p ∈ G and
y ∈ g(ρG, σG). Hence there must be 〈η, q〉 ∈ piρ,σ such that q ∈ G and y = ηG. Then also
p ∧ q ∈ G, so ηG ∈ θG.
As in set forcing, Boolean values are closely related to the forcing theorem.
Lemma 3.2.5. If B is an M-complete pre-Boolean algebra, then we can define the forcing
relation for LOrd,0(B,M)-formulae by
p MB∗ ϕ⇐⇒ p ≤B JϕKB.
Proof. Suppose first that p B ϕ and that p B JϕKB. By separativity of B, there is
q ≤B p which is incompatible with JϕKB. Let G be B-generic over M with q ∈ G. Then
p ∈ G and hence M [G] |= ϕG. By Lemma 3.2.2 we obtain that JϕKB ∈ G contradicting
that q⊥BJϕKB. The converse follows directly from the previous lemma.
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Theorem 3.2.6. Let M = 〈M, C〉 be a countable transitive model of GB−. Suppose that P
is a separative notion of class forcing for M. Then the following statements are equivalent:
(1) P satisfies the definability lemma for one of the L∈-formulae “v0 ∈ v1” or “v0 = v1”.
(2) P satisfies the forcing theorem for all L∈-formulae with class parameters.
(3) P satisfies the uniform forcing theorem for all LOrd,0(P,M)-formulae.
(4) P has a pre-Boolean M-completion.
Proof. The equivalence of (1) – (3) follow from Theorem 2.1.5 and Lemma 2.1.9. As-
sume now that (3) holds. We will construct what could be seen as an analogue of the
Lindenbaum algebra. Define a pre-Boolean algebra in the following way: Consider the
class FmlOrd,0(P,M) of all Go¨del codes of infinitary formulae in the forcing language of P
endowed with the canonical Boolean operations, i.e. suprema and infima are just set-sized
disjunctions and conjunctions of formulae and complements are just negations, and with
the equivalence relation given by
pϕq ≈ pψq⇐⇒ 1P MP ϕ↔ ψ.
It is easy to check that this defines an M -complete pre-Boolean algebra. Moreover, the
embedding
i : P→ FmlOrd,0(P,M), p 7→ ppˇ ∈ G˙q
is injective and dense.
It remains to prove that (4) implies (1). Assume that P has a pre-Boolean M -
completion B(P). Without loss of generality, we may assume that the domain of P is
a subclass of the domain of B(P). Then we have for σ, τ ∈MP,
p MP σ ∈ τ ⇐⇒ p MB(P)∗ σ ∈ τ.
Since by Lemma 3.2.2, B(P)∗ satisfies the definability lemma for σ ∈ τ , by Lemma 2.1.7
so does P.
Corollary 3.2.7. Suppose that M satisfies representatives choice and let P be a separative
and antisymmetric notion of class forcing for M. Then P satisfies the forcing theorem if
and only if it has a Boolean M-completion.
Moreover, representatives choice is only necessary for the forward direction.
Proof. If P satisfies the forcing theorem we can proceed as in the proof of Theorem
3.2.6 and consider the pre-Boolean algebra FmlOrd,0(P,M). Let ≈ be the equivalence
relation given by pϕq ≈ pψq if and only if 1P MP ϕ ↔ ψ as above. Since M satisfies
representatives choice, there are B ∈ C and pi ∈ C such that pi : FmlOrd,0(P,M) → B is
surjective and such that pi(pϕq) = pi(pψq) if and only if pϕq ≈ pψq. Now we can obtain
induced Boolean operations on B in the obvious way and define 0B = pi(p0 6= 0q) and
1B = pi(p0 = 0q). Clearly, B is an M -complete Boolean algebra. We identify p ∈ P with
the formula pi(ppˇ ∈ G˙q), thus obtaining a dense embedding i : P→ B in C. Note that the
injectivity of i follows from the antisymmetry and separativity of P. The converse follows
from Theorem 3.2.6.
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Corollary 3.2.8. Suppose that M is a model of GB− which satisfies representatives choice.
Then a notion of class forcing P satisfies the forcing theorem if and only if its separative
quotient S(P) has a Boolean M-completion.
Proof. This follows directly from Lemma 3.1.11 and Theorem 3.2.7.
Corollary 3.2.9. If M is a model of GB− which has a hierarchy then every separative
pretame notion of class forcing for M has a pre-Boolean M-completion. Moreover, if P
is additionally antisymmetric then it has a Boolean M-completion.
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of Theorems 2.2.2 and 3.2.6 and Corollary 3.2.7.
In Section 4.4 we will show that in some models of GB− pretameness can in fact be
characterized by the existence of a Boolean M -completion.
3.3 Boolean completions in KM
In this section, we prove that in KM every separative notion of class forcing has a Boolean
completion. Moreover, we may conclude that in KM, unlike GB−, every notion of class
forcing satisfies the forcing theorem. An alternative proof of the forcing theorem in KM
which uses class recursion to prove that the syntactic forcing relation2 coincides with the
semantic one is presented in [Ant15].
Theorem 3.3.1. If M = 〈M, C〉 is a countable transitive model of KM, then every sepa-
rative notion of class forcing P for M has a pre-Boolean M-completion. In particular, if
P is antisymmetric, it has a Boolean M-completion.
Proof. Let M = 〈M, C〉 be a model of KM and let P = 〈P,≤P〉 be a separative notion
of class forcing for M. Making use of a suitable bijection in C, we may assume that
P ∩OrdM = ∅. Pick a disjoint partition 〈Aα | α ∈ OrdM〉 of OrdM such that {〈α, β〉 | β ∈
Aα} ∈ C. Using class recursion, we define ⊆-increasing sequences 〈Pα | α ∈ OrdM〉 and
〈Qα | α ∈ OrdM〉 of separative notions of class forcing containing P such that {〈p0, p1, α〉 |
p0 ≤Pα p1} ∈ C, {〈q0, q1, α〉 | q0 ≤Qα q1} ∈ C and P is dense in each P∗α and Q∗α, where P∗α
and Q∗α are the notions of class forcing obtained from Pα or Qα respectively, by removing
all conditions p which stengthen every other condition (i.e. which are equivalent to 0Pα or
0Qα respectively).
Let P0 = P . If α is a limit ordinal, let Pα =
⋃
β<α Pβ and ≤Pα=
⋃
β<α ≤Pβ for every
β < α. Suppose that Pα has been defined. We construct Qα by adding suprema for all
subsets of Pα in M , and then construct Pα+1 by adding negations for all elements of Qα.
More precisely, let Qα = Pα ∪ {supA | A ∈ M,A ⊆ Pα}, where supA ∈ A2·α is
different for each A ∈ M with A ⊆ Pα and {〈A, supA〉 | A ∈ M,A ⊆ Pα} ∈ C. Thus
2The syntactic forcing relation as defined in [Ant15, Definition 14] for class forcing is an analogue of
the one in set forcing (see [Kun80, Ch. VIII, Definition 3.3]).
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Qα ∈ C and we define an ordering ≤Qα on Qα with ≤Qα ∩ (Pα × Pα) =≤Pα and ≤Qα∈ C
in the following way:
supA ≤Qα p ⇐⇒ ∀a ∈ A(a ≤Pα p),
p ≤Qα supA ⇐⇒ A is predense below p in Pα,
supA ≤Qα supB ⇐⇒ ∀a ∈ A(a ≤Qα supB)
(3.2)
for all p ∈ Pα, and A,B ∈ M with A ⊆ Pα. Firstly, we check that P is dense in Q∗α. If
A ⊆ Pα with A ∈M such that supA ∈ Q∗α then A∩P∗α 6= ∅. Now if a ∈ A is in P∗α then a
strenghtens supA, and since by assumption P is dense in P∗α, there is p ∈ P with p ≤Pα a.
In particular, p ≤Qα supA. In order to prove that Qα is separative, since sup{p} = p for
p ∈ Pα, it suffices to check that whenever A,B ⊆ Pα are sets with supA Qα supB, then
there is p ≤Qα supA incompatible with supB. So suppose that supA Qα supB. Then
there is a ∈ A with a Qα supB, i.e. there exists a strengthening p ∈ P of a such that
each q ≤P p is incompatible with every element of B. In particular, p is incompatible
with supB.
Now let Pα+1 = Qα ∪ {¬q | q ∈ Qα}, where ¬q ∈ A2·α+1 is different for each q ∈ Qα,
such that {〈q,¬q〉 | q ∈ Qα} ∈ C. Thus Pα+1 ∈ C and we define an ordering ≤Pα+1 on
Pα+1 extending ≤Qα such that ≤Pα+1∈ C as follows:
p ≤Pα+1 ¬q ⇐⇒ p⊥Qαq,
¬p ≤Pα+1 q ⇐⇒ ∀r ∈ Qα(r ‖Qα p ∨ r ‖Qα q),
¬p ≤Pα+1 ¬q ⇐⇒ q ≤Qα p
(3.3)
for all p, q ∈ Qα. Again, we need to verify that P is dense in P∗α+1. Let q ∈ Qα be a
condition such that ¬q is non-zero, i.e. there is p ∈ Pα+1 such that ¬q Pα+1 p. If p ∈ Qα,
then this means that there is r ∈ Qα which is incompatible with p and q in Qα. In
particular, r ≤Pα+1 ¬q and since P is dense in Qα, we can strengthen r to some condition
in P. Otherwise, p is of the form ¬r for some r ∈ Qα. Therefore, r Qα q and so by
separativity of Qα there is s ∈ Qα with s ≤Qα r and s⊥Qαq. But then s ≤Pα+1 ¬q and
once again we apply the density of P in Qα to obtain the result.
Secondly, we need to check that separativity is preserved. First suppose that p, q ∈
Qα such that p Pα+1 ¬q. Then p and q are compatible, hence there is r ∈ Qα with
r ≤Qα p, q. In particular, r and ¬q are incompatible in Pα+1. If ¬p Pα+1 q, then there
is r ∈ P such that r⊥Qαp and r⊥Qαq. But this means that r ≤Pα+1 ¬p,¬q and so r and
q are incompatible in Pα+1. Finally, suppose that ¬p Pα+1 ¬q. Then q Qα p, so by
separativity of Qα there is a strengthening r ∈ Qα of q with r⊥Qαp. This means that
r ≤Pα+1 ¬p and clearly r is incompatible with ¬q.
Then B =
⋃
α∈OrdM Pα =
⋃
α∈OrdM Qα is in C. We define an order on B by p ≤B q
if and only if there is α ∈ OrdM such that p, q ∈ Pα and p ≤Pα q. This defines a
preorder. Moreover, we can define the Boolean operations on B as follows. If α ∈ OrdM
is minimal such that p ∈ Qα, then let ¬p be as defined in Pα+1. If A ⊆ B and α is the
minimal ordinal such that A ⊆ Pα, then we let supA be as computed in Qα. Finally, the
equivalence relation on B is given by
p ≈B q ⇐⇒ ∃α ∈ OrdM(p, q ∈ Pα ∧ p ≤Pα q ∧ q ≤Pα p).
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It is easy to check that this defines an M -complete pre-Boolean completion of P.
If P is antisymmetric, we can form the quotient of B modulo ≈B in order to obtain an
M -complete Boolean algebra. For p ∈ ⋃α∈OrdM Pα, we define
[p] = {q | q ≈B p ∧ ∀r [r ≈B p→ rnk(r) ≥ rnk(q)]} ∈M
and B′ = {[p] | ∃α ∈ OrdM(p ∈ Pα)}. Now we can introduce the ordering, suprema, infima
and complements in B′ in the canonical way and let 1B′ = [1P] as well as 0B′ = ¬1B′ . More
precisely, if A ⊆ B′ is a set, then let α ∈ OrdM be least such that every member of A has
a representative in (Vα)
M and A¯ = {p ∈ (Vα)M | ∃β ∈ OrdM(p ∈ Pβ ∧ [p] ∈ A)}. Then we
can define supA = [supQβ A¯], where β is the least ordinal with A¯ ⊆ Pβ. It follows directly
from (3.2) that supA is well-defined and that it is the supremum of A in B′. Complements
are defined in the same way, i.e. for [p] ∈ B′ with p ∈ Qα put ¬[p] = [¬p], where ¬p is
defined in Pα+1. Again, it is a straightforward consequence of (3.3) and the density of
P in Q∗α that this is well-defined and that this actually defines the complement of [p] in
B′. Furthermore, if A ∈ M is a subset of B′, then we let inf A = ¬(sup{¬a | a ∈ A}).
Moreover, the embedding pi : P → B′ \ {0B′}, p 7→ [p] is dense by construction and it
follows from P being separative and antisymmetric that pi is injective.
Note that Owen has erroneously used a similar proof in [Owe08] to show that every
class forcing has a Boolean completion. However, Corollary 2.5.4 shows that the defin-
ability lemma for atomic formulae can consistently fail, and hence Boolean completions
do not always exist.
Corollary 3.3.2. If M is a model of KM, then every notion of class forcing for M satisfies
the forcing theorem.
Proof. By Lemma 3.1.11, it is enough to prove that every separative notion of class forcing
for M satisfies the forcing theorem. But this is a direct consequence of Theorems 3.3.1
and 3.2.6.
In combination with Theorem 2.5.3, the previous theorem can also be used to provide
an alternative proof of the following well-known fact.
Corollary 3.3.3. If M = 〈M, C〉 is a model of KM, then C contains a first-order truth
predicate for M .
Proof. By Corollary 3.3.2, F satisfies the the forcing theorem over M, so by Theorem
2.5.3, C contains a first-order truth predicate for M .
3.4 Unions of set-sized complete subforcings
The next theorem shows that approachability by projections is essentially a weakening of
being an increasing union of set-sized complete subforcings.
Theorem 3.4.1. If P =
⋃
α∈OrdM Pα is an increasing union of set-sized complete subforc-
ings of P (as witnessed by a class in C), then there is a dense embedding i : P → B∗ in
C, where B is an M-complete Boolean algebra in C which is approachable by projections.
Moreover, P and B∗ have the same generic extensions, i.e. whenever G is B∗-generic over
M, then M [G] = M [i−1[G]].
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Proof. Since every Pα is a set-sized forcing notion, we can always form its separative
quotient S(Pα). We can then define an equivalence relation ≈ on
⋃
α∈OrdM S(Pα) by
stipulating [p]α ≈ [q]β if and only if α ≤ β and [p]β = [q]β or α > β and [p]α = [q]α, where
[q]α denotes the equivalence class in S(Pα) corresponding to p. If we put
[p]≈ = {q ∈
⋃
α∈OrdM
S(Pα) | q ≈ p ∧ ∃α ∈ OrdM [q ∈ S(Pα) ∧ ∀β < α∀r ∈ S(Pβ)(r 6≈ p)]}
then S = {[p]≈ | p ∈
⋃
α∈OrdM S(Pα)} is separative, antisymmetric and it can be written as
an increasing union of complete subforcings Sα = {[p]≈ | p ∈ Sα}. Furthermore, it is easy
to check that P embeds densely into S, and P and S have the same generic extensions.
By the observation above we can assume without loss of generality that P is separative
and antisymmetric. Since Pα is set-sized, it has a Boolean completion B(Pα) given by the
set of all regular open subsets of Pα3. Let eα : Pα → B(Pα)∗ be the canonical dense
embedding of Pα into B(Pα)∗ for each α ∈ OrdM . For ordinals α ≤ β we define an
embedding from B(Pα) into B(Pβ) by
iαβ : B(Pα)→ B(Pβ), b 7→ sup{eβ(p) | p ∈ Pα ∧ eα(p) ≤B(Pα) b}.
We have the following properties for all ordinals α ≤ β ≤ γ:
(1) iαγ = iβγ ◦ iαβ,
(2) iαβ is injective.
The first statement is a straightforward computation of suprema. For the second claim,
assume that b0, b1 ∈ B(Pα) are such that b0 B(Pα) b1. By separativity of B(Pα) and
density of Pα, there must be some p ∈ Pα such that eα(p) ≤B(Pα) b0 and eα(p)⊥B(Pα)b1.
Now consider q ∈ Pα with eα(q) ≤B(Pα) b1. Then eα(p)⊥B(Pα)eα(q), so since eα and eβ are
complete embeddings, we also get p⊥Pαq and hence eβ(p)⊥B(Pβ)eβ(q). This shows that
iαβ(b0) 6= iαβ(b1).
Now we define an equivalence relation ∼ on ⋃α∈Ord B(Pα) by setting b0 ∼ b1 iff b1 =
iαβ(b0) if b0 ∈ B(Pα) and b1 ∈ B(Pβ) and α < β or b0 = iαβ(b1) if b0 ∈ B(Pα) and
b1 ∈ B(Pβ) and α ≥ β. Note that the equivalence classes of ∼ are, in general, proper
classes. We can avoid this problem by considering instead
[b] = {c ∈
⋃
α∈OrdM
B(Pα) | b ∼ c ∧ ∃α ∈ Ord[c ∈ B(Pα) ∧ ∀β < α∀d ∈ B(Pβ)(d 6∼ b)]}.
Now we can define Bα = {[b] | b ∈ B(Pα)} equipped with the order given by [b0] ≤Bα [b1]
iff b0 ≤B(Pα) b1 for b0, b1 ∈ B(Pα). This is well-defined by construction. Finally, let
B =
⋃
α∈OrdM Bα, endowed with the ordering given by extending the orderings on the
Bα’s. Moreover, we can define the Boolean operations on B in the canonical way. By
construction, B is an M-complete Boolean algebra. For each α ∈ OrdM and [b] ∈ B∗ we
define the projection
piα+1([b]) = sup{[eα+1(p)] | p ∈ Pα+1 ∧ [eα+1(p)] ≤ [b]} = sup{[c] ∈ B∗α+1 | [c] ≤ [b]}.
3(see [Jec03, Theorems 7.13, 14.10]
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The equality follows from the density of eα+1. Straightforward calculations yield those
projections to witness that B∗ is approachable by projections. Moreover, i : P→ B∗, i(p) =
[eα(p)] for p ∈ Pα is a dense embedding.
In order to see that P and B∗ have the same generic extensions, note that if G is
B∗-generic over M, then for every α, G ∩ B∗α is B∗α-generic, because B∗α is a complete
subforcing of B∗. SoM [G] =
⋃
α∈OrdM M [G∩B∗α]. Similiarly, ifH is P-generic overM, then
M [H] =
⋃
α∈OrdM M [H ∩ Pα]. Moreover, the set forcings Pα,B(Pα)∗ and B∗α all have the
same generic extensions, i.e. if G is B∗-generic over M, then M [i−1[G∩B∗α]] = M [G∩B∗α].
This shows that
M [i−1[G]] =
⋃
α∈OrdM
M [i−1[G] ∩ Pα] =
⋃
α∈OrdM
M [i−1[G ∩ B∗α]]
=
⋃
α∈OrdM
M [G ∩ B∗α] = M [G]
as desired.
Corollary 3.4.2. If P =
⋃
α∈OrdM Pα is an increasing union of set-sized complete sub-
forcings of P, then P satisfies the forcing theorem.
Proof. By passing to the separative quotient of each Pα as in the proof of Theorem 3.4.1
above, by Lemma 3.1.11 we may assume that P is separative and antisymmetric. But
then the embedding given in the proof of Theorem 3.4.1 can easily be seen to be injective,
and so P has a Boolean M -completion. By Corollary 3.2.7, this shows that P satisfies the
forcing theorem.
Note that Zarach already proved in [Zar73] that unions of set-sized complete sub-
forcings satisfy the forcing theorem for all L∈-formulae. A similar result for first-order
formulae with class name parameters can be found in the dissertation of Jonas Reitz
[Rei06].
Corollary 3.4.3. If P is a product or an iteration of length OrdM of support < OrdM of
set-sized forcing notions, then P satisfies the forcing theorem.
Proof. Since products can always be viewed as iterations, it remains to check the claim
for iterations. By Corollary 3.4.2 it suffices to prove that each iteration of length OrdM is
an increasing union of set-sized complete subforcings. Let P = POrdM be the final iterand
and let Pα denote the iteration up to α ∈ OrdM . Since the support of the iteration is
< OrdM , P is isomorphic to the union of the Pα, α ∈ OrdM . Moreover, it is easy to check
that each Pα is a complete subforcing of P.
3.5 Non-unique Boolean completions
In this section, we show by means of a concrete example that Boolean M -completions
need not be unique. Note that in Section 4.4 we will in fact characterize the existence
of a unique Boolean M -completion. Fix a ground model M = 〈M, C〉 which satisfies
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representatives choice. Note that by Lemma 2.4.3 and Theorem 2.4.4, P = Col(ω,Ord)M
satisfies the forcing theorem. Now let Q be the forcing notion obtained from P by adding
the supremum e = sup{{〈0, α〉} | α even}4. It is easy to check that Q is also approachable
by projections and hence it satisfies the forcing theorem. Consequently, by Corollary 3.2.7,
both P and Q have Boolean M -completions B(P) and B(Q). Since P embeds densely into
Q, B(Q) is also a Boolean completion of P.
Definition 3.5.1. For pϕq ∈ FmlOrd,0(P,M), we recursively define the support of pϕq by
supp(ppˇ ∈ G˙q) = range(p)
supp(pσ = τq) = supp(pσ ∈ τq) = sup{range(p) | p ∈ P ∩ tc(σ ∪ τ)}
supp(p¬ϕq) = supp(pϕq)
supp(p
∨
i∈I
ϕiq) =
⋃
{supp(pϕiq) | i ∈ I}.
Recall that the Boolean M -completion B(P) as constructed in Corollary 3.2.7 is ob-
tained using representatives choice from FmlOrd,0(P,M) and the equivalence relation
pϕq ≈ pψq if and only if 1P MP ϕ↔ ψ, i.e. there is a surjective map pi : FmlOrd,0(P,M)→
B(P) such that pi(pϕq) = pi(pψq) if and only if pϕq ≈ pψq. We will write [pϕq] for pi(pϕq).
Next we want to extend the notion of support to elements of B(P).
Definition 3.5.2. Let B(P) be the Boolean M -completion of P = Col(ω,Ord)M as de-
scribed above. If b ∈ B(P), then we define the support of b by
supp(b) = min{α ∈ OrdM | ∃pϕq ∈ FmlOrd,0(P,M)([pϕq] = b ∧ supp(pϕq) = α)}.
Lemma 3.5.3. For α ∈ OrdM and n ∈ ω, let pnα = {〈n, α〉}. If α, β ∈ OrdM then there
is an automorphism piαβ : B(P) → B(P) such that for every n ∈ ω, piαβ(pnα) = pnβ and for
every b ∈ B(P) such that supp(b) < min{α, β}, piαβ(b) = b.
Proof. We first define an automorphism ταβ on P which switches α and β in the range of
every condition. Then we can extend ταβ to infinitary formulae in the forcing language of
P over M by stipulating
τ¯αβ(ppˇ ∈ G˙q) = p ˇταβ(p) ∈ G˙q,
τ¯αβ(pσ = τq) = pτ ∗αβ(σ) = τ ∗αβ(τ)q,
τ¯αβ(pσ ∈ τq) = pτ ∗αβ(σ) ∈ τ ∗αβ(τ))q,
τ¯αβ(p¬ϕq) = 〈3, τ¯αβ(pϕq)〉,
τ¯αβ(p
∨
i∈I
ϕiq) = 〈4, I, {〈i, τ¯αβ(pϕiq) | i ∈ I}〉,
where τ ∗αβ is the map on M
P induced by ταβ. Finally, let piαβ : B(P) → B(P) be the
automorphism defined by piαβ[pϕq] = [τ¯αβ(pϕq)]. This is clearly well-defined. Suppose
that b ∈ B(P) with γ = supp(b) < min{α, β} and take pϕq of support γ such that
b = [pϕq]. Then clearly piαβ(b) = [τ¯αβ(pϕq)] = [pϕq] = b.
4i.e. p ≤Q e iff 0 ∈ dom(p) and p(0) even. A general method for adding suprema is described in
Section 4.1.
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Theorem 3.5.4. P = Col(ω,OrdM) does not have a unique Boolean M-completion.
Proof. Firstly, observe that we can embed B(P) in B(Q) by mapping [pϕq]P to [pϕq]Q.
This embedding fixes P and it is well-defined since for any two infinitary formulae ϕ, ψ in
the forcing language of P, 1P MP ϕ↔ ψ iff 1Q MQ ϕ↔ ψ. This holds since such formulae
are quantifier-free and therefore absolute between P- and Q-generic extensions.
We claim that e does not lie in B(P). Suppose for a contradiction that e ∈ B(P) and
let α, β > supp(e) such that α is even and β is odd. Clearly, p0α ≤B(P) e since this holds in
Q. But then p0β = piαβ(p0α) ≤B(P) piαβ(e) = e since α, β > supp(e). But this is impossible
because β is odd.
We are left with checking that there is no isomorphism between B(P) and B(Q) which
fixes P. Inductively, one can easily show that Boolean values JϕKB(P) coincide with [pϕq],
i.e. for every LOrd,0(P,M)-formula ϕ, JϕKB(P) = [pϕq]. Again by induction on formula
complexity, one can check that each isomorphism which fixes P already fixes all Boolean
values, in particular it fixes B(P). But e ∈ B(Q) \ B(P), so there is no isomorphism
between B(P) and B(Q) which fixes P.
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Chapter 4
Characterizations of pretameness
and the Ord-cc
In this chapter, we will present various characterizations of pretameness and the Ord-
chain condition in terms of several properties which hold for all set-sized forcing notions
but may fail for class forcing. Examples are the forcing theorem, the forcing equivalence
of forcing notions and their dense subforcings and the existence of nice names for sets of
ordinals.
4.1 Preliminaries
Pretameness has already been introduced in Section 2.2, where we prove that over models
M |= GB− with a hierarchy, every pretame notion of class forcing satisfies the forcing
theorem. In this chapter we will argue that pretameness can in some sense be considered
the minimal requirement to avoid pathologies in class forcing. The other – stronger –
property that we will characterize is the following.
Definition 4.1.1. We say that a notion of class forcing P satisfies the Ord-chain condition
(or simply Ord-cc) over M, if every antichain of P which is in C is already an element of
M .
Note that in the presence of a global well-order the Ord-cc obviously implies pretame-
ness. Hence by Theorem 2.2.2, if C contains a set-like well-order we obtain that every
notion of class forcing with the Ord-cc satisfies the forcing theorem. However, by carefully
modifying the proof of Theorem 2.2.2, we can observe that the assumption of a set-like
well-order can actually be reduced to the requirement of an arbitrary – not necessarily
set-like – global well-order.
Lemma 4.1.2. If M = 〈M, C〉 is a countable transitive model of GB− such that C contains
a global well-order. Then every notion of class forcing with the Ord-cc satisfies the forcing
theorem.
Proof. The proof is exactly the same as the proof of Theorem 2.2.2, but whenever we
make reference to the hierarchy, we use instead the global well-order in C.
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However, it is an open question whether in the absence of a global well-order the
Ord-cc implies the forcing theorem.
Note that there are several canonical ways to define the Ord-chain condition. An-
other possibility would be to simply stipulate that all maximal antichains are set-sized.
However, the following remark shows that this is not equivalent to our definition given in
4.1.1.
Remark 4.1.3. Let M = 〈M, C〉 |= GB− such that M does not satisfy global choice. Then
there is a notion of class forcing P for M such that every maximal antichain of P is in M
but it does not satisfy the Ord-cc over M.
Proof. Let P be the forcing notion whose conditions are of the form 1P – the maximal
element of P – or pairs 〈x, y〉 with y ∈ x, ordered by 〈x, y〉 ≤P 〈x, z〉 for all x, y, z ∈ M
with y, z ∈ x. Clearly, P has a class-sized antichain given by {〈{x}, x〉 | x ∈M}. However,
the only maximal antichain is {1P}, since if A is a non-trivial maximal antichain, then for
every x ∈ M \ {∅} there is some y such that 〈x, y〉 ∈ A. But this would define a global
choice function on M .
The next lemma shows that the Ord-cc of some notion of class forcing in fact depends
on which classes one considers. In particular, adding a global well-order by forcing can
destroy the Ord-chain condition.
Lemma 4.1.4. Let M = 〈M, C〉 be a countable transitive model of GB− which has a
hierarchy and satisfies choice but does not satisfy global choice. Then there is a forcing
notion P for M which satisfies the Ord-cc over M but whenever D ⊇ C is such that
N = 〈M,D〉 |= GB−+ global choice, then P does not satisfy the Ord-cc over N.
Proof. Let 〈Cα | α ∈ OrdM〉 witness that M has a hierarchy. Let
Xα = {f : Cα →M | ∀x ∈ Cα (f(x) ∈ x)}
denote the set of all choice functions on Cα. Now let P be the forcing notion whose
conditions are in
⋃
α∈OrdM Xα ∪ {1P}, with the maximal element given by 1P and the
ordering given by f ≤P g if and only dom(f) = dom(g). In particular, if f is a choice
function on Cα and g is a choice function on Cβ for α 6= β then f and g are incompatible.
Otherwise, f ≤P g and g ≤P f . Clearly, P is not antisymmetric.
We claim that P satisfies the Ord-cc over M. Suppose that A ∈ C is a class-sized
antichain. Then for every ordinal α ∈ OrdM there is β ≥ α such that A ∩Xβ 6= ∅. Then
we can define a global choice function F : M \ {∅} → M as follows. For x ∈ M \ {∅} let
αx ∈ OrdM be the least ordinal such that x ∈ Cα and A∩Xα 6= ∅. Then let F (x) = f(x),
where {f} = A ∩Xαx .
On the other hand, suppose that N = 〈M,D〉 |= GB− is a model of global choice with
D ⊇ C and let F ∈ D be a global choice function. Then there is a class-sized antichain of
P in D given by {F (Xα) | α ∈ OrdM ∧ Cα 6= ∅}.
Note that there are models of GB− which satisfy the conditions of Lemma 4.1.4 by
Remark 5.4.4. We can use the forcing notion P from the previous lemma to prove the
following.
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Remark 4.1.5. Suppose that M = 〈M, C〉 |= GB− has a hierarchy but does not satisfy
global choice. Then there is a dense embedding pi : P→ Q in C of notions of class forcing
such that P satisfies the Ord-cc over M but Q does not. We can take P as above and Q
to be the antisymmetric quotient of P, i.e. the forcing notion where all elements of Xα
are collapsed to a single element pα.
In the presence of a global well-order there can be no such counterexample.
Remark 4.1.6. If C contains a global well-order, and pi : P → Q is a dense embedding in
C of notions of class forcing such that P satisfies the Ord-cc over M, then so does Q.
Proof. Suppose that A ∈ C is an antichain in Q. Using the global well-order, we choose
an antichain A¯ for P which is maximal in {p ∈ P | ∃a ∈ A (pi(p) ≤Q a)}. In particular,
A¯ ∈M . But then we can define a surjection from A¯ onto A given by mapping p ∈ A¯ to the
unique a ∈ A such that pi(p) ≤Q a. Using replacement in M , we obtain that A ∈M .
As noted above, if there is a global well-order of M in C, pretameness follows from
the Ord-chain condition. The following example shows that the assumption of the global
well-order cannot be dropped.
Lemma 4.1.7. Let M = 〈M, C〉 be a countable transitive model of GB− which has a
hierarchy and satisfies choice but does not satisfy global choice. Then there is a non-
pretame forcing notion P for M which satisfies the Ord-cc.
Proof. Consider the forcing notion P defined in Lemma 4.1.4. We modify P to a notion of
class forcing Q which additionally collapses OrdM . Conditions in Q are sequences of the
form p = 〈pi | i < lh(p)〉, where lh(p) ∈ ω and pi ∈
⋃
α∈OrdM Xα, where Xα is as in the
proof of Lemma 4.1.4. We define p ≤Q q if and only if lh(p) ≥ lh(q) and for all i < lh(q),
pi ‖P qi.
Claim 1. Q satisfies the Ord-cc over M.
Proof. Suppose that A ∈ C is an antichain. We prove that for every condition p ∈ Q,
Ap = {q ≤Q p | ∃a ∈ A (a ≤Q q)} is in M . If this holds, we obtain that A ∈M , since it is
a subclass of A1Q ∈M . By induction on n ∈ ω, we prove that for every p ∈ Q,
Anp = {q ∈ Ap | lh(q)− lh(p) ≤ n}
is an element of M . For n = 0 this is obvious. Suppose now that for some n ∈ ω, Anp ∈M
for all p ∈ Q. Let p ∈ Q be a fixed condition. We show that An+1p is an elementof M .
Note that for every q ∈ An+1p , q  n = 〈qi | i < lh(q) − 1〉 is in Anp . So there are only
set-many possibilities for q  n. Hence it suffices to check that for every r ∈ Anp , the set of
all extensions of r which lie in An+1p is in M . But this is obvious, since each such element
is of the form r a f , where f ∈ ⋃α∈OrdM Xα and – as in the previous lemma – class-many
options for f would lead to a global choice function in C.
Claim 2. Q is not pretame over M.
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Proof. For each n ∈ ω, consider the dense class
Dn = {p ∈ Q | lh(p) > n}.
Suppose that there are p ∈ Q and sets dn ⊆ Dn which are predense below p. Let n = lh(p).
Now let α = sup{β ∈ OrdM | ∃q ∈ dn (q ∈ Xβ)}. Now we extend p to p¯ = 〈p¯i | i < n+ 1〉,
where p¯i = pi for i < n and p¯n ∈ Xα+1. Then p¯ is incompatible with every element of dn,
a contradiction.
This concludes the proof of Lemma 4.1.7.
Note that we can modifyQ in the proof of Lemma 4.1.7 above to obtain a forcing notion
with the same properties as above but which is antisymmetric. This can be achieved by
changing the order on Q as follows.
p ≤Q q ⇐⇒ p = q ∨ [lh(p) > lh(q) ∧ ∀i < lh(q)(dom(pi) = dom(qi))].
However, this forcing notion is not separative.
In set forcing, a standard technique to verify that some forcing notion satifies the κ-cc
for some cardinal κ is to apply the ∆-system lemma. In class forcing, the Ord-version of
the ∆-system lemma is a useful tool to prove the Ord-cc.
Lemma 4.1.8 (∆-system lemma, class version). Let M = 〈M, C〉 be a countable transitive
model of GB−. Let 〈xi | i < OrdM〉 be a sequence of sets such that card(xi) < κ for some
M-cardinal κ. Then there is a proper class Z ⊆ OrdM in C and a set r such that for all
i, j ∈ Z with i 6= j, xi ∩ xj = r.
Proof. Let X ⊆ OrdM be a proper class in C and λ < κ such that for each i ∈ X,
card(xi) = λ. Let µ ≤ λ be maximal such that there is a set r of cardinality µ and a
proper class Y ⊆ X such that for each i ∈ Y , r ⊆ xi. Since ∅ satisfies this property,
such µ exists. Note that for each a ∈ ⋃i∈Y xi with a /∈ r there is i(a) ∈ OrdM such that
for all i ∈ Y with i > i(a), a /∈ xi. This holds because otherwise r ∪ {a} would be a
counterexample to the maximality of r.
Recursively, we define a strictly increasing sequence 〈iξ | ξ ∈ OrdM〉 of ordinals in
Y . Suppose that the sequence 〈iξ | ξ < η〉 has already been defined. Now let iη be the
minimal i ∈ Y such that for all ξ < η and for all a ∈ xiξ \ r, i > i(a). Such an ordinal i
exists, since Y is a proper class.
Now put Z = {iξ | ξ ∈ OrdM}. We claim that for all ordinals ξ < η, xiξ ∩ xiη = r.
Suppose that ξ < η. By construction of Y we have that r ⊆ xiξ ∩ xiη . Conversely, let
a ∈ xiξ ∩ xiη and assume that a /∈ r. But then iη > i(a) and so a /∈ xiη , contradicting our
assumption.
Example 4.1.9. The class-sized Le´vy collapse P = Col(ω,< Ord)M satifies the Ord-cc.
Proof. Suppose that A ⊆ P is a proper class in C. Since P essentially consists of finite
sets of pairs of ordinals, it can be well-ordered and so we can write A = {pi | i ∈ OrdM}.
We apply the ∆-system Lemma 4.1.8 to {dom(pi) | i ∈ OrdM} for κ = ω in order to
obtain a proper class Z ⊆ OrdM in C and a finite set r such that for all i 6= j ∈ Z,
dom(pi) ∩ dom(pj) = r. But since r is finite, there must be i 6= j in Z such that
pi  r = pj  r and so pi and pj are compatible. This proves that A is not an antichain.
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In the following paragraphs, we describe a general method of how to extend a notion
of class forcing P by adding suprema. This technique is a useful tool to characterize
both pretameness and the Ord-cc. More precisely, it will frequently be used to show that
pretameness (resp. the Ord-cc) of P is equivalent to P densely having some property.
Let S = 〈Xi | i ∈ I〉 ∈ C with I ∈ M be a sequence of subclasses of P. Making use
of a suitable bijection in C, we may assume that P ∩ I = ∅. Now let PS be the forcing
notion with domain PS = P ∪ I ordered by
i ≤PS p⇐⇒ ∀q ∈ Xi (q ≤P p),
p ≤PS i⇐⇒ Xi is predense below p in P,
i ≤PS j ⇐⇒ ∀q ∈ Xi (q ≤PS j).
For i ∈ I, we will usually write supXi rather than i. In case that supXi already exists
in P, or that supXi ≤PS supXj and supXj ≤PS supXi for some i 6= j, instead of PS
we need to consider the quotient of PS by the equivalence relation p ∼ q iff p ≤PS q and
q ≤PS p for p, q ∈ P ∪ I, in order to obtain a separative partial order. Since I ∈ M and
P is separative, all equivalence classes are set-sized, and so this can easily be done and
we will identify PS with this quotient in this case. We call PS the forcing notion obtained
from P by adding supXi for all i ∈ I. Note that by construction, P is dense in PS.
Lemma 4.1.10. Suppose that P is a notion of class forcing for some countable transitive
model M = 〈M, C〉 of GB− which satisfies the forcing theorem. If S ∈ C is a finite sequence
of subclasses of P, then PS satisfies the forcing theorem.
Proof. By induction, we may assume that S consists of a single class X ∈ C. Let Q
denote PS. For σ ∈ MQ, let σ+ denote the P-name obtained from σ by replacing every
occurrence of supA in tc(σ) by 1P, and let σ
− ∈ MP be the name obtained from σ by
removing every pair of the form 〈µ, supA〉 from tc(σ). To be precise about the latter, we
inductively define σ− = {〈τ−, p〉 ∈ σ | p 6= supA}. One easily checks that for all p ∈ Q
and all Q-names σ and τ , we have that p MQ σ ∈ τ if and only if
∀q ∈ P [q ≤Q p→ [(q⊥PA→ q MP σ− ∈ τ−) ∧ (q ≤P A→ q MP σ+ ∈ τ+)]] .
It is clear that the righthand-side is a consequence of p MQ σ ∈ τ . For the converse,
suppose that the righthand-side holds and let G be Q-generic with p ∈ G. Observe that
D = {q ∈ P | q⊥PA ∨ q ≤P A} is dense below p, hence there is q ≤P p with q ∈ D ∩G. If
q⊥PA, by assumption (σ−)G = (τ−)G. Moreover, supA /∈ G and so σG = (σ−)G as well
as τG = (τ−)G. The case that q ≤P A is similar, since then supA ∈ G and so σG = (σ+)G
and τG = (τ+)G.
4.2 The forcing theorem
Theorem 2.2.2 shows that over models with a hierarchy, every pretame notion of class
forcing satisfies the forcing theorem. By combining this with a generalization of the ideas
given in Section 2.5, we will characterize pretameness in terms of the forcing theorem
over models without a first-order truth predicate. Furthermore, a strengthening of the
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forcing theorem is given by the maximality principle which states that if some conditon
p forces en existential formula, there is always a witness σ such that p forces σ to satisfy
that formula. We will show that the Ord-cc is essentially equivalent to the maximality
principle.
4.2.1 Pretameness in terms of the forcing theorem
Let M = 〈M, C〉 be a countable transitive model of GB−. To motivate our result, consider
the forcing P = Colinj(ω,M) whose domain consists of injective functions p : dp → M
such that dp is a finite subset of ω. Let now F = FM denote the forcing introduced in
Section 1.3.3. Then there is a dense embedding from P into F given by p 7→ 〈dp, ep, p〉,
where ep is the binary relation on dp defined by
〈i, j〉 ∈ ep ⇐⇒ p(i) ∈ p(j).
If M satisfies for example global choice then it is easy to see that P satisfies the forcing
theorem, since it is then isomorphic to Colinj(ω,Ord
M), the forcing notion consisting of
injective finite partial functions from ω into the ordinals. On the other hand if C does not
contain a first-order truth predicate, then by Theorem 2.5.3, F does not satisfy the forcing
theorem. This already gives a counterexample to the converse of Lemma 2.1.7. We will
now generalize this idea and prove that over certain models of GB−, we can embed every
non-pretame notion of class forcing densely into one which does not satisfy the forcing
theorem.
The following easy observation will be a key ingredient for our proof.
Lemma 4.2.1. Suppose that M = 〈M, C〉 is a countable transitive model of GB− such that
C contains a set-like well-order of M and let P be a notion of class forcing for M which
satisfies the forcing theorem. Then P is pretame if and only if there exist no M-cardinal
κ, F˙ ∈ CP and p ∈ P such that p MP “ F˙ : κˇ→ OrdM is cofinal”.
Proof. Suppose first that P is pretame. If p MP “ F˙ : κˇ→ OrdM is cofinal”, consider
Dα = {q ≤P p | ∃γ ∈ OrdM (q MP F˙ (αˇ) = γˇ)} ∈ C
for α < κ. By pretameness there are q ≤P p and sets dα ⊆ Dα in M which are predense
below q. Now let
β = sup{γ + 1 | γ ∈ OrdM ∧ ∃α < κ∃r ∈ dα (r MP F˙ (αˇ) = γˇ)}.
Then q MP ran(F˙ ) ⊆ βˇ, a contradiction.
Conversely, suppose that 〈Di | i ∈ I〉 ∈ C with I ∈M is a sequence of dense subclasses
of P and p ∈ P is such that there exist no q ≤P p and 〈di | i ∈ I〉 ∈ M with each di ⊆ Di
predense below q. Using the axiom of choice, we may assume that I = κ is a cardinal
in M . Let 〈Cα | α ∈ OrdM〉 be a hierarchy on M . Now let G be P-generic over M with
p ∈ G. In M[G], let F : κ→ OrdM be the function defined by
F (α) = min{γ ∈ OrdM | Cγ ∩Dα ∩G 6= ∅}.
74
Chapter 4. Characterizations of pretameness and the Ord-cc
Using the forcing theorem and Lemma 2.1.2, we may choose a name F˙ ∈ C for F and a
condition q ≤P p in G such that the above property of F˙ is forced by q. But then q forces
that F˙ is cofinal in the ordinals – otherwise we could strengthen q to some r which forces
the range of F˙ to be contained in some ordinal γ and so dα = Dα ∩Cγ would be predense
below r for every α ∈ I, contradicting our assumption.
Note that the forward direction does not require the existence of a set-like well-order
in case that P is known to satisfy the forcing theorem. The next step is to strengthen
Lemma 4.2.1.
Lemma 4.2.2. Suppose that M = 〈M, C〉 is a countable transitive model of GB− and that
P is a notion of class forcing for M which satisfies the forcing theorem. Assume that F˙ ∈
CP and p ∈ P are such that p MP “ F˙ : κˇ→ OrdM is cofinal” for some M-cardinal κ. Then
there is a class name E˙ ∈ C and q ≤P p such that q MP “ E˙ : κˇ→ OrdM is surjective.”
Proof. Since P satisfies the forcing theorem,
A = {〈r, α, β〉 | ∃s ≤P r (s MP F˙ (αˇ) = βˇ)} ∈ C.
Hence there is a sequence C = 〈Cα | α ∈ OrdM〉 ∈ C such that each Cα is of the form
Ar,α = {β ∈ OrdM | ∃s ≤P r (s MP F˙ (αˇ) = βˇ)}
for some r ∈ P and α ∈ OrdM such that Ar,α is a proper class, and moreover each such
class Ar,α appears unboundedly often in C.
Claim 3. There is a class D = 〈Dβ | β ∈ OrdM〉 such that the classes Dβ form a partition
of OrdM and Cα ∩Dβ is a proper class for all α, β ∈ OrdM .
Proof. Let k : OrdM × OrdM → OrdM be a bijection in C such that whenever γ¯ < γ,
k(β, γ¯) < k(β, γ). Now we recursively define sets of ordinals Dγβ ∈M in the following way:
We start with D00 = ∅. Let α, β, γ ∈ OrdM be such that α = k(β, γ) and assume that for
all β¯, γ¯ with k(β¯, γ¯) < α, Dγ¯
β¯
has already been defined. Now let Dγβ =
⋃
γ¯<γ D
γ¯
β ∪ {δ},
where δ is the least ordinal in Cγ \
⋃{Dγ¯
β¯
| k(β¯, γ¯) < α}. Finally, put Dβ =
⋃
γ∈OrdM D
γ
β
for each β ∈ OrdM . By construction, if β 6= β¯ then Dβ and Dβ¯ are disjoint. Moreover,
since Cα appears unboundedly often in the enumeration defined above, Cα∩Dβ is a proper
class for all α, β ∈ OrdM .
Suppose that D is a class as in the statement of the previous claim. If G is P-generic
over M with p ∈ G, let E : κ→ OrdM be the function given by E(α) = β if F˙G(α) ∈ Dβ.
Since P satisfies the forcing theorem, by Lemma 2.1.2, there is a class name E˙ ∈ C and a
condition q ∈ G below p which forces that E˙ satisfies this definition.
Claim 4. q MP “ E˙ : κˇ→ OrdM is surjective”.
Proof. Suppose the contrary. Since P satisfies the forcing theorem, there is a condition
r ≤P q and some ordinal β such that r MP E˙(αˇ) 6= βˇ for all α < κ. On the other hand,
there is α < κ such that Ar,α = {β ∈ OrdM | ∃s ≤P r (s MP F˙ (αˇ) = βˇ)} is a proper
class, since otherwise r forces that the range of F˙ is bounded in OrdM , contradicting our
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assumption on F˙ . By the previous claim, Ar,α ∩Dβ is nonempty. Choose γ ∈ Ar,α ∩Dβ
and s ≤P r so that s MP F˙ (αˇ) = γˇ. Then s MP E˙(αˇ) = βˇ, contradicting our choice of r
and of β.
This completes the proof of Lemma 4.2.2.
Using the previous lemma, we are now ready to prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 4.2.3. Suppose that M = 〈M, C〉 is a countable transitive model of GB− such
that C contains a set-like well-order of M , but no first-order truth predicate for M .1 If
P is a non-pretame notion of class forcing for M, then there is a notion of class forcing
Q for M and a dense embedding pi : P→ Q in C such that Q does not satisfy the forcing
theorem.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we may assume that P satisfies the forcing theorem.
Using Lemmata 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, we can choose p ∈ P and a class name F˙ such that
p MP “ F˙ : κˇ→ Mˇ is surjective”
for some M -cardinal κ.
We extend P to a forcing notion Q by adding suprema pα,β for the classes
Dα,β = {q ≤P p | q MP F˙ (αˇ) ∈ F˙ (βˇ)}
for all α, β < κ such that Dα,β is nonempty. Let X = {〈α, β〉 ∈ κ2 | Dα,β 6= ∅}. The
following arguments generalize the proof of Theorem 2.5.3. Define
E˙ = {〈op(αˇ, βˇ), pα,β〉 | 〈α, β〉 ∈ X} ∈MQ.
Assume for a contradiction that Q satisfies the forcing theorem. We will use E˙ to show
that C contains a first-order truth predicate for M , contradicting our assumptions. The
following claim is an analogue of Lemma 1.3.8.
Claim 1. Let G be Q-generic over M with p ∈ G and let E = E˙G and F = F˙G. Then in
M [G] it holds that 〈α, β〉 ∈ E if and only if M |= F (α) ∈ F (β).
Proof. Let α, β < κ such that 〈α, β〉 ∈ E. Then 〈α, β〉 ∈ X and pα,β ∈ G. But by
definition of ≤Q, pα,β Q F˙ (αˇ) ∈ F˙ (βˇ) and therefore F (α) ∈ F (β) as desired. Conversely,
suppose that x ∈ y in M . Since F is surjective, there are α, β < κ such that F (α) = x
and F (β) = y. Moreover, there must be q ∈ G which forces that F˙ (αˇ) ∈ F˙ (βˇ) and so
q ≤Q pα,β. In particular, pαβ ∈ G and so 〈α, β〉 ∈ E.
The next step will be to translate L∈-formulae into infinitary quantifier-free formu-
lae into LOrd,0(Q,M)-formulae. Inductively, we assign to every L∈-formula ϕ with free
1Note that by Tarski’s theorem on the undefinability of truth, every model of the form 〈M, C〉 |= GB−
with a set-like well-order, where C only consists of the definable subsets of M , satisfies these requirements.
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variables in {v0, . . . , vk−1} and all ~α = α0, . . . , αk−1 ∈ κk an LOrd,0(Q,M)-formula in the
following way:
(vi = vj)
∗
~α = (αˇi = αˇj)
(vi ∈ vj)∗~α = (op(αˇi, αˇj) ∈ E˙)
(¬ϕ)∗~α = (¬ϕ∗~α)
(ϕ ∨ ψ)∗~α = (ϕ∗~α ∨ ψ∗~α)
(∃vkϕ)∗~α = (
∨
β<κ
ϕ∗~α,β).
Note that by Corollary 2.1.10, if Q satisfies the definability lemma for “v0 ∈ v1” or
“v0 = v1”, then it satisfies the forcing theorem for all infinitary formulae in the forcing
language of Q. The following claim will allow us to define a first-order truth predicate
over M . The next claim is an adaptation of Lemma 2.5.2.
Claim 2. For every L∈-formula ϕ with free variables among {v0, . . . , vk−1} and for all
~x = x0, . . . , xk−1 in M , the following statements are equivalent:
(1) M |= ϕ(~x).
(2) ∀~α ∈ κk ∀q ≤P p [q MP “∀i < k(F˙ (αˇi) = xˇi)”→ q MQ ϕ∗~α].
(3) ∃~α ∈ κk ∃q ≤P p [q MP “∀i < k(F˙ (αˇi) = xˇi)” ∧ q MQ ϕ∗~α].
Proof. Observe that since p MP “ F˙ : κˇ→M is surjective”, (2) always implies (3). Hence
it remains to prove that (1) implies (2) and that (3) implies (1). We proceed by induction
on the construction of the formula ϕ.
We start with the atomic formula “vi ∈ vj”. Without loss of generality, we may assume
that i = 0 and j = 1. Suppose first that x ∈ y in M . Let α, β < κ and q ≤P p with
q MP F˙ (αˇ) = xˇ∧ F˙ (βˇ) = yˇ. Take a Q-generic filter with q ∈ G. Since q ≤Q pα,β, pα,β ∈ G.
Moreover, 〈α, β〉 ∈ E˙G, so (2) holds. Assume now that (3) holds, i.e. there are α, β < κ
and q ≤P p such that q MP F˙ (αˇ) = xˇ ∧ F˙ (βˇ) = yˇ and q MQ (v0 ∈ v1)∗α,β. Let G be
Q-generic with q ∈ G. Then by assmption 〈α, β〉 ∈ E˙G and so pα,β ∈ G. In particular,
this means that x = F˙G(α) ∈ F˙G(β) = y. The proof for “vi = vj” is similar.
Next we turn to negations. Suppose first that M |= ¬ϕ(~x) and let ~α ∈ κk and q ≤P p
with q MP ∀i < k (F˙ (αˇi) = xˇi). Assume, towards a contradiction, that q 1Q ¬ϕ∗~α. Then
there is r ≤Q q with r MQ ϕ∗~α. By density, we may assume that r ∈ P. Then r ≤P p and
so ~α and r witness (3) for ϕ. By our inductive hypothesis we obtain that M |= ϕ(~x), a
contradiction. The implication from (3) to (1) is similar.
Suppose now that M |= (ϕ∨ψ)(~x). Without loss of generality, assume that M |= ϕ(~x).
Now if ~α ∈ κk and q ≤P p with q MP ∀i < k (F˙ (αˇi) = xˇi), by induction q MQ ϕ∗~α. But
then in particular q MQ (ϕ∨ψ)∗~α. In order to see that (3) implies (1), suppose that ~α ∈ κk
and q ≤P p witness (3). Then there must be a strengthenig r ∈ Q of q which satisfies,
without loss of generality, r MQ ϕ∗~α. By density of P in Q, we can assume that r ∈ P.
This means that ~α and r witness that (3) holds for ϕ, so M |= ϕ(~x).
We are left with the existential case. Assume first that M |= ∃vkϕ(~x). Take y ∈ M
such that M |= ϕ(~x, y) and let ~α ∈ κk and q ≤P p with q MP ∀i < k (F˙ (αˇi) = xˇi). Let
now G be Q-generic with q ∈ G. By an easy density argument there must be r ≤P p
77
Chapter 4. Characterizations of pretameness and the Ord-cc
and β < κ with r ∈ G and r MP F˙ (βˇ) = yˇ. By induction, r MQ ϕ∗~α,β. In particular,
M [G] |= (∃vkϕ)∗~α. The converse follows in a similar way.
As a consequence of Claim 2, the class
T = {〈pϕq, x〉 | pϕq ∈ Fml1 ∧ x ∈M ∧ ∀α < κ∀q ≤P p (q MP F˙ (αˇ) = xˇ→ q MQ ϕ∗α)}
in C defines a first-order truth predicate for M , contradicting our assumptions on M.
Corollary 4.2.4. Suppose that M = 〈M, C〉 is a countable transitive model of GB− such
that C contains a set-like well-order of M but no first-order truth predicate for M . Then
a notion of class forcing P for M is pretame if and only if it densely satisfies the forcing
theorem.
Furthermore, the proof of Theorem 4.2.3 yields the following.
Corollary 4.2.5. Suppose that M = 〈M, C〉 is a countable transitive model of GB− such
that C contains a set-like well-order of M but no first-order truth predicate for M . Then
for any M-cardinal κ, there is a notion of class forcing P for M which satisfies the forcing
theorem, such that there is a κ-sequence S in C of subclasses of P, for which PS does not
satisfy the forcing theorem.
4.2.2 The maximality principle
The definition of the forcing relation in the existential case uses that p MP ∃xϕ(x) if and
only if the class of all q ≤P p such that there is a P-name σ with q MP ϕ(σ) is dense
below p. The maximality principle states that (in set forcing) it is in fact not necessary
to strengthen p in order to obtain a witness for an existential formula. We observe that
for notions of class forcing which satisfy the forcing theorem, this principle is equivalent
to the Ord-cc over models of GBC.
Definition 4.2.6. A notion of class forcing P for M which satisfies the forcing theorem
is said to satisfy the maximality principle over M if whenever p MP ∃xϕ(x, ~σ, ~Γ) for some
p ∈ P, some L∈-formula ϕ(v0, . . . , vm, ~Γ) with class name parameters ~Γ ∈ (CP)n and ~σ in
(MP)m, then there is τ ∈MP such that p MP ϕ(τ, ~σ, ~Γ).
Lemma 4.2.7. Assume that M is a model of GBC and let P be a notion of class forcing
for M which satisfies the forcing theorem. Then P satisfies the maximality principle if
and only if it satisfies the Ord-cc over M.
Proof. Suppose first that P satisfies the maximality principle and let A ∈ C be an antichain
in P. Since C contains a well-ordering of M , we can extend A to a maximal antichain
A′ ∈ C. It is enough to show that A′ ∈ M . Clearly, 1P MP ∃x (x ∈ Aˇ′ ∩ G˙). Using the
maximality principle, we obtain σ ∈ MP such that 1P MP σ ∈ Aˇ′ ∩ G˙. But then since
rnk(σG) ≤ rnk(σ) for every P-generic filter G, A′ ⊆ P ∩ (Vα)M for α = rnk(σ) and so
A′ ∈M .
Conversely, assume that P satisfies the Ord-cc over M and let p MP ∃xϕ(x, ~σ, ~Γ).
Using the global well-order in C we can find an antichain A ∈ C which is maximal in
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{q ≤P p | ∃σ ∈ MP [q MP ϕ(σ, ~σ, ~Γ)]} ∈ C. Note that A is predense below p and
that A ∈ M by assumption. For every q ∈ A, choose a name τq ∈ MP such that
q MP ϕ(τq, ~σ, ~Γ). Furthermore, for every µ ∈ dom(τq), let Aqµ be a maximal antichain in
{r ≤P q | ∃s (〈µ, s〉 ∈ τq ∧ r ≤P s)}. Now put
σ = {〈µ, r〉 | ∃q ∈ A (µ ∈ dom(τq) ∧ r ∈ Aqµ)}.
By construction, q MP σ = τq for every q ∈ A and so p MP ϕ(σ).
4.3 Preservation of axioms
As we have seen in Lemma 1.2.9 and Lemma 2.1.2, the only axiom of GB− which can fail
to be preserved by notions of class forcing which satisfy the forcing theorem, is the scheme
of collection. In the present section, we investigate failures of separation and, moreover,
we will show that the preservation of separation, replacement and collection under class
forcing are essentially equivalent and characterize pretameness.
4.3.1 Failures of separation
Let M = 〈M, C〉 be a countable transitive model of GB−. Recall that P = Col(ω,Ord)M
adds a predicate F =
⋃
G which is a cofinal function from ω to OrdM . Hence replacement
fails in M[G]. It is also easy to see that separation fails in each such extension. We show
that there is no name for the set {n ∈ ω | F (n) is even}. Let F˙ be a class name for the
generic function F . Assuming that separation holds and using the forcing theorem, there
are p ∈ P and a P-name σ so that
p MP σ = {n ∈ ωˇ | F˙ (n) is even}.
Let α = rank(σ). Now, using an easy density argument, we may extend p to some
condition q so that q(n) = β > α for some n ∈ ω. Let pi be the automorphism of P that
for any condition r swaps the values β and β + 1 of r(n). Then pi∗(σ) = σ. Consider
q′ = pi(q) and pick a P-generic filter G with q ∈ G, let G′ = pi′′G and note that q′ ∈ G′
and that σG = σG
′
. But this equation clearly contradicts that q MP F˙ (n) is even if and
only if q′ MP F˙ (n) is odd.
In the counterexample to separation illustrated above, we make reference to the generic
filter in the formula for which separation fails. Sometimes, however, we are not interested
in the classes that are added by class forcing but only in the sets. This is often the
case, for example, when we force over models 〈M,Def(M)〉, where M is a model of (some
subtheory of) ZFC.
Definition 4.3.1. Let M be a countable transitive model of GB−. If P is a notion of class
forcing for M and G is P-generic over M, then we call the structure 〈M [G],∈〉 a P-generic
set extension of M. We also identify 〈M [G],∈〉 with 〈M [G],Def(M [G])〉.
In the remainder of this section, we consider generic set extensions. We want to show
that a failure of separation in such an extension is possible as well. The notion of forcing
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that will witness this is an adaption of Col(ω,Ord)M , which does not only add a predicate
that is a cofinal function from ω to OrdM , but also codes this predicate into the values of
the continuum function of M [G].
Theorem 4.3.2. Let M = 〈M, C〉 be a countable transitive model of GBC + GCH. There
is a cofinality-preserving notion of class forcing P for M that satisfies the forcing theorem
such that separation fails in any P-generic set extension M [G].
Proof. Let P be the forcing notion with conditions of the form p = 〈p(i) | i < n(p)〉 for
some n(p) ∈ ω, with each p(i) of the form p(i) = 〈αi(p), Ci(p)〉 where αi(p) is a regular
uncountable cardinal and ci(p) is a condition in Add(αi(p), αi(p)
++), the forcing that adds
αi(p)
++ Cohen subsets of αi(p), and 〈αi(p) | i < n(p)〉 is strictly increasing. Given p ∈ P,
we let α(p) = 〈αi(p) | i < n(p)〉. The ordering on P is given by stipulating that q is
stronger than p iff α(q) end-extends α(p) and for every i < n(p), ci(q) extends ci(p) in
the usual ordering of Add(αi(p), αi(p)
++).
Claim 3. P satisfies the forcing theorem over M.
Proof. We will show that P is approachable by projections. By Theorem 2.4.4, this implies
that P satisfies the forcing theorem. For this purpose, for each ordinal α let
Pα =
{
{p ∈ P | αn(p)−1(p) < α}, α ∈ Lim,
{p ∈ P | αn(p)−1(p) < α ∧ αn(p)−1(p) = α− 1→ cn(p)−1(p) = ∅}, otherwise.
We define projections piα+1 : P → Pα+1 as follows. If αn(p)−1(p) < α then piα+1(p) = p.
Otherwise, let piα+1(p) = 〈p(i) | i < k〉a〈α, ∅〉, where k is maximal such that αk−1(p) < α.
It is easy to check that the maps piα+1 witness that P is approachable by projections.
Given a P-generic filter G over M and a condition p ∈ G, we denote by Gp the∏
i<n(p) Add(αi(p), αi(p)
++)-generic filter induced by G.
Claim 4. For every p ∈ P and every σ ∈ MP, there is a condition q ≤P p and a∏
i<n(q) Add(αi(q), αi(p)
++)-name σ¯ such that q MP σ = σ¯.
Proof. Suppose that σ ∈ (Vγ)M and p ∈ P. Now choose q ≤P p such that αn(q)−1(q) ≥ γ.
By recursion on the name rank, we define for τ ∈MP,
τ q = {〈piq, r¯〉 | 〈pi, r〉 ∈ τ ∧ α(r) ⊆ α(q)},
where for r ∈ P, r¯ = 〈ci(r) | i < n(q)〉 ∈
∏
i<n(q) Add(αi(q), αi(q)
++) with ci(r) = ∅ for
n(r) ≤ i < n(q). Then q and σ¯ = σq are as desired, since whenever 〈τ, r〉 ∈ σ such that
α(r) * α(q) then q and r are incompatible by construction of q.
Claim 5. Assume that G is P-generic over M and α ∈ OrdM . Then there is r ∈ G such
that whenever σ is a P-name with σG ⊆ α, then there is a ∏i<n(r) Add(αi(r), αi(r)++)-
name σ˜ so that σ˜Gp = σG.
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Proof. We use a reduction argument similar as the one presented in [Jec03, Lemma
15.19]. Let G and α ∈ OrdM be given and choose r ∈ G such that αn(p)−1(r) ≥ α.
Assume σ ∈ MP and extend r to p in G to obtain a ∏i<n(q) Add(αi(p), αi(p)++)-name σ¯
such that p MP σ = σ¯, using the previous claim. Let Q =
∏
i<n(q) Add(αi(p), αi(p)
++)
and observe that Q ∼= Q0 × Q1, where Q0 =
∏
i<n(r) Add(αi(r), αi(r)
++) and Q1 =∏
n(r)≤i<n(p) Add(αi(p), αi(p)
++). Moreover, Q0 satisfies the κ+-cc and Q1 is <κ+-closed
for κ = αn(r)−1(r). Let p ∼= 〈p0, p1〉, where p0 ∈ Q0 and p1 ∈ Q1. For each β < α, we
consider the class
Dβ = {q ≤Q1 p1 | ∃A ⊆ Q0 [A maximal antichain ∧ ∀a ∈ A (〈a, q〉 decides βˇ ∈ σ¯)]}.
We show that each Dβ is open dense below p1 in Q1. It is obvious that Dβ is open.
In order to check density, pick some q ≤Q1 p1. Inductively, we construct a decreasing
sequence 〈qi | i < γ〉 of conditions in Q1 below q and a sequence 〈ai | i < γ〉 in Q0
which enumerates an antichain so that each pair 〈ai, qi〉 decides βˇ ∈ σ¯, for some γ < κ+.
Suppose that qi, ai are given for all i < ξ. If {ai | i < ξ} is not a maximal antichain, then
we can extend both sequences, using that Q1 is <κ+-closed. Since Q0 satisfies the κ+-cc,
there must be some γ < κ+ such that A = {ai | i < γ} is maximal. Invoking the closure
of Q1 once again, we can find qγ ∈ Q1 which extends each qi, i < γ. Then qγ ≤Q1 q and
qγ ∈ Dβ as desired.
Since Q1 is <κ+-closed, D =
⋂
β<αDβ is also open dense below p1. Pick q ∈ D ∩H,
where H is the Q1-generic filter induced by G, and for each β < α, pick a maximal
antichain Aβ ⊆ Q0 witnessing that q ∈ Dβ. It follows that
σ˜ = {〈βˇ, a〉 | a ∈ Aβ ∧ 〈a, q〉 MQ0×Q1 βˇ ∈ σ¯} ∈MQ0
is as desired.
Claim 6. P is cofinality-preserving and hence preserves all cardinals.
Proof. Assume it is not. Let σ ∈MP name a witness, i.e. a function f from κ to λ that is
cofinal, where κ < λ are regular cardinals in M . By Claim 5, f has a name in some finite
product of Cohen forcings. However, this forcing notion is cofinality-preserving using the
GCH, a contradiction.
Claim 7. M [G] satisfies the power set axiom, and whenever α is an infinite cardinal of
M , M [G] |= 2α = α++ if and only if there are p ∈ G and i < n(p) such that α = αi(p).
Proof. Let α be an infinite M -cardinal. Using Claim 5, choose p ∈ G such that for every
σ ∈MP such that σG ⊆ α there is a ∏i<n(p) Add(αi(p), αi(p)++)-name σ˜ with σ˜Gp = σG.
Then P(α)M [G] = P(α)M [Gp]. Since M is a model of ZFC + GCH, together with Claim 6
this proves both statements of the claim.
Claim 8. M [G] does not satisfy separation.
81
Chapter 4. Characterizations of pretameness and the Ord-cc
Proof. Suppose the contrary and consider
x = {〈n, α〉 ∈ ω × ω1 | ∃β ∈ OrdM(f(n) = ℵω1·β+α)},
where f(n) denotes the n-th cardinal at which the GCH fails. Separation implies that
x ∈M [G]. Since for α < ω1 the class
Dα = {p ∈ P | ∃β ∈ OrdM ∃i < n(p) [αi(p) = ℵω1·β + α]}
is a dense subclass P that is definable over M , it follows that x defines a surjection from
ω onto ω1, contradicting that P is cofinality-preserving.
This completes the proof of Theorem 4.3.2.
4.3.2 Separation implies replacement
In this section, we show that over models of GB− which contain a set-like well-order, the
preservation of separation and replacement is equivalent. First we need the following easy
characterization of the preservation of separation.
Lemma 4.3.3. Let M = 〈M, C〉 be a model of GB− and let P be a notion of class forcing
for M that satisfies the forcing theorem. Then the following statements are equivalent:
(1) For every Γ ∈ CP, σ ∈MP and p ∈ P with p MP Γ ⊆ σ, the class
DΓ,p = {q ≤P p | ∃τ ∈MP(q MP Γ = τ)} ∈ C
is dense below p.
(2) For every P-generic filter G over M, M[G] satisfies separation.
Proof. Suppose first that (1) holds and let G be P-generic over M. Let y ∈ M [G] and ϕ
an L∈-formula with set paramters ~p in M [G] and class paramters ~C in C[G]. We need to
find a set name for {x ∈ y | ϕ(x, ~z, ~C)}. Take names σ ∈MP for y and ~µ and ~Σ for ~z and
~C. Now consider
Γ = {〈τ, p〉 | τ ∈ dom(σ) ∧ p MP τ ∈ σ ∧ ϕ(τ, ~µ, ~Σ)} ∈ CP.
Clearly, 1P MP Γ ⊆ σ. Using (1), we can take p ∈ G ∩ DΓ,1P and a name τ ∈ MP such
that p MP Γ = τ . Then τ is as desired.
Suppose now that (2) holds. Assume that p MP Γ ⊆ σ for some σ ∈ MP,Γ ∈ CP and
p ∈ P and let q ≤P p. Let G be P-generic over M with q ∈ G. Then ΓG = {x ∈ σG |
x ∈ ΓG} ∈M [G] since M[G] satisfies separation. Pick τ ∈MP such that ΓG = τG. Using
the forcing theorem, we can find r ∈ G which strengthens q such that r MP Γ = τ . In
particular, r ∈ DΓ,p.
Theorem 4.3.4. Suppose that M = 〈M, C〉 is a countable transitive model of GB− such
that C contains a set-like well-order ≺. Let P ∈ C be a notion of class forcing which
satisfies the forcing theorem and let G be P-generic over M. If M[G] satisfies separation,
then M[G] satisfies replacement (or equivalently, collection).
82
Chapter 4. Characterizations of pretameness and the Ord-cc
Proof. Assume that replacement fails in M[G]. We want to show that separation fails in
M[G]. Using Lemma 4.2.1 and the forcing theorem, we can pick a class name F˙ ∈ CP and
p ∈ G such that
p MP F˙ : κˇ→ OrdM is cofinal.
As p plays no role in the proof to come, we may assume that p = 1P. Let C ⊆ OrdM ×
OrdM be an element of C such that each Cγ = {δ ∈ OrdM | 〈γ, δ〉 ∈ C} for γ ∈ OrdM is
either of the form
Ap,α = {β ∈ OrdM | ∃q ≤P p (q P F˙ (αˇ) = βˇ)} ∈ C
for p ∈ P and α ∈ OrdM such that Ap,α is a proper class of M, or of the form
Bp,α,τ = {β ∈ OrdM | ∃q ≤P p [q MP (F˙ (αˇ) = βˇ ∧ αˇ ∈ τ)]} ∈ C
for p ∈ P, α ∈ OrdM and τ ∈M such that Bp,α,τ is a proper class ofM, and moreover each
such Ap,α and Bp,α,τ appears unboundedly often in the enumeration 〈Cγ | γ ∈ OrdM〉.
Claim 1. There is D ∈ C such that both Cγ ∩D and Cγ \D are proper classes of M for
all γ ∈ OrdM .
Proof. This can be achieved by recursively defining Dγ and D
′
γ in M as follows. Let
D0 = D
′
0 = ∅. Suppose that Dγ and D′γ have already been defined. Let Dγ+1 ∈M be the
set obtained from Dγ by adding the least ordinal in Cγ \ (Dγ ∪ D′γ). Let D′γ+1 ∈ M be
the set obtained from D′γ by adding the least ordinal in Cγ \ (Dγ+1 ∪D′γ). If γ is a limit
ordinal, let Dγ =
⋃
δ<γ Dδ and D
′
γ =
⋃
δ<γ D
′
δ. Let D =
⋃
γ∈OrdM Dγ ∈ C. Since each
Cγ appears unboundedly often in the enumeration, both Cγ ∩D and Cγ \D are proper
classes.
Suppose that D ∈ C is as provided by Claim 1. Since P satisfies the forcing theorem,
to show that separation fails in M[G], by Lemma 4.3.3 it suffices to find Γ ∈ CP such
that ΓG is a subset of some s ∈ M [G] and such that there is no p ∈ G and no τ ∈ MP
with p MP Γ = τ . Let F = F˙G. Let Γ ∈ C be a name for {α < κ | F (α) ∈ D} ∈ C[G].
The above set s will be equal to κ. Suppose for a contradiction that p ∈ G is such that
p P Γ = τ for some τ ∈ MP. We first claim that there is an α < κ such that Ap,α is a
proper class. Assume that such an α does not exist. Then p forces that the range of F˙ is
bounded in OrdM , contradicting our assumption on F˙ .
The above claim implies that Ap,α ∩D = {β | ∃q ≤P p [q P (F˙ (αˇ) = βˇ ∧ αˇ ∈ τ)]} =
Bp,α,τ is a proper class. Then Bp,α,τ \D is empty, contradicting the choice of D.
4.3.3 Pretameness and the preservation of axioms
Recall that in Theorem 2.2.3 we have shown that pretame notions of class forcing preserve
GB− over models with a hierarchy. The following lemma states that there is a converse
to this result. This was first observed in [Fri00, Proposition 2.17] in a slightly less general
context.
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Lemma 4.3.5. Let M = 〈M, C〉 be a model of GB− which has a hierarchy witnessed by
〈Cα | α ∈ OrdM〉. Suppose that P is a notion of class forcing for M with the property
that for every p ∈ P there is a P-generic filter G over M such that p ∈ G and replacement
holds in M[G]. Then P is pretame for M.
Proof. Assume, towards a contradiction, that 〈Di | i ∈ I〉 is a sequence of dense classes
and p is a condition in P which witnesses that pretameness fails. By assumption, there is
a P-generic filter G containing p such that M[G] satisfies replacement. Now consider the
function
F : I → OrdM , F (i) = min{α ∈ OrdM | G ∩Di ∩ Cα 6= ∅}.
SinceM[G] satisfies replacement, ran(F ) ∈M [G]. Let γ ∈ OrdM be such that ran(F ) ⊆ γ
and
D = {q ≤P p | ∃i ∈ I ∀r ∈ Di ∩ Cγ (q⊥Pr)}.
By assumption, D is dense below p. Pick q ∈ G ∩ D and let i ∈ I such that q is
incompatible with all elements of Di ∩ Cγ. But then F (i) > γ, a contradiction.
Corollary 4.3.6. Suppose that M is a countable transitive model of GB− which has a
hierarchy. Then a notion of class forcing for M is pretame if and only if it preserves the
axioms of GB−.
By combining Corollary 4.3.6 with the results of the previous section, we obtain the
following.
Corollary 4.3.7. Suppose that M = 〈M, C〉 is a countable transitive model of GB− such
that C contains a set-like well-order of M , and let P be a notion of class forcing for M.
Then the following statements are equivalent:
(1) P is pretame.
(2) P preserves GB−.
(3) P preserves collection.
(4) P preserves replacement.
(5) P preserves separation and satisfies the forcing theorem.
Proof. The implications from (2) to (3), from (3) to (4) and from (4) to (5) are trivial.
That (1) implies (2) was shown in Theorem 2.2.3. and that (4) implies (1) follows from
Lemma 4.3.5. Finally, the implication from (5) to (4) is shown in Theorem 4.3.4. Note
that this is the only time that we are using the fact that C contains a set-like well-order;
for the other implications it suffices to require that M has a hierarchy.
4.4 Boolean completions
As has been shown in Section 3.2, the existence of Boolean completions is closely related
to the forcing theorem. Namely by Theorem 3.2.6, if M has a hierarchy and P is a
separative notion of class forcing for M, then P has a pre-Boolean M -completion iff it
satisfies the forcing theorem for all L∈-formulae. Thus the following is a consequence of
Theorem 4.2.4.
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Theorem 4.4.1. Suppose that C contains a set-like well-order of M , but no first-order
truth predicate for M . Then a separative notion of class forcing P for M is pretame for
M if and only if it densely has a pre-Boolean M-completion.
Definition 4.4.2. Suppose that P is a notion of class forcing for M = 〈M, C〉 |= GB−. If
A,B ⊆ P with A,B ∈ C, we say that supPA = supPB if
(1) A is predense below every b ∈ B and
(2) B is predense below every a ∈ A.
Note that this definition is possible even if the suprema do not exist in P. On the other
hand, if supPA = supPB and A has a supremum in P then so does B and indeed they
coincide.
The following observation is a slight strengthening of a lemma which is essentially due
to Joel Hamkins.
Lemma 4.4.3. Suppose that C contains a set-like well-order of M . If P does not satisfy
the Ord-cc, then there is an antichain A ∈ C such that for every B ∈ M with B ⊆ P,
supPB 6= supPA. In particular, A does not have a supremum in P.
Proof. Let A ∈ C be a class-sized antichain in P. We claim that there is a subclass of
A in C which fulfills the desired properties. Suppose for a contradiction that no such
subclass exists. Using the set-like well-order of M , we can assume that the domain of
P is OrdM . Let pi : OrdM → A be a bijection in C. Furthermore, there is an injection
ϕ : P(OrdM)∩M → OrdM in C. This gives us a mapping i : P(OrdM)∩ C → OrdM in V
which maps X ⊆ OrdM to ϕ(B), where B is the least (with respect to our given global
well-order) set B ⊆ P in M such that supP pi′′X = supPB. Since A is an antichain, i is
injective. Moreover, whether i(X) = α is definable over M, so
C = {α ∈ OrdM | pi(α) P α ∧ i(Xα) = α}
is in C for Xα = {β ∈ OrdM | pi(β) ≤P α}.
Claim 1. For each α ∈ OrdM we have α ∈ C if and only if there is X ∈ P(OrdM) ∩ C
such that i(X) = α and α /∈ X.
Proof. Suppose first that α ∈ C. Then α /∈ Xα and so we can choose X = Xα. Conversely,
suppose that X ∈ P(OrdM)∩C is such that i(X) = α and α /∈ X. Then X = Xα, because
pi′′X and pi′′Xα are both subsets of the antichain A and have the same supremum. Hence
α ∈ C.
We will use Claim 1 to derive a contradiction similar to Russell’s paradox. Consider
β = i(C). If β ∈ C then by Claim 1 there is X such that i(X) = β but β /∈ X. By
injectivity of i, this means that X = C, a contradiction. On the other hand, it is also
impossible that β /∈ C, since otherwise X = C would witness that β ∈ C.
The following theorem characterizes the Ord-cc in terms of the existence of Boolean
completions.
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Theorem 4.4.4. Suppose that M = 〈M, C〉 is a countable transitive model of GB− such
that C contains a set-like well-order of M . Then the following statements are equivalent
for every separative partial order P:
(1) P satisfies the Ord-cc.
(2) P has a unique Boolean M-completion.
(3) P has a Boolean C-completion.
Proof. Suppose first that P satisfies the Ord-cc over M. Since C contains a global well-
order of M , P is pretame for M and therefore it has a Boolean M -completion B(P) ∈ C by
Corollary 3.2.9. Let B be another Boolean M -completion of P. Without loss of generality,
we can assume that P is a subset of B. Then every element b ∈ B satisfies b = supBDb,
where Db = {p ∈ P | p ≤B b} ∈ C. But using the global well-order of M we obtain that
Db contains an antichain which is maximal in Db. Moreover, since P satisfies the Ord-cc,
every such antichain lies in M . Furthermore, observe that if A and A′ are two antichains
which are maximal in Db, then supBA = supBA
′ = b and supB(P) A = supB(P) A
′. But this
gives a canonical embedding of B into B(P) which fixes P. It is clearly surjective, since
the same argument as above can be done within B(P). This shows that P has a unique
Boolean M -completion.
Suppose now that B is the unique Boolean M -completion of P and that A ⊆ B is a
class in C which does not have a supremum in B. Let Q be the forcing notion obtained
from P by adding supA. Note that Corollary 3.2.7, P satisfies the forcing theorem. Then
by Lemma 4.1.10 so does Q and hence Q has a Boolean M -completion B′. But by our
assumption, B and B′ are isomorphic and hence supA exists in B, a contradiction. This
proves that B is already a Boolean C-completion.
To see that (3) implies (1), suppose that B is a Boolean C-completion of P. Assume,
towards a contradiction, that P does not satisfy the Ord-cc. Then neither does B. But
then by Lemma 4.4.3, B cannot be C-complete.
4.5 The extension maximality principle
This section is motivated by the following easy observation which follows from Lemma
1.3.2. The collapse forcing Col∗(ω,Ord)M , which consists of functions n → OrdM for
n ∈ ω, is dense in Col(ω,Ord)M . However, unlike Col(ω,Ord)M which collapses all
M -cardinals, the subforcing Col∗(ω,Ord)M does not add any new sets, so Col(ω,Ord)M
and Col∗(ω,Ord)M do not have the same generic extensions. We will show that, under
sufficient conditions on the ground model M, the property of P of having the same generic
extensions as all forcing notions into which P embeds densely is in fact equivalent to the
pretameness of P. Throughout this section, let M = 〈M, C〉 be countable transitive model
of GB−.
Definition 4.5.1. A notion of class forcing P for M satisfies the
(1) extension maximality principle (EMP) over M, if whenever Q is a notion of class
forcing for M and pi : P → Q is a dense embedding in C, then for every Q-generic
filter G over M, M [G] = M [pi−1(G) ∩ P].
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(2) strong extension maximality principle (SEMP) over M, if whenever Q is a notion of
class forcing for M, pi : P→ Q is a dense embedding in C and σ ∈MQ, then there is
τ ∈MP with 1Q MQ σ = pi(τ).
Theorem 4.5.2. Let M = 〈M, C〉 be a countable transitive model of GB− such that C
contains a set-like well-order of M . Then a notion of class forcing P for M is pretame
for M if and only if it satisfies the forcing theorem and the EMP.
Proof. Suppose first that P is pretame. By Theorem 2.2.2, P satisfies the forcing theorem.
Let Q be a notion of class forcing such that P embeds densely into Q and let G be Q-
generic over M. Without loss of generality, we may assume that P is a dense suborder
of Q. Fix a Q-name σ. We claim that σG ∈ M [G ∩ P]. For every q ∈ tc(σ) ∩ Q, let
Dq = {p ∈ P | p ≤Q q ∨ p⊥Qq}. Then Dq is a dense subclass of P. By pretameness, there
is p ∈ G ∩ P and there are dq ⊆ Dq which are predense below p in P. Now we define
inductively for every name τ in tc({σ}) ∩MQ,
τ¯ = {〈µ¯, r〉 | ∃s (〈µ, s〉 ∈ τ ∧ r ∈ ds ∧ r ≤Q s)}.
But then σ¯ ∈MP and σG = σ¯G∩P ∈M [G ∩ P].
Conversely, assume that P is not pretame but satisfies the forcing theorem. Then there
is a P-generic filter G such that replacement fails in the generic extension M[G], and by
Theorem 4.3.4 so does separation (note that this is where we use the assumption about
the set-like well-order). By Lemma 4.3.3 there are Γ ∈ CP, σ ∈ MP and p ∈ G such that
p MP Γ ⊆ σ and there are no q ∈ G and τ ∈ MP such that q MP Γ = τ . For µ ∈ dom(σ)
consider
Aµ = {q ∈ P | q MP µ ∈ Γ}.
Let Q be the forcing obtained from P by adding supAµ for each µ ∈ dom(σ) such that
Aµ is nonempty below p, as described in Section 4.1. Then P is a dense subclass of Q.
Consider the Q-name
τ = {〈µ, supAµ〉 | µ ∈ dom(σ), Aµ is nonempty below p} ∈MQ.
Let H be the Q-generic induced by G, that is the upwards closure of G in Q. Then τ is
a Q-name for ΓG, so τH = ΓG ∈M [H] \M [G], proving the failure of the EMP.
Note that in the proof of Theorem 4.5.2 we have only used the set-like well-order of
M to show that every forcing notion which satisfies the forcing theorem and the EMP is
pretame; for the other direction it suffices to assume that M has a hierarchy.
Example 4.5.3. Jensen coding P (see [BJW82]) is a pretame notion of class forcing which
over a model M of ZFC adds a generic real x such that the P-generic extension is of the
form L[x]. Moreover, there is a class name Γ for x such that 1P MP M [G˙] = L[Γ], but
there is no set name σ such that 1P MP σ = Γ. Let Q be the forcing notion obtained from
Jensen coding by adding the suprema pn = sup{p ∈ P | p MP nˇ ∈ Γ}. Since P is pretame
and dense in Q, it follows that Q is also pretame. By Theorem 4.5.2, P satisfies the EMP
and hence P and Q produce the same generic extensions. In particular, this means that
if G is Q-generic then M [G ∩ P] = M [G] = L[σG], where σ = {〈nˇ, pn〉 | n ∈ ω} ∈MQ.
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Lemma 4.5.4. Suppose that M = 〈M, C〉 is a countable transitive model of GB− and that
C contains a set-like well-order of M . Then a notion of class forcing P for M satisfies the
SEMP if and only if it satisfies the Ord-cc over M.
Proof. Suppose first that P satisfies the Ord-cc. Suppose that there is a dense embedding
from P into some forcing notion Q. Without loss of generality, we may assume that P is a
subclass of Q. We prove by induction on rank(σ) that for every σ ∈MQ there is σ¯ ∈MP
with 1Q MQ σ = σ¯. Assume that this holds for all τ of rank less than rank(σ). Then for
every τ ∈ dom(σ) there is τ¯ ∈ MP with 1Q MQ τ = τ¯ . For each condition q ∈ range(σ),
let Dq = {p ∈ P | p ≤Q q} and choose an antichain Aq which is maximal in Dq. By
assumption, we may do this so that 〈〈q, Aq〉 | q ∈ range(σ)〉 ∈M . Then put
σ¯ = {〈τ¯ , p〉 | ∃q ∈ Q (〈τ, q〉 ∈ σ ∧ p ∈ Aq)} ∈MP.
By construction, 1Q MQ σ = σ¯.
Conversely, suppose that P does not satisfy the Ord-cc. Then by Lemma 4.4.3 there
is an antichain A ∈ C such that for no B ∈ M with B ⊆ P, supPA = supPB. Let
Q = P∪{supA} be the extension of P given by adding the supremum of A. Now consider
σ = {〈0ˇ, supA〉} ∈MQ. We claim that σ witnesses the failure of the SEMP. Suppose for
a contradiction that there is τ ∈MP such that 1Q MQ σ = τ . Let τ = {〈µi, pi〉 | i ∈ I} for
some I ∈ M . But then it is easy to check that supP{pi | i ∈ I} = supPA, contradicting
our assumption on A.
4.6 Nice forcing notions
This section is motivated by the observation in Lemma 4.6.2 below, namely that - unlike
in the context of set forcing - there are sets of ordinals in class-generic extensions which
do not have a nice name. We will characterize both pretameness and the Ord-cc in terms
of the existence of nice names for sets of ordinals.
4.6.1 Basic definitions and examples
Throughout this section, M = 〈M, C〉 will denote a countable transitive model of GB−.
Definition 4.6.1. Let P be a notion of class forcing for M. A name σ ∈MP for a set of
ordinals is a nice name if it is of the form
⋃
α<γ{αˇ}×Aα for some γ ∈ OrdM , where each
Aα ∈M is a set-sized antichain of conditions in P.
Lemma 4.6.2. Let P denote Col(ω,Ord)M . Then in every P-generic extension there is
a subset of ω which does not have a nice P-name.
Proof. Consider the canonical name σ = {〈nˇ, {〈n, 0〉}〉 | n ∈ ω} for the set of natural
numbers which are mapped to 0 by the generic function from ω to the ordinals. Let G be
P-generic over M. We show that the complement of σG is an element of M [G], but does
not have a nice P-name in M . Suppose for a contradiction that there are p ∈ G and a
nice P-name
τ =
⋃
n∈ω
{nˇ} × An ∈M,
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where each An ∈ M is an antichain, such that p MP ωˇ \ σ = τ . Let n ∈ ω \ dom(p) and
choose α > sup{r(i) | r ∈ An ∧ i ∈ dom(r)}. Then q = p ∪ {〈n, α〉} strengthens p and
q MP nˇ ∈ τ . Hence there must be some r ∈ An which is compatible with q. But then
n /∈ dom(r), so p and r ∪ {〈n, 0〉} are compatible. Let s ≤P p, r ∪ {〈n, 0〉} witness this.
Then s MP nˇ ∈ σ ∩ τ , a contradiction.
That the complement of σG has a P-name in M and is thus an element of M [G] follows
from a more general result in [HKS16b, Lemma 8.7]. For the benefit of the reader, we
provide a shorter proof for the present special case. For each n ∈ ω, consider the P-name
τn = nˇ ∪ {〈mˇ, {〈i, 0〉 | n ≤ i < m}〉 | m > n}.
Then each τn is a name for the least k ≥ n such that k /∈ σG. Now put τ = {〈τn,1P〉 |
n ∈ ω}. Since by an easy density argument the complement of σG is unbounded in ω, τ
is as desired.
Definition 4.6.3. A notion of class forcing P for M is said to be
(1) nice, if for every γ ∈ OrdM , for every σ ∈ MP and for every P-generic filter G such
that σG ⊆ γ there is a nice name τ ∈MP such that σG = τG.
(2) very nice, if for every γ ∈ OrdM and for every σ ∈MP such that 1P MP σ ⊆ γˇ there
is a nice name τ ∈MP such that 1P MP σ = τ .
Example 4.6.4. (1) By Lemma 4.6.2, Col(ω,Ord)M is not nice.
(2) Suppose thatM has a hierarchy and satisfies the axiom of choice. Then every pretame
notion of class forcing P for M is nice. To see this, let γ ∈ OrdM be an ordinal and
let p ∈ P and σ ∈MP be such that p MP σ ⊆ γˇ.2 For each α < γ, consider the class
Dα = {q ≤P p | q MP α ∈ σ ∨ q MP α /∈ σ} ∈ C,
which is dense below p. By pretameness there exist q ≤P p and for every α < γ a
set dα ⊆ Dα in M which is predense below q. Using the axiom of choice, we may
choose for every α < γ an antichain aα ⊆ dα which is maximal in dα. Finally, let
Aα = {r ∈ aα | r MP αˇ ∈ σ}. Then
τ =
⋃
α<γ
{αˇ} × Aα ∈MP
is a nice name for a subset of γ with q MP σ = τ .
(3) If C contains a global well-order of M , then every notion of class forcing P for M
which satisfies the Ord-cc is very nice: Note first that by Lemma 4.1.2, P satisfies
the forcing theorem. Suppose that 1P MP σ ⊆ γˇ. For every α < γ, we can choose
an antichain Aα which is maximal in {q ∈ P | ∃〈µ, p〉 ∈ σ (q ≤P p ∧ q MP µ = αˇ)}.
Since P satisfies the Ord-cc, making use of the global well-order we can do this so
that 〈〈α,Aα〉 | α < γ〉 ∈M . Then
τ =
⋃
α<γ
{αˇ} × Aα ∈MP
is a nice name and it is easy to check that 1P MP σ = τ .
2Note that since M has a hierarchy, it follows by Theorem 2.2.2 that P satisfies the forcing theorem.
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(4) Every M -complete pre-Boolean algebra B is very nice, since then we can always
define Boolean values JϕKB for quantifier-free infinitary formulae ϕ which mention
only set names. More precisely, if σ ∈ MB such that 1B B σ ⊆ γˇ for some ordinal
γ, the name
τ = {〈αˇ, Jαˇ ∈ σKB〉 | α < γ} ∈MB
is a nice name with the property that 1B B σ = τ . In particular, this shows
that there are very nice notions of class forcing which are not pretame (for example
the Boolean M -completion of Col(ω,Ord)M), since every separative notion of class
forcing for M which satisfies the forcing theorem has a pre-Boolean M -completion
by Theorem 3.2.6.
4.6.2 Pretameness and nice forcing notions
Lemma 4.6.2 suggests that one might try to use the class name F˙ for the generic cofinal
function F : κ → OrdM added by a non-pretame notion of class forcing P (by Lemma
4.2.1) to construct a forcing notion Q into which P densely embeds and such that there is
a Q-name τ for a subset of κ which has no nice Q-name (the idea would be to obtain Q
by adding the Boolean values of “ F˙ (αˇ) = 0ˇ” for α < κ, which allow for the construction
of a name τ for {α < κ | F (α) 6= 0}; in the case of Col(ω,Ord), these Boolean values
already exist). This approach would indeed work if κ = ω, as we can construct such τ by
[HKS16b, Lemma 8.7]. Since we however do not know whether names for the complements
of (nice) names for subsets of arbitrary ordinals always exist (for more on this topic,
consult [HKS16b, Section 8]), we will instead work with a name for an intersection of
two nice names. The following lemma shows that such intersections exist in every class
forcing extension.
Lemma 4.6.5. Let M be a countable transitive model of GB−. Let P be a notion of class
forcing for M. Let α ∈ OrdM be an ordinal and let σ, τ ∈ MP be nice names for subsets
of α. If G is P-generic over M, then there is a P-name µ ∈MP such that µG = σG ∩ τG.
Proof. Since σ and τ are nice names, they are of the form
σ =
⋃
β<α
{βˇ} × Aβ and τ =
⋃
β<α
{βˇ} ×Bβ,
where 〈Aβ | β < α〉, 〈Bβ | β < α〉 ∈ M . Let G be P-generic over M and let β0 ∈ α be
minimal such that β0 ∈ σG ∩ τG. Put µ = {〈βˇ0,1P〉} ∪ {〈µβ, p〉 | β ∈ (β0, α), p ∈ Xβ},
where µβ = βˇ0 ∪
⋃
γ<β{γˇ} × Yβ for every β ∈ (β0, α) = {β ∈ OrdM | β0 < β < α}. Then
(µβ)
G =
{
β, β ∈ τG
β0, otherwise.
Clearly, µG = σG ∩ τG is as desired.
Remark 4.6.6. Note that it is in general not possible to find a P-name µ as in Lemma
4.6.5 such that 1P MP µ = σ ∩ τ . For example, consider a notion of class forcing P which
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contains compatible conditions p, q ∈ P such that the class {r ∈ P | r ≤P p, q} contains
no predense subclass that is an element of M . Then there is no such P-name for the
intersection of σ = {〈0ˇ, p〉} and τ = {〈0ˇ, q〉}.
Theorem 4.6.7. Let M = 〈M, C〉 be a countable transitive model of KM. Then an
antisymmetric separative notion of class forcing P for M is pretame for M if and only if
it is densely nice.
Proof. Suppose first that P is pretame. It is straightforward to check that whenever there
is a dense embedding pi : P→ Q in C for some notion of class forcing Q for M, then Q is
also pretame. Then by Example 4.6.4 (2), every such Q is nice.
Conversely, suppose that P is not pretame. By Theorem 3.3.1, P has a Boolean M -
completion. Hence, without loss of generality, we may assume that P = 〈P,≤P〉 is an
M -complete Boolean algebra. We will extend P to a notion of class forcing Q for M
which is not nice and so that P is a dense subforcing of Q. By Lemma 4.2.1 there are a
class name F˙ ∈ CP, κ ∈ Ord and p ∈ P such that p MP “ F˙ : κˇ→ Ord is cofinal”. For the
sake of simplicity, suppose that p = 1P.
For every α, β < κ and p ∈ P, let
Xp,α,β = {〈γ, δ〉 ∈ OrdM ×OrdM | ∃q ≤P p (q MP F˙ (αˇ) = γˇ ∧ F˙ (βˇ) = δˇ)},
and let
Yp,α = {γ ∈ OrdM | ∃q ≤P p (q MP F˙ (αˇ) = γˇ)}.
Claim 1. For each p ∈ P there is α < κ such that for all β < κ, Xp,α,β is a proper class.
Proof. Suppose the contrary. Then for every α < κ there exists βα < κ such that Xp,α,βα
is set-sized. In particular, this implies that for every α < κ, the class Yp,α is set-sized.
But then p forces that the range of F˙ is bounded in the ordinals, a contradiction.
Let C = 〈Ci | i ∈ OrdM〉 ∈ C be an enumeration of subclasses of OrdM × OrdM such
that each Ci is of the form Xp,α,β for some p ∈ P and α, β < κ such that Xp,α,β is a proper
class, and moreover each Xp,α,β which is a proper class appears unboundedly often in the
enumeration C.
We will next perform a recursive construction to build two classes D,E ∈ C, in a way
that in particular each of D ∩ E, D \ E and E \D has a proper class sized intersection
with Yp,α = {γ | 〈γ, γ〉 ∈ Xp,α,α} whenever Yp,α is a proper class. The construction of
the classes D,E will satisfy further properties which will be used in the proof of Claim 2
below.
Let D0 = D
′
0 = E0 = E
′
0 = ∅. Suppose that Di, D′i, Ei, E ′i have already been defined
such that Di ∩ D′i = Ei ∩ E ′i = D′i ∩ E ′i = ∅ and Di ∪ D′i = Ei ∪ E ′i. We define
Fi = Di ∪ D′i = Ei ∪ E ′i. Let 〈γ0, δ0〉, 〈γ1, δ1〉, 〈γ2, δ2〉 be the lexicographically least pairs
of ordinals in Ci such that each pair 〈γk, δk〉 contains at least one ordinal not in Fi ∪{γj |
j < k} ∪ {δj | j < k}, and γ0, δ0 additionally satisfy (if possible)
γ0 /∈ Fi ∧ δ0 /∈ D′i,(4.1)
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and γ1, δ1 satisfy in addition (if such exist)
γ1 /∈ Fi ∪ {γ0, δ0} ∧ δ1 /∈ E ′i.(4.2)
In the successor step, we will enlarge Di, D
′
i, Ei and E
′
i to Di+1, D
′
i+1, Ei+1 and E
′
i+1 by
putting distinct ordinals, which are not in Fi, into the sets Di+1 ∩ Ei+1, Di+1 ∩ E ′i+1 and
D′i+1∩Ei+1. First, we put each ordinal in {γ0, δ0} which is not in Fi into Di+1∩E ′i+1. Next,
we put all ordinals amongst {γ1, δ1} that are not in Fi∪{γ0, δ0} into D′i+1∩Ei+1. Finally,
we put every ordinal in {γ2, δ2} which is not yet in Fi ∪ {γ0, γ1, δ0, δ1} into Di+1 ∩ Ei+1.
Note that by construction, Di+1∩D′i+1 = Ei+1∩E ′i+1 = D′i+1∩E ′i+1 = ∅ and Di+1∪D′i+1 =
Ei+1 ∪ E ′i+1.
At limit stages, we take unions, e.g. if j is a limit ordinal, we let Dj =
⋃
i<j Di. Finally,
let D =
⋃
i∈OrdM Di ∈ C and let E =
⋃
i∈OrdM Ei ∈ C.
Note that at each stage i such that Ci = Xp,α,α for some p ∈ P and α ∈ OrdM , each of
the classes D∩E, D \E and E \D obtains a new element from Yp,α. Since there are class
many such stages, each of D ∩ E, D \ E and E \D has a proper class-sized intersection
with Yp,α whenever Yp,α is a proper class.
We define
a = {α < κ | ∃p ∈ P (p MP F˙ (αˇ) ∈ Dˇ)} and
b = {α < κ | ∃p ∈ P (p MP F˙ (αˇ) ∈ Eˇ)}.
We extend P to a forcing notion Q by adding suprema for each of the classes
Rα = {p ∈ P | p MP F˙ (αˇ) ∈ Dˇ} and
Sβ = {p ∈ P | p MP F˙ (βˇ) ∈ Eˇ}
for α ∈ a and β ∈ b, as described in Section 4.1. Let pα = supQRα and let qβ = supQ Sβ
for α ∈ a resp. β ∈ b. Since M is a model of KM, Q satisfies the forcing theorem.
We will show that Q is not nice. Let G˙ denote the canonical class name for the
Q-generic filter. Consider the Q-names
σ = {〈αˇ, pα〉 | α ∈ a} and τ = {〈αˇ, qα〉 | α ∈ b}
for {α < κ | F˙ G˙(α) ∈ Dˇ} and {α < κ | F˙ G˙(α) ∈ Eˇ} respectively. It follows from Lemma
4.6.5 that for every Q-generic filter G there is a Q-name µ such that µG = σG ∩ τG. We
claim that MQ contains no nice name for σG∩ τG. Suppose for a contradiction that there
are p ∈ Q and a nice name ν ∈ MQ such that p MQ ν = σ ∩ τ . By density of P in Q, we
may assume that p ∈ P. Since ν is a nice name, it is of the form
ν =
⋃
α<κ
{αˇ} × Aα,
where each Aα ⊆ Q is a set-sized antichain in M .
Let α < κ be as in Claim 1. We may assume that Aα only contains conditions which
are compatible with p.
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Claim 2. For every q ∈ Aα,
Zq = {γ ∈ OrdM | ∃r ∈ P (r ≤Q p, q and r MP F˙ (αˇ) = γˇ)}
is a set in M .
Proof. We first consider q ∈ Aα ∩ P. By assumption p and q are compatible, and since
P is a Boolean algebra, Zq = Yp∧q,α. Assume for a contradiction that Yp∧q,α is a proper
class. Then by our construction, Yp∧q,α \D is a proper class as well. Take γ ∈ Yp∧q,α \D
and r ≤P p ∧ q with r MP F˙ (αˇ) = γˇ. Let G be Q-generic with r ∈ G. Then p, q ∈ G and
so α ∈ νG = σG ∩ τG. On the other hand, since F˙G(α) = γ /∈ D, we have pα /∈ G and
hence α /∈ σG. This is a contradiction.
Next, suppose that q = pα and assume for a contradiction that Zpα is a proper class.
Then Yp,α is a proper class, so Yp,α ∩ (D \ E) is also a proper class. Now let r ≤P p and
γ ∈ D \ E be such that r MP F˙ (αˇ) = γˇ. Then r ≤Q pα by the definition of pα. If G is
Q-generic with r ∈ G, then α ∈ νG. Since γ /∈ E, we have α /∈ τG. This is a contradiction.
Next, suppose that q = pβ ∈ Aα for some β 6= α. If there is some 〈γ, δ〉 ∈ Xp,α,β such
that δ ∈ D but γ /∈ D ∩ E, then take r ≤P p such that r MP F˙ (αˇ) = γˇ ∧ F˙ (βˇ) = δˇ and
a Q-generic filter containig r. Since δ ∈ D we have pβ ∈ G and so α ∈ νG. On the other
hand, F˙G(α) = γ /∈ D∩E, so α /∈ σG∩τG. So there can be no such 〈γ, δ〉 ∈ Xp,α,β. Hence
for all 〈γ, δ〉 ∈ Xp,α,β, if δ ∈ D then γ ∈ D ∩E. Suppose for a contradiction that Zpβ is a
proper class. Consider now the first stage i such that Xp,α,β = Ci. Since Yp,α is a proper
class, there is 〈γ, δ〉 ∈ Xp,α,β such that γ /∈ Fi. If there is such a pair which additionally
satisfies that δ /∈ D′i, then we are in case (1) in the recursive construction of D and E
and so this would imply that γ ends up in D \E and δ ∈ D. But we have already shown
that this is impossible. So for every pair 〈γ, δ〉 ∈ Xp,α,β with γ /∈ Fi we have δ ∈ D′i. In
particular, if δ ∈ D then γ ∈ Fi. But this implies that Zpβ ⊆ Fi is not a proper class,
which is a contradiction.
The case q = qα is analogous to the case q = pα. Finally, suppose that q = qβ for
some β 6= α. As in the previous case q = pβ, we can conclude that for all 〈γ, δ〉 ∈ Xp,α,β,
if δ ∈ E then γ ∈ D ∩ E. As above, we assume that Zqβ is not in M and we let i be the
least ordinal such that Ci = Xp,α,β. After choosing γ0, δ0 in the recursive construction of
D and E, there is still a pair 〈γ1, δ1〉 such that γ1 /∈ F+i = Fi ∪ {γ0, δ0}, since Yp,α is a
proper class. If possible, this pair is chosen such that δ1 /∈ E ′i. But then γ1 is put into
E \D and δ1 ends up in E. However, we have already argued that this cannot occur. But
then for every such pair 〈γ1, δ1〉 ∈ Xp,α,β with γ1 /∈ F+i , we have δ1 ∈ E ′i, and so Zqβ is
contained in the set F+i , which is a contradiction.
By Claim 2 and since Aα ∈M , we have that
B =
⋃
q∈Aα
Zq ∈M.
Since Yp,α is a proper class, so is Yp,α ∩D ∩E by our construction, and hence there must
be some γ ∈ (Yp,α ∩ D ∩ E) \ B. Let now q ≤P p such that q MP F˙ (αˇ) = γˇ and take a
Q-generic filter G with q ∈ G. Then F˙G(α) = γ ∈ D∩E, so α ∈ σG∩τG. Therefore there
is some r ∈ Aα ∩G. Take s ∈ G with s ≤Q q, r. Then s MQ γˇ = F˙ (αˇ) ∈ Bˇ, contradicting
the choice of γ.
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4.6.3 The Ord-cc and very nice forcing notions
The next theorem shows that the Ord-chain condition can be characterized in terms of
very niceness.
Theorem 4.6.8. Suppose that M = 〈M, C〉 is a countable transitive model of GB− such
that C contains a set-like well-order of M . A separative antisymmetric notion of class
forcing P for M which satisfies the forcing theorem satisfies the Ord-cc if and only if it is
densely very nice.
Proof. Suppose first that P satisfies the Ord-cc and P embeds densely into Q. It is easy
to see that then Q also satisfies the Ord-cc and so by Example 4.6.4, (3) it is very nice.
Conversely, suppose that P contains a class-sized antichain. We would like to extend
P via a dense embedding to a partial order which is not very nice. Since P satisfies the
forcing theorem, P has a Boolean M -completion. As we are only interested in a dense
property, we may therefore assume that P is already an M -complete Boolean algebra.
By the proof of Lemma 4.4.3, we can find three disjoint subclasses of our given class-
sized antichain, each of which contains a subclass which does not have a supremum in
P. Denote these subclasses without suprema by A,D and E, and let B = A ∪ D and
C = A ∪ E.
Claim 1. At least one of supB and supC does not exist in P.
Proof. We show that if both supB and supC exist, then so does supA, contradicting our
choice of A. Since P is an M -complete Boolean algebra, if supB and supC exist, then
so does p = supB ∧ supC. We claim that p is already the supremum of A. It is clear
that every element of A is below p. It remains to check that A is predense below p. Let
q ≤P p. Since B is predense below q, there are r ≤P q and b ∈ B with r ≤P b. Since C
is predense below r, there are s ≤P r and c ∈ C with s ≤P c. In particular, b and c are
compatible. But they both belong to the antichain B ∪ C, so b = c ∈ B ∩ C = A.
Let Q be the forcing notion obtained from P by adding supB and supC. By Lemma
4.1.10, Q satisfies the forcing theorem. Moreover, it follows from the separativity of P
that Q is separative. We show that Q is not very nice. Consider the Q-name
σ = {〈{〈0ˇ, supB〉}, supC〉}.
By definition, 1Q MQ σ ⊆ 2ˇ.
Claim 2. There is no nice Q-name τ such that 1Q MQ σ = τ .
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that τ = {0ˇ} ×A0 ∪ {1ˇ} ×A1, where A0, A1 ∈M are
antichains of Q, and 1Q MQ σ = τ . Observe that A1 ⊆ P, since if for example supB ∈ A1
and G is Q-generic with supB ∈ G and supC /∈ G, then 1 ∈ τG \ σG. The same works
for supC. Therefore supA1 exists in P. We claim that supA1 is the supremum of A.
Firstly, we show that every element of A is below supA1. Suppose for a contradiction
that there is a ∈ A with a Q supA1. Then by separativity of Q there is p ≤P a with
p⊥P supA1. In particular, p is incompatible with every element of A1. Hence if G is a
Q-generic filter with p ∈ G then 1 ∈ σG \ τG, contradicting our assumptions on σ and τ .
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Secondly, we check that A is predense below supA1. Assume, towards a contradiction,
that there is p ≤P supA1 with p⊥Pa for each a ∈ A. Now A1 is predense below p, so there
exist q ≤P p and r ∈ A1 with q ≤P r. Again, this yields that for any Q-generic filter G
with q ∈ G, 1 ∈ τG but A ∩ G = ∅, so it is impossible that supB and supC are both in
G. Hence 1 /∈ σG, contradicting our assumptions on σ and τ .
We have thus shown that supA exists in P, contradicting our choice of A.
This proves that Q is not very nice.
The proof of Theorem 4.6.8 actually shows that every notion of forcing P which satisfies
the forcing theorem but not the Ord-cc, can be densely embedded into a notion of class
forcing which satisfies the forcing theorem and is nice but not very nice. To see this, it
remains to check that the partial order Q constructed above is nice. This follows from
the following more general result:
Lemma 4.6.9. Suppose that P is a notion of class forcing which satisfies the forcing
theorem. If P is nice and Q is obtained from P by adding the supremum of some subclass
A ∈ C of P, then Q is also nice.
Proof. Let σ ∈ MQ and p MQ σ ⊆ γˇ for some p ∈ Q and γ ∈ OrdM . Let σ+ denote the
P-name obtained from σ by replacing every ocurrence of supA in tc(σ) by 1P, and let σ−
be defined recursively by σ− = {〈τ−, p〉 ∈ σ | p 6= supA}. Let q ≤Q p. Without loss of
generality, we can assume that q ∈ P. If q is incompatible with every element of A, then
q MQ σ = σ−. But then there are r ≤P q and a nice P-name τ such that r MP σ− = τ
and so r MQ σ = τ . If there is some a ∈ A such that q is compatible with a, let r ≤P q, a.
Then r MQ σ = σ+ and so as in the previous case we can strengthen r to some s which
witnesses that σ+ has a nice P-name.
Corollary 4.6.10. Suppose that M = 〈M, C〉 is a countable transitive model of GB− such
that C contains a set-like well-order of M . Every separative antisymmetric notion of class
forcing which satisfies the forcing theorem but not the Ord-cc is dense in a notion of class
forcing which is nice but not very nice.
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Chapter 5
Second-order arithmetic, topological
regularity and sharps
In this chapter, we will compare the consistency strength of extensions of second-order
arithmetic (SOA) with (extensions of ZFC−. In Section 5.1 we present the folklore result
that second-order arithmetic and ZFC−+ “all sets are countable” are bi-interpretable. In
Section 5.2 we will generalize the result mentioned in [KM07] that every model of SOA
enhanced with the Π11-perfect set property contains inner models of ZFC. More precisely,
we will prove that every model of SOA + Π11-determinacy +Π
1
2-perfect set property has
an inner model of ZFC in which every set of ordinals has a sharp. Section 5.3 is dedicated
to the converse of the above mentionend results. This will be achieved using class forcing.
Finally, in Section 5.4, we show how to perform class forcing over models of SOA and prove
that the Π11- PSP is preserved under class forcing for a large class of forcing notions, but
is not preserved in general.
5.1 Second-order arithmetic and ZFC−
In this section, we follow [Sim09]. Firstly, we show how we obtain a model of SOA from
a model of ZFC− in which all sets are countable.
Notation. By V = HC we will denote the axiom that states that every set is hereditarily
countable, i.e. every set is a countable set of hereditarily countable sets. Note that in the
presence of countable choice, this is equivalent to stipulating that for every set x, tc({x})
is countable.
Given a model M of ZFC− + V = HC, we define
M2 = 〈ωM ,P(ω)M ,+M , ·M ,=M , <M ,∈M (ωM × P(ω)M)〉.
In the case that the context is clear, we omit the superscripts. Furthermore, we will
usually identify models of second-order arithmetic with their domain of natural and real
numbers, i.e. we would simply write M2 = 〈ωM ,P(ω)M〉.
Lemma 5.1.1. If M is a model of ZFC− + V = HC, then M2 is a model of SOA.
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Proof. It is clear that the axioms of Robinson arithmetic are satisfied. In order to show
the induction axiom we proceed by contradiction. Assume that x ⊆ ω such that 0 ∈ x
and for all n ∈ x, n+ 1 is also in x, and let a ∈ ω such that a /∈ x. We define a sequence
〈an | n ∈ ω〉 of natural numbers which are not in x as follows. Let a0 = a. Given an /∈ x,
let an+1 = an − 1. Note that this is possible, since an 6= 0. But then an+1 ∈ an for every
n ∈ ω contradicting the axiom of foundation.
The collection axiom for ϕ(n) is a consequence of Separation applied to the formula
n ∈ x ∧ ϕ(n). It remains to prove choice. For this consider a formula ϕ(n, x) such that
∀n ∈ ω∃x ⊆ ω ϕ(n, x). By collection there is a set y satisfying
∀n ∈ ω∃x ∈ y [x ⊆ ω ∧ ϕ(n, x)].
Using the axiom of choice, we obtain a function f such that
∀n ∈ ω[f(n) ⊆ ω ∧ ϕ(n, f(n))].
Separation then allows us to define a set z = {k ∈ ω | ∃m ∈ f(n) [k = (m,n)]} which is
as desired.
The converse is more involved. The idea is to use well-founded trees to code heredi-
tarily countable sets. Let A = 〈N,R〉 be a fixed model of second-order arithmetic. Using
Go¨del’s β-function one can code finite sets – and in particular finite sequences – of natural
numbers in N as single numbers. We denote by Seq the set of all finite sequences, and
for s ∈ Seq we denote by lh(s) the length of s. Furthermore, for i < lh(s) we denote the
i-th entry of s by s(i). For sequences s, t ∈ Seq we write s a t for the concatenation of s
and t and s ⊆ t to state that s is an initial segment of t. The empty sequence is given by
 = 〈 〉. By a tree we denote a set T ⊆ Seq which is closed under taking initial segments.
Definition 5.1.2. Let T ⊆ Seq be a tree in R.
(1) A function f : N → N is said to be a path through T , if for every n ∈ N,
〈F (0), . . . , F (n− 1)〉 ∈ T .
(2) We denote the class of paths through T by [T ].
(3) T is said to be well-founded , if [T ] = ∅.
(4) Given s ∈ T , we define the subtree of T at s by Ts = {t ∈ Seq | s a t ∈ T}. If s is of
the form 〈n〉, then Ts is said to be a direct subtree of T .
Furthermore, we will denote the class of well-founded trees by WF.
Remark 5.1.3. Note that a tree T is well-founded if and only if 〈T,⊇〉 is a well-founded
relation. To see this, suppose that 〈sn | n ∈ N〉 is an infinite ⊃-descending sequence
in T . Then the sequence 〈lh(sn) | n ∈ N〉 is strictly increasing and n < lh(sn+1). Then
F (n) = sn+1(n) defines a path through T . The converse is obvious, since any path F ∈ [T ]
leads to a counterexample of well-foundedness of ⊇ given by sn = 〈F (0), . . . , F (n− 1)〉.
Furthermore, in SOA it is possible to use transfinite recursion along a well-founded
relation. Simpson [Sim09] gives a precise account on this topic. We apply transfinite
recursion in order to use trees as codes for hereditarily countable sets which will then
form the domain of the interpretation of ZFC− + V = HC within a model of SOA.
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Each well-founded tree T encodes a hereditarily countable set, namely the set of sets
encoded by its direct subtrees. We will define an equivalence relation =∗ on WF to identify
trees which encode the same set. More precisely, if S, T ∈WF we write S =∗ T to denote
that
∃X[〈, 〉 ∈ X ∧ ∀n(n ∈ X ↔ ∃s∃t(n = 〈s, t〉 ∧ ϕ(s, t, S, T,X)))](5.1)
where ϕ(s, t, S, T,X) is the formula
s ∈ S ∧ t ∈ T∧∀m[s a 〈m〉 ∈ S → ∃n(t a 〈n〉 ∈ T ∧ 〈s a 〈m〉, t a 〈n〉〉 ∈ X)]∧
∀n[t a 〈n〉 ∈ T → ∃m(s a 〈m〉 ∈ S ∧ 〈s a 〈m〉, t a 〈n〉〉 ∈ X)].(5.2)
We call a real X witnessing (5.1) an equivalence code for S and T .
The intuition behind this definition is that the real X encodes all pairs 〈s, t〉 such that
Ss =
∗ Tt, i.e. X collects the sequences 〈s, t〉 such that the set encoded by Ss is equal to
the set encoded by Tt. The obvious observation that we can make is the following.
Lemma 5.1.4. The class relation =∗ defines an equivalence relation on the class of well-
founded trees.
Proof. Reflexivity is clearly a consequence of arithmetical transfinite recursion applied to
the well-founded relation 〈s, t〉 ≺ 〈s′, t′〉 iff s ⊃ s′ ∧ t ⊃ t′ on T × T for a well-founded
tree T . In order to show symmetry, assume that S =∗ T is witnessed by the equivalence
code X. Then {〈s, t〉 | 〈t, s〉 ∈ X} witnesses that T =∗ S. For transitivity, assume that
S =∗ T and T =∗ U are witnessed by reals X resp. Y . Then
Z = {〈s, u〉 | ∃t ∈ T (〈s, t〉 ∈ X ∧ 〈t, u〉 ∈ Y )}
witnesses the equivalence of S and U .
Furthermore, we interpret elementhood as follows.
S ∈∗ T iff ∃n [〈n〉 ∈ T ∧ S =∗ T〈n〉].
This means that the elements of a well-founded tree are given by its direct subtrees; or, in
terms of hereditarily countable sets, the elements are exactly the sets coded by its direct
subtrees. For a tree T ∈WF let
[T ]∗ = {S | S ∈ T ∧ S =∗ T}
be the equivalence class of T with respect to =∗. Now for a model A of SOA there is a
definable L∈-structure A∈ = 〈A∈,∈〉, with domain given by
A∈ = {[T ]∗ | T ∈WFA}
and where for any S, T ∈ WFA, [S]∗ = [T ]∗ if and only if S =∗ T and [S]∗ ∈ [T ]∗ if and
only if S ∈∗ T . Note that A∈ is definable in A. Now we can finally prove the converse of
Lemma 5.1.1.
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Theorem 5.1.5. Let A = 〈N,R〉 |= SOA. Then A∈ |= ZFC− + V = HC.
Proof. We check all axioms of ZFC−+V = HC in A∈. For extensionality, fix S, T ∈WFA
such that for all U ∈WFA, U ∈∗ S iff U ∈∗ T which is, by transitivity of =∗, equivalent
to
∀n [〈n〉 ∈ S → ∃m(〈m〉 ∈ T ∧ S〈n〉 =∗ T〈m〉)]∧
∀m [〈m〉 ∈ T → ∃n(〈n〉 ∈ S ∧ S〈n〉 =∗ T〈m〉)].
Using choice, we can choose equivalence codes Xn,m such that if 〈n〉 ∈ S, 〈m〉 ∈ T and
S〈n〉 =∗ T〈m〉, then this is witnessed by Xn,m, and otherwise Xn,m = ∅. Then
X = {〈, 〉} ∪ {〈〈n〉 a s, 〈m〉 a t〉 | s, t ∈ Xn,m}
is an equivalence code witnessing S =∗ T .
In order to prove pairing, consider two well-founded trees S, T . Then the tree given
by
U = {} ∪ {〈0〉 a s | s ∈ S} ∪ {〈1〉 a t | t ∈ T}
has exactly S and T as direct subtrees, so it encodes the pair of the set encoded by S and
the set encoded by T .
For the union axiom, let S ∈WFA. Then the direct subtrees of the tree
T = {} ∪ {〈(n,m)〉 a s | 〈n,m〉 a s ∈ S}.
correspond to subtrees of subtrees of S, so T encodes the union of the set coded by S.
In order to prove the axiom of infinity, we construct the natural numbers in A∈ as
follows.
0∗ = {},
(n+ 1)∗ = n∗ ∪ {〈n〉 a s | s ∈ n∗} for n > 0.
Then the set of natural numbers is interpreted as
N∗ = {} ∪ {〈n〉 a s | n ∈ N ∧ s ∈ n∗}.
This tree has clearly infinitely many non-equivalent subtrees.
Next we proof Collection. For the sake of simplicity, we prove the parameter-free
version. Let S ∈ A∈ and ϕ(v0, v1) an L∈-formula such that
A∈ |= ∀x ∈ S ∃y ϕ(x, y).
This means that for every n such that 〈n〉 ∈ S, there is a well-founded non-empty tree T
such that A |= ϕ∗(S〈n〉, T ). The axiom of choice in SOA then yields a real T such that for
every n such that 〈n〉 ∈ S, A |= ϕ∗(S〈n〉, (T )n). Then putting
U = {} ∪ {〈n〉 a s | s ∈ (T )n}
we get A∈ |= ∀x ∈ S∃y ∈ Uϕ(x, y). Note that Separation follows from Collection.
100
Chapter 5. Second-order arithmetic, topological regularity and sharps
Now we turn to the axiom of foundation. Suppose for a contradiction that S ∈WFA
and n ∈ N such that S 6= {} and
A∈ |= ∀x ∈ S∃y [y ∈ S ∧ y ∈ x].
Since S 6= {}, there exists n0 ∈ N such that 〈n0〉 ∈ S. Now we construct inductively a
sequence 〈nk | k ∈ N〉 such that 〈n0, . . . , nk〉 ∈ S and S〈n0,...,nk〉 ∈∗ S. Having found such
a sequence, the function k 7→ nk yields a path through S contradicting well-foundedness.
Given nk, define nk+1 as follows. Since S〈n0,...,nk〉 ∈∗ S, there exists T ∈ WFA such that
T ∈∗ S and T ∈∗ S〈n0,...,nk〉. But then there is nk+1 ∈ N such that 〈nk+1〉 ∈ S〈n0,...,nk〉 and
T =∗ (S〈n0,...,nk〉)〈nk+1〉 = S〈n0,...,nk,nk+1〉. This shows that S〈n0,...,nk,nk+1〉 ∈∗ S.
Next we show that every element of WFA can be well-ordered. Let T ∈ WFA be an
arbitrary well-founded tree. Without loss of generality, we may assume that T 6= {}. For
every S ∈∗ T put
nS = min{n ∈ N | S =∗ T〈n〉}.
This allows us to define a well-ordering C of T by stipulating
R C S iff nR < nS
for R, S ∈∗ T .
It remains to check that every set in A∈ is hereditarily countable. The transitive
closure of a set can be shown to exist without the use of the power set axiom. So it
suffices to show that every T ∈ WFA is countable. We need to construct a surjection
from N∗ onto T . For this, we can define nS for S ∈∗ T just as in the proof of the well-
ordering principle. Then by the axioms we have already verified, there exists PS ∈WFA
encoding the ordered pair 〈n∗S, T〈nS〉〉 for S ∈∗ T . Then the tree
F = {} ∪ {〈nS〉 a s | S ∈∗ T ∧ s ∈ PS}
defines a bijection from a subset of N∗ onto T .
Now working in ZFC−+V = HC we can also introduce the notion of well-founded trees
T . Consider the relation of immediate successor, i.e.
rT = {〈t a 〈n〉, t〉 | t a 〈n〉 ∈ T}.
Since T is a well-founded tree, we can collapse it recursively in the followsing way.
cT (t) = {cT (t a 〈n〉) | t a 〈n〉 ∈ T}
|T | = cT (〈 〉).
We can view this as coding the hereditarily countable set |T | by a well-founded tree T .
This is especially useful since every hereditarily countable set has such a tree code.
Lemma 5.1.6. Suppose that M |= ZFC−+V = HC. Then for any set a ∈M there exists
a well-founded tree T such that |T | = a.
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Proof. Let a ∈M be an arbitary set. Then by V = HC there is a bijection f : ω → tc({a}).
Consider the tree given by t ∈ T if and only if
t =  ∨ ∃n∃s[t = 〈n〉 a s ∧ f(n) ∈ a ∧ ∀i < lh(s)(f(t(i+ 1)) ∈ f(t(i)))].
It is easy to check that |T | = a as desired.
Lemma 5.1.7 (ZFC− + V = HC). If S and T are non-empty well-founded trees, then we
have
(1) S =∗ T if and only if |S| = |T |
(2) S ∈∗ T if and only if |S| ∈ |T |.
Proof. Let S and T be non-empty well-founded trees. For (1), assume first that S =∗ T
and take an equivalence code X for S and T . Then one can check inductively that for any
〈s, t〉 ∈ X, cS(s) = cT (t). In particular, since 〈, 〉 ∈ X, this shows that |S| = cS() =
cT () = |T |. Vice versa, suppose that |S| = |T |. Then the set
{〈s, t〉 | s ∈ S ∧ t ∈ T ∧ |Ss| = |Tt|} = {〈s, t〉 | s ∈ S ∧ t ∈ T ∧ cS(s) = cT (t)}
clearly witnesses that S =∗ T .
We turn to the second claim. Assume that S ∈∗ T . Then there exists n ∈ ω such that
〈n〉 ∈ T and S =∗ T〈n〉. By condition (1) this implies that |S| = |T〈n〉|. Moreover, one can
check by induction that for any s ∈ T and t ∈ Ts, cTs(t) = cT (s a t). Consequently, we
obtain that |S| = |T〈n〉| = cT〈n〉() = cT (〈n〉) ∈ |T |. The converse is similar.
Now we would like to generalize Lemma 5.1.7. We define an assignment ϕ 7→ ϕ∗ of
L∈-formulae to L2-formulae where = and ∈ are translated to =∗ and ∈∗ and quantifiers
(∃x) resp. (∀x) are interpreted as (∃T ∈WF) resp. (∀T ∈WF).
Lemma 5.1.8 (ZFC− + V = HC). For any L∈-formula ϕ(v0, . . . , vn−1) and for any non-
empty well-founded trees T0, . . . , Tn−1,
ϕ∗(T0, . . . , Tn−1) iff ϕ(|T0|, . . . , |Tn−1|).
Proof. This is an easy induction on the complexity of ϕ. If ϕ is an atomic formula, then
we can apply Lemma 5.1.7. For existential resp. universal formulae, it is a consequence
of Lemma 5.1.6.
Remark 5.1.9. Lemma 5.1.8 states that if M is a model of ZFC− + V = HC, then
ϕ∗(T0, . . . , Tn−1) formalizes (M2)∈ |= ϕ(T0, . . . , Tn1).
For the converse, we code (in SOA) natural numbers and reals as trees in the following
way:
0∗ = {},
(n+ 1)∗ = n∗ ∪ {〈n〉 a s | s ∈ n∗} for n ∈ N,
X∗ = {} ∪ {〈n〉 a s | n ∈ X ∧ s ∈ n∗} for X ∈ R.
Clearly, every n∗ and X∗ is a – in the case of n∗, finite – non-empty well-founded tree.
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Lemma 5.1.10 (ZFC− + V = HC). For n ∈ ω and x ⊆ ω we can define n∗ resp. x∗ as
above. Then we have |n∗| = n and |x∗| = x. Moreover, this means that x = y if and only
if x∗ =∗ y∗ and n ∈ x if and only if n∗ ∈∗ x∗.
Proof. In order to check |n∗| = n we proceed by induction. If the claim holds for k < n
then
|n∗| = {|n∗〈k〉| | k < n} = {|k∗| | k < n} = n.
Secondly, note that
|x∗| = {|x∗〈n〉| | n ∈ x} = {|n∗| | n ∈ x} = x.
The last claim is a direct consequence of the above in combination with Lemma 5.1.7.
Since every L2-formula ϕ has a canonical set theoretic interpretation ϕ¯ (which we
identify with ϕ), there is an assignment ϕ 7→ ϕ∗ from L2-formulas to L2-formulas (where
ϕ∗ is identified with ϕ¯∗).
Lemma 5.1.11 (SOA). If ϕ(v0, . . . , vk−1, V0, . . . , Vl−1) is an L2-formula, then for any
n0, . . . , nk−1 and X0, . . . , Xl−1,
ϕ(n0, . . . , nk−1, X0, . . . , Xl−1) iff ϕ∗(n∗0, . . . , n
∗
k−1, X
∗
0 , . . . , X
∗
l−1).
Remark 5.1.12. For a model A of SOA, the formula ϕ∗(n∗0, . . . , n∗k−1, X∗0 , . . . , X∗l−1) is a
formalization of the formula (A∈)2 |= ϕ(n∗0, . . . , n∗k−1, X∗0 , . . . , X∗l−1).
Proof of Lemma 5.1.11. We proceed by induction on the complexity of ϕ. For atomic
formulae, we have to check first that the assignment ϕ 7→ ϕ∗ preserves the non-logical
symbols +, ∗ and <. Since + etc. are definable in ZFC−+V = HC, this will be transferred
to the ∗-translation of L∈ into L2 in the sense that a defining formula ϕ+ of + in L∈
will be a defining formula for a function +∗. In particular, the resulting function will be
canonical, i.e. n∗+∗m∗ = (n+m)∗ for all n,m ∈ N. The argument for ∗ and < is similar.
The atomic case for formulae of the form v ∈ V follows directly from the definition.
For formulae of the form ¬ϕ and ϕ ∧ ψ the statement is an easy consequence of the
induction hypothesis. For existential formulae observe that ϕ¯ relativizes (∃n) to (∃n ∈ ω)
and (∃X) to (∃X ⊆ ω). Now since ω is translated to N∗, all quantifiers appearing in ϕ∗ will
again be relativized by N∗. Suppose that ϕ is of the form ∃vψ(v, v0, . . . , vk−1, V0, . . . , Vl−1)
and assume that ϕ∗(n∗0, . . . , n
∗
k−1, X
∗
0 , . . . , X
∗
l−1) is satisfied. Thus there exists T ∈∗ N∗
such that ψ(T, n∗0, . . . , n
∗
k−1, X
∗
0 , . . . , X
∗
l−1). But then T is of the form N∗〈n〉 = n∗ for some
n. Hence by induction hypothesis we get ψ(n, n0, . . . , nk−1, X0, . . . , Xl−1) and thus also
ϕ(n0, . . . , nk−1, X0, . . . , Xl−1). In the case of set quantification we check that T ⊆∗ N∗
corresponds to a set of natural numbers, where ⊆∗ is defined in the canonical way. Since
T ⊆∗ N∗ stands for ∀S ∈ WF [S ∈∗ T → S ∈∗ N∗] which implies that for every S ∈ WF
there is n such that S = N∗〈n〉 = n∗. This means that T = X∗, where
X = {n | n∗ ∈∗ T}.
This concludes the proof.
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Finally, we show that SOA and ZFC− are bi-interpretable und hence prove the same
theorems. Moreover, ZFC− + V = HC is a conservative extension of SOA.
Theorem 5.1.13. If A is a model of SOA, then (A∈)2 is isomorphic to A. Conversely,
for every model M |= ZFC−+V = HC, the tree model (M2)∈ is isomorphic to the original
model M .
Proof. The first assertion is a consequence of Lemma 5.1.11. For the converse, note that
Lemma 5.1.6 allows us to represent every set a ∈M as a tree T with |T | = a. Concerning
uniqueness, note that we have defined the tree model (M2)∈ as a class of equivalence
classes of trees and Lemma 5.1.7 states that the assignment a 7→ [T ]∗ is well-defined. The
claim then follows from Lemma 5.1.8.
Theorem 5.1.14. The following statements hold.
(1) For every L∈-sentence ϕ, ZFC− + V = HC ` ϕ if and only if SOA ` ϕ∗.
(2) For any L2-sentence ϕ, we have SOA ` ϕ if and only if ZFC− + V = HC ` ϕ¯, i.e. by
identifying ϕ¯ with ϕ this means that ZFC− + V = HC is a conservative extension of
SOA.
Proof. For the first part, suppose that ϕ is an L∈-sentence such that ZFC−+V = HC ` ϕ
and let A |= SOA. Then A∈ |= ϕ. But this means exactly that A |= ϕ∗. Conversely,
suppose that SOA ` ϕ∗ and let M be a model of ZFC− + V = HC. Therefore we have
M2 |= ϕ∗. But then we obtain that (M2)∈ |= ϕ and since (M2)∈ ∼= M we can conclude
that M |= ϕ.
We turn to the second statement. The first implication is obvious. For the converse,
let ϕ be an L2-sentence such that ZFC− + V = HC ` ϕ¯ and let A |= SOA. Using (1) we
obtain that A |= ϕ¯∗ which means by identifying ϕ¯ with ϕ∗ that A |= ϕ∗. Then Lemma
5.1.11 implies that A |= ϕ as desired.
Theorem 5.1.14 implies that to show that some L2-sentence is a logical consequence of
SOA, we can either argue in SOA or in ZFC− + V = HC. From now on, we will therefore
switch freely between the two axiom systems.
5.2 Inner models of ZFC and ZFC# in models of SOA
In the following, we will show how to obtain inner models of ZFC and ZFC+“every set of
ordinals has a sharp” within models of second-order arithmetic with additional topological
regularity and determinacy hypotheses.
5.2.1 Inner models of ZFC
In this section we prove that every model of SOA which satisfies the Π11-perfect set
property has an inner model of ZFC, notably Go¨del’s constructible universe. We fol-
low the exposition presented in [KM07] and [War05]. By Theorem 5.1.14, we may work
in ZFC− + V = HC instead of SOA.
Definition 5.2.1. Let p be a tree in <ωω, and s, t ∈ p two nodes.
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• s is said to be an extension of t, if t ⊆ s.
• s and t are said to be incompatible, if s * t and t * s.
The tree p is called
• pruned , if for every s ∈ p there is a natural number n such that s a 〈n〉 ∈ p.
• perfect , if every element of p has at least two incompatible extensions in p.
Recall that the topology on the Baire space ωω is defined by taking the closed classes
to be of the form [p] for some tree p. Furthermore, a class of reals is said to be perfect , if
it is of the form [p] for some perfect tree p.
Definition 5.2.2. For a class Γ of L2-formulae, we define the Γ-perfect set property (de-
noted Γ-PSP) to be the scheme postulating that every uncountable class of reals definable
by a formula in Γ has a perfect subclass.
The following standard results carry over to SOA (resp. ZFC− + V = HC).
Theorem 5.2.3. The Σ11-perfect set property holds in every model of SOA resp. ZFC
−+
V = HC.
Proof. The idea is that trees are thinned out countably many times by removing at each
step the isolated points. For a detailed proof, consult [Sim09, Theorem V.4.3].
Theorem 5.2.4 (Kondo-Addison). Let ϕ(x, ~y) be a Π11-formula with parameters ~y. Then
there is a Π11-formula ψ(x, ~y) such that the following statements hold.
(1) ∀x∀~y [ψ(x, ~y)→ ϕ(x, ~y)]
(2) ∀~y [∃xϕ(x, ~y)→ ∃xψ(x, ~y)]
(3) ∀x∀x′∀~y [ψ(x, ~y) ∧ ψ(x′, ~y)→ x = x′].
Proof. The proof be found in [Sim09, Theorem VI.2.6], .
Lemma 5.2.5. For every real x ∈ ωω, Π11[x]-PSP implies Σ12[x]-PSP.
Proof. Let x ∈ ωω and A a Σ12[x]-class of reals given by the defining formula ϕ(x, y).
Since ϕ is a Σ12[x]-formula, there is a Π
1
1[x]-formula ϕ¯(x, y, z) such that ϕ(x, y) is of the
form ∃zϕ¯(x, y, z). Now we can apply Theorem 5.2.4 to ϕ¯ in order to find a Π11[x]-formula
ψ(x, y, z) which satisfies properties (1)-(3) as above. Clearly, the first two properties can
be summarized as ∀y [ϕ(x, y)↔ ∃zψ(x, y, z)]. Consider the Π11[x]-formla ψ¯(x, y) given by
ψ(x, (y)0, (y)1). Since we assume Π
1
1[x]-PSP, the class B given by y ∈ B iff ψ¯(x, y) is
either countable or contains a perfect subclass. Clearly, if B is countable then so is A. So
suppose that p is a perfect tree such that [p] ⊆ B. Let P be the projection of [p] onto the
first coordinate. Then P is an uncountable Σ11-class of reals and consequently, Theorem
5.2.3 implies that it contains a perfect subclass. Since P ⊆ A, this concludes the proof of
Lemma 5.2.5.
Now for any real x we can construct the universe L[x] of constructible sets relative to
x in the usual way, since this does not require the power set axiom. It is easy to check
that L[x] is a model of ZFC−. We will show that using Π11[x]-PSP one can even prove that
the power set axiom holds in L[x], thus obtaining a model of ZFC.
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Definition 5.2.6. Let WO denote the class of well-orders.
(1) Given x, y ∈WO, we write x ≤WO y to denote that there is an order-preserving map
from the domain of x to the domain of y. Furthermore, we write x =WO y if x ≤WO y
and y ≤WO x.
(2) We say that a class A ⊆WO is ordertype bounded , if there is x ∈WO such that for
every y ∈ A, y ≤WO x.
The following classical result carries over to SOA and hence also to ZFC− + V = HC.
Theorem 5.2.7. [Sim09, V.6.2] Every Σ11-subclass of WO is ordertype bounded.
Given a real x ∈ ωω, the class of x-constructible reals is a Σ12[x]-class of reals which
has a Σ12[x]-well-ordering. Now consider the class of reals given by
y ∈ Cx ⇐⇒ y ∈ L[x] ∧ y ∈WO ∧ ∀z (z ∈WO ∧ z ≺x y → z 6=WO y).
Lemma 5.2.8. For any real x, Cx is a Σ
1
2[x]-class of reals.
Proof. The predicates y ∈ L[x] and y ∈WO are Σ12[x] resp. Π11, so it suffices to consider
the last part which we can restate as
∃z[〈z, y〉 ∈ A ∧ ∀n ∈ ω [(z)n ∈WO→ (z)n 6=WO y)],
where A is the class of 〈z, y〉 such that {(z)n | n ∈ ω} = {w ∈ ωω | w ≺x y}. By [Add63],
it follows that A is Σ12[x] and hence so is Cx.
Note that in ZFC− + V = HC we can code ordinals by reals in WO and vice versa as
follows.
(1) Given an ordinal α, by V = HC we can find a bijection fα : ω → α and define a
well-ordering on ω by
n <α m⇐⇒ f(n) < f(m).
(2) Conversely, consider a real y ∈WO. Then define recursively
ry(n) = sup({ry(m) + 1 | m <y n})
and
‖y‖ = sup({ry(n) | n ∈ ω}).
Clearly, ‖y‖ is a countable ordinal.
Lemma 5.2.9. Let x ∈ ωω be a real. Then the following statements hold.
(1) Cx is uncountable in L[x].
(2) Cx contains no perfect subclass.
Proof. We show first that WO ∩ L[x] is unbounded in Cx. It suffices to show that for
every α ∈ Ord which is countable in L[x] there is y ∈ Cx such that ‖y‖ = α. As observed
above, we can code each α ∈ Ord which is countable in L[x] by a real yα ∈ WO ∩ L[x]
such that ‖yα‖ = α. Moreover, there is β(α) ∈ Ord such that yα ∈ Lβ(α)[x]. By choosing
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yα to be the least such real with respect to the well-ordering of Lβ(α)[x] we obtain that
yα ∈ Cx and ‖yα‖ = α. Now if Cx was countable, then for α = sup{‖y‖ | y ∈ Cx}, the
real yα would be a ≤WO-upper bound for Cx, contradicting our previous argument. This
proves (1).
For the second statement, assume that P ⊆ Cx is a perfect subclass. In particular, P
is closed and hence Σ11. By Theorem 5.2.7 we know that P is ordertype bounded, so we
can find y ∈WO such that for every z ∈ P we have z ≺WO y. But then P has ordertype
at most ‖y‖ and is therefore countable, a contradiction.
Theorem 5.2.10. For every real x ∈ ωω, the following statements are equivalent.
(1) Π11[x]-PSP.
(2) Σ12[x]-PSP.
(3) ℵL[x]1 exists.
(4) ωω ∩ L[x] is countable.
Proof. The implication from (1) to (2) is exactly the statement of Lemma 5.2.5. Now
suppose that (2) holds. We prove that ℵL[x]1 exists. Due to Lemma 5.2.9 (2) and Lemma
5.2.8, the class Cx must be countable. In particular, there exists y ∈WO such that for all
z ∈ Cx, z ≺WO y. However, it follows Lemma 5.2.9 (1) that WO ∩ L[x] is unbounded in
Cx and so ‖y‖ is uncountable in L[x]. In particular, there must exist a least uncountable
ordinal in L[x] and so ℵL[x]1 exists.
To see that (3) implies (4), suppose that ℵL[x]1 exists. We prove that P(ω) ∩ L[x] ⊆
L
ω
L[x]
1
[x]. Since ℵL[x]1 is countable, this proves that there are only countably x-constructible
reals. Suppose that α ∈ Ord and y ∈ Lα+1[x] \ Lα[x] is a real. We need to prove that α is
countable in L[x]. So write y = {n ∈ ω | ϕ(n, x, p)}, where p is a parameter in Lα[x]. Now
p is definable from a parameter q ∈ Lβ[x] for some β < α by a formula ψ. Let n be the
maximal number such that ϕ and ψ are Πn-formulae. Let H = H
Lα[x]({q, r}) ≺Σn+1 Lα[x]
be the Σn+1-Skolem hull of {q, r} in Lα[x], where r is a parameter appearing in the
definition of q. Then by Go¨del condensation there is α¯ ≤ α such that H = Lα¯[x]. If
α¯ < α, then p = hψ(q) ∈ Lα¯[x] and so y ∈ Lα¯+1[x] ⊆ Lα[x] contradicting our assumption.
This implies that α¯ = α and hence Lα[x] is countable. In particular, α is countable and
so P(ω)L[x] exists in Lω1 [x].
In order to prove that (4) implies (1), the canonical approach would be to apply
Mansfield’s Theorem1. However, its proof relies on the representation of Σ12[x]-classes of
reals as projections of trees on ω1 × ω and on an iterative process of thinning out such
trees, and so it does not carry over to ZFC− + V = HC. Instead, one can prove (4) by
forcing with Col(ω, ω
L[x]
1 ). For a detailed proof, consult [War05, Theorem 4.11].
Theorem 5.2.11. Assume Π11-PSP. Then for every x ∈ ωω, L[x] |= ZFC.
Proof. It only remains to show that the power set axiom holds in L[x]. By Theorem
5.2.10, P(ω)L[x] exists in L[x]. It suffices to prove that for every ordinal α ≥ ω the power
set of Lα[x] exists in L[x]. Using V = HC we can find a real y such that ‖y‖ = α. In
1See [Kan09, Theorem 14.7]
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L[x, y], α is countable and thus so is Lα[x]. Pick a bijection f : ω → (Lα[x])Lα[x,y] = Lα[x]
in L[x, y]. By the previous argument, P(ω)L[x,y] exists. We define a function
g : P(ω)L[x,y] → L[x, y], x 7→ f ′′x.
Put a = g′′(P(ω)L[x,y]) and aL[x] = a∩L[x]. Now for every s ∈ aL[x] there exists β(s) ∈ Ord
minimal such that s ∈ Lβ(s)[x]. Define γ = sup{β(s) | s ∈ aL[x]}. We claim that
P(Lα[x])L[x] is in Lγ[x]. Let s ∈ L[x] such that s ⊆ Lα[x]. In L[x, y], s = g((f−1)′′s), so
s ∈ aL[x] and thus by construction a ∈ Lβ(s)[x] ⊆ Lγ[x]. This implies that we can define
the power set of Lα[x] in L[x] as
P(Lα[x])L[x] = {s ∈ Lγ[x] | s ⊆ Lα[x]}
concluding the proof of Theorem 5.2.11.
5.2.2 Inner models of ZFC#
In the following, we will generalize the proof from the previous section in order to ob-
tain inner models of ZFC+“every set of ordinals has a sharp” in models of second-order
arithmetic plus Π11-determinacy and Π
1
2-perfect set property.
Firstly, we briefly recall the Ehrenfeucht-Mostowski definition of sharps. We work in
ZFC− + V = HC. Let a ⊆ Ord be a set of ordinals and let α = sup(a). By V = HC, α is
countable. We expand the language L∈ by adding constants for a and for every ordinal
γ ≤ α. We denote the corresponding language by La. Our goal is to obtain a closed
unbounded class of indiscernibles for the structure 〈L[a], a, ζ〉ζ≤α. As a convention, we
will always identify the structure 〈L[a], a, ζ〉ζ≤α with its domain L[a].
For any given language L we denote FmlL the set of all Go¨del numbers pϕq of formulae
ϕ in the language L. If it is clear from the context which language is referred to we may
omit the subcript L. Furthermore, for an L-structure M put
Th(M) = {pϕq ∈ FmlL | free(ϕ) = ∅ ∧M |= ϕ}.
Definition 5.2.12. Let ϕ(v0, v1, . . . , vn) be a formula in the language of some structure
M with domain M . Then we define an n-ary function, called canonical Skolem function,
for ϕ by
hMϕ (v1, . . . , vn) =
{
min{u ∈M | ϕ(u, v1, . . . , vn)}, if such u exists,
∅, otherwise,
where the minimum is computed with respect to some fixed order < of M (in our case,
< is <L[A]). Each set of the form h
M
ϕ (~x) is said to be a Skolem term. For any set X ⊆M
let
HM(X) = {hMϕ (a0, . . . , an−1) | pϕ(v0, . . . , vn−1)q ∈ Fml ∧ a0, . . . , an−1 ∈ X}
denote the Skolem hull of X. Note that HM(X) is an elementary substructure of M.
The superscript will be omitted in the case that it is clear which structure it refers to.
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Definition 5.2.13. LetM be a structure with domain M and 〈I,<〉 be a linearly ordered
set such that I ⊆M . Then I is said to be a set of indiscernibles forM, if for every formula
ϕ(v0, . . . , vn−1) in the language of M and for all x0 < · · · < xn−1 and y0 < · · · < yn−1 in
I,
M |= ϕ(x0, . . . , xn−1) iff M |= ϕ(y0, . . . , yn−1).
From now on, we will stick to the following convention.
Convention. If 〈I,<〉 is a set of indiscernibles for some structure, then the notation ~x ∈ I
means that ~x is a tuple in I of the form 〈x0, . . . , xn−1〉, where x0 < · · · < xn−1 for some
n ∈ ω.
Definition 5.2.14. LetM be a structure with domainM and 〈I,<〉 a set of indiscernibles
for M. We denote by LI the language of M expanded by constants 〈cx | x ∈ I〉. Let
MI be the LI-structure which extendsM and where each cx is interpreted by x. For any
ordered set 〈J,C〉 we define K(M, I, J) to be the theory given by
K(M, I, J) = {pϕ(~cy)q ∈ FmlLJ | ~y ∈ J ∧ pϕ(~cx)q ∈ Th(MI)}.
Note that in the case that I = J we have K(M, I, I) = Th(MI).
Remark 5.2.15. One can easily check (see [Koe78]) that the theory defined by K(M, I, J)
is complete, consistent, contains Th(M) and that the ~cy are indiscernibles, i.e. for any
pϕq ∈ FmlLJ ,
pϕ( ~cy0)↔ ϕ( ~cy1)q ∈ K(M, I, J).
Lemma 5.2.16. Assume that β ∈ Lim is a limit ordinal such that β > α and that I is
a set of indiscernibles for 〈Lβ[a], a ∩ β, ζ〉ζ≤α∩β, and let γ ∈ Lim. Then there exists an
La-model M and a set of indiscernibles J ⊆ Ord for M satisfying
(1) Th(M, J) = K(Lβ[a], I, J).
(2) otp (J) = γ.
(3) HM(J) =M.
Moreover, M and J are unique up to isomorphisms. Hence we can define the unique pair
〈M, J〉 to be the γ-model for 〈Lβ[a], I〉.
Proof. The proof is essentially the same as [Jec03, Lemma 18.7] using the observation
that the Compactness Theorem holds in ZFC−.
Definition 5.2.17. Let 〈J,C〉 be an ordered set. Then K(M, I, J) is said to be
(1) well-founded, if for every γ ∈ Lim, the γ-model is well-founded.
(2) unbounded, if for every Skolem term t(v0, . . . , vn−1),
pt(c0, . . . , cn−1) ∈ Ord→ t(c0, . . . , cn−1) < cnq ∈ K(M, I, J).
(3) remarkable, if it is unbounded and for every Skolem term of the form t(v0, . . . , vm+n),
pt(c0, . . . , cm+n) ∈ Ord ∧ t(c0, . . . , cm+n) < cm
→ t(c0, . . . , cm+n) = t(c0, . . . , cm−1, cm+n+1, . . . , cm+2n+1)q
is in K(M, I, J).
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For the rest of this section, we fix β ∈ Lim and a set I of indiscernibles for Lβ[a]. Now
if for a limit ordinal γ the γ-model 〈M, J〉 is well-founded, then its Mostowski collapse is
of the form Lδ[a] for some δ ∈ Lim. In that case we identify the γ-model with Lδ[a]. We
enumerate the indiscernibles for Lδ[a] as
〈xγξ | ξ < γ〉.
Similarly, we denote the constants cxξ by cξ for ξ < γ. In fact, we can do better than this:
The next lemma shows that the superscript γ is – under certain conditions – superflous.
Lemma 5.2.18. [Kan09, Lemma 9.11] Assume that I is a set of indiscernibles for Lβ[a]
and that Th(Lβ[a]I) is well-founded and remarkable. Let γ, δ ∈ Ord such that γ ≤ δ and
γ ∈ Lim. Then the Skolem hull of {xδξ | ξ < γ} in the δ-model is Lxδγ [a].
As a consequence, we obtain that for limit ordinals γ < δ, the γ-model is Lxδγ [a] and
{xδξ | ξ < γ} is the corresponding set of indiscernibles. Hence xγξ = xδξ for every ξ < γ.
From now on, we will thus write simply xξ for x
γ
ξ . Furthermore, we denote the class of
all indiscernibles for Th(Lβ[a]I) by
I¯ = {xξ | ξ ∈ Ord}
and for every γ ≥ ω we put
Iγ = {xξ | ξ < γ}.
Corollary 5.2.19. Let γ < δ. Then Lxγ [a] is an elementary substructure of Lxδ [a].
Proof. If δ ∈ Lim, this follows directly from Lemma 5.2.18. Otherwise, let ε ∈ Lim such
that Lxγ [a], Lxδ [a] ∈ Lxε [a]. Then for any γ′ < δ′ such that δ′ ∈ Lim and γ′, δ′ < ε,
Lxε [a] |= “Lxγ′ [a] ≺ Lxδ′ [a]” which by indescernibility proves the claim.
Lemma 5.2.20. The following statements hold.
(1) I¯ is closed unbounded in Ord.
(2) If y ∈ L[a], then there exists a Skolem term t(v0, . . . , vn−1) and ξ0 < · · · < ξn−1 such
that y = tL[a](xξ0 , . . . , xξn−1).
(3) For any γ, Lxγ [a] ≺ L[a].
Proof. In order to show that I¯ is unbounded, let γ ∈ Ord. Clearly, we have ξ ≤ xξ for
every ordinal ξ. So in particular this shows that γ < xγ+1. The closure property follows
from Lemma 5.2.18.
For the second statement, fix y ∈ L[a]. Using (1) we can take γ ∈ Ord such that
y ∈ Lxγ [a]. Then there are ξ0 < · · · < ξn−1 < γ and a Skolem term t(v0, . . . , vn−1) such
that y = tLxγ [a](xξ0 , . . . , xξn−1) = t
L[a](xξ0 , . . . , xξn−1).
Thirdly, Let ϕ(v, v0, . . . , vn−1) be a formula such that L[a] |= ∃xϕ(x, y0, . . . , yn−1) for
y0, . . . , yn−1 ∈ Lxγ [a]. Then L[a] |= ϕ(hϕ(y0, . . . , yn−1), a0, . . . , an−1) and by Lemma 5.2.16
we obtain that h
Lxγ [a]
ϕ (y0, . . . , yn−1) ∈ Lxγ [a], so the Tarksi-Vaught criterion completes the
proof.
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Lemma 5.2.21. The class I¯ is the unique class of indiscernibles for L[a] satisfying prop-
erties (1) and (2) from Lemma 5.2.20.
Proof. Assume that J¯ is another such class of indiscernibles. Then I¯ ∩ J¯ is closed un-
bounded in Ord. We claim that
Th(L[a]J¯) = K(L[a], I¯ , J¯).(5.3)
If ϕ(~v) is a formula such that pϕ(~cx)q ∈ Th(L[a]I¯), then in particular for ~ξ such that
~xξ ∈ I¯ ∩ J¯ , we have that pϕ( ~cxξ)q ∈ Th(L[a]I¯) ∩ Th(L[a]J¯). So by indiscernibility of J¯ ,
pϕ(~cy)q ∈ Th(L[a]J¯). The other inclusion is shown in a similar way.
Now let h : I¯ → J¯ be an order-preserving bijection. We extend h to h¯ : L[a] → L[a]
by stipulating
h¯(tL[a](~xξ)) = t
L[a]( ~h(xξ)).
By (5.3) h¯ is an isomorphism. But then h¯ is the identity map, since otherwise there would
exist ξ ∈ Ord such that h¯(ξ) > ξ; however, this would mean that ξ /∈ ran(h¯) which is a
contradiction. In particular, this implies that I¯ = J¯ .
We now single out the initial segment of I¯ of ordertype ω given by
Iω = {xξ | ξ < ω}.
By Lemma 5.2.18, Iω is a set of indiscernibles for Lxω [a]. Due to the fact that for any
γ ∈ Lim that the γ-model with respect to 〈Lxω [a], Iω〉 is equal to the γ-model with
respect to the original model 〈Lβ[a], I〉, we obtain that Th(Lxω [a]Iω) is well-founded and
remarkable. Under the assumption that β and I exist such that Th(Lβ[a]I) is well-founded
and remarkable, Iω must be unique and I (and hence also I¯) can be reconstructed from
Iω.
Theorem 5.2.22. If there exist an ordinal β and a set I ⊆ Ord of indiscernibles for
〈Lβ[a], a∩ β, ζ〉ζ≤α∩β such that Th(Lβ[a]I) is remarkable and well-founded, then Iω ⊆ Ord
is the unique set with the following properties.
(1) There exists δ ∈ Ord such that Iω is a set of indiscernibles for Lδ[a].
(2) otp (Iω) = ω.
(3) HLδ[a](Iω) = Lδ[a].
(4) Th(Lδ[a]Iω) is well-founded and remarkable.
Furthermore, I¯ can be reconstructed from Iω.
Proof. Firstly, we verify that Iω satisfies the desired properties. Lemmata 5.2.18 and
5.2.16 prove (1)-(3) for δ = xω. Remarkability clearly follows from remarkability of
Th(Lβ[a]I). In order to show well-foundedness, we check that for every γ ≥ ω, the γ-
model with respect to 〈Lδ[a], Iω〉 is equal to the γ-model with respect to the original
structure 〈Lβ[a], I〉. Fix γ ≥ ω and let 〈M, J〉 be the γ-model obtained from 〈Lδ[a], Iω〉 as
in Lemma 5.2.16. It suffices to verify that Th(M, J) = K(Lβ[a], I, J). For this, suppose
that pϕ(~cy)q ∈ Th(M, J), where ~y ∈ J . Since Th(M, J) = K(Lδ[a], Iω, J), pϕ(~cx)q ∈
Th(Lδ[a]Iω). But Th(Lδ[a]Iω) = K(Lβ[a], I, Iω) and Iω ⊆ I, so pϕ(~cy)q ∈ K(Lβ[A], I, J).
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The other inclusion follows in a similar way. Applying uniqueness in Lemma 5.2.16 yields
that 〈M, J〉 and 〈Lxγ [a], Iγ〉 are isomorphic and in particular 〈M, J〉 is well-founded and
remarkable. So M = Lxγ [a] and using closed unboundedness of Iγ and J in xγ, similar
arguments as in the proof of Lemma 5.2.21 yield that J = Iγ.
Now we show that Iω is indeed unique. Suppose that J ⊆ Ord and λ ∈ Ord such
that J is a set of indiscernibles for Lλ[a] of ordertype ω, H
Lλ[a](J) = Lλ[a] and Th(Lλ[a]J)
is well-founded and remarkable. Then we can realize the whole construction in a similar
way as for 〈Lβ[a], I〉 in order to obtain a closed unbounded class J¯ of indiscernibles for
L[a] such that L[a] is the Skolem hull of J¯ . But then Lemma 5.2.21 implies that I¯ = J¯
and by the previous arguments we obtain that Iω = Jω = J and λ = xω = δ. This proves
the claim.
Definition 5.2.23. For a set of ordinals a ⊆ Ord we denote by
a# exists
the statement that there exists a set I ⊆ Ord such that
(1) otp (I) = ω,
(2) I is a set of indiscernibles for Lδ[a] for δ = sup I,
(3) HLδ[a](I) = Lδ[a],
(4) Th(Lδ[a]I) is remarkable and well-founded,
and a# denotes the unique I satisfying the properties listed above. Observe that for every
set a ⊆ Ord, the corresponding sharp a# is also a set of ordinals. Moreover, we abbreviate
the axiom
∀a ⊆ Ord(a# exists)
by ∃# and for any theory T, we write T# for T + ∃#.
Remark 5.2.24. The reason why we can take δ = sup I in Definition 5.2.23 is that otherwise
if sup I < δ, then sup I would lie in the Skolem hull of I contradicting the remarkability
of Th(Lδ[a]I).
Remark 5.2.25. If a# exists, we can define truth in L[a] as follows: If ϕ(v0, . . . , vn−1) is a
formula and y0, . . . , yn−1 ∈ L[a], then each yi can be written as yi = tL[a]i (~xi) for ~xi ∈ I¯. If
xλ = sup{sup ~xi | i < n} then every yi is in Lxλ [a], hence
L[a] |= ϕ(y0, . . . , yn−1) iff Lxλ [a] |= ϕ(y0, . . . , yn−1).
Moreover, since there is a formula ψϕ,~y such that the free variables of ψ correspond to the
indiscernibles ~xi appearing in the definition of the yi as a Skolem term and L[a] |= ϕ(~y)
iff L[a] |= ψ(~x), where ~x consists of all ~xi. Then
L[a] |= ϕ(y0, . . . , yn−1) iff pψ(c0, . . . , ck)q ∈ Th(Lδ[a]a#)
for k the number of free variables of ψ and δ = sup a#.
Remark 5.2.26. The previous remark motivates an alternative definition of a# as T =
Th(Lδ[a]a#), where
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(1) T is consistent, complete, all axioms of ZF− are in T and pσq ∈ T , where σ is the
statement with the property that 〈M,∈〉 |= σ if and only if M is of L[a] or Lδ[a] for
some δ > ω.2,
(2) all cx for x ∈ a# (since otp
(
a#
)
= ω we can number them ci, i < ω) are indiscernibles,
(3) T is remarkable,
(4) T is well-founded.
Note that consistency of T and the existence of the ci, i < ω, implies that T has a
countable model whose interpretation of the ci is a set of indiscernibles. Then T is well-
founded, if and only if every countable model equipped with some set of indescernibles is
well-founded.
This means that if such T exists, we can reconstruct a# from it as the unique model
of T with indiscernibles of order type ω. Moreover, the above characterization allows us
to consider a# to be a real.
Theorem 5.2.27. The statement “a# exists ∧ I = a#” is absolute for transitive models
M of ZF− such that {a} ∪Ord ⊆M . Moreover, if a# exists in M , then (a#)M = a#.
Proof. Let M be a model of ZF− with {a} ∪Ord ⊆M . Now let α = sup a. Then for any
δ > α, we have (Lδ[a])
M = Lδ[a], since the relation x = Lδ[a] is ∆1 in the parameter a.
Now if I ⊆ Ord such that I ∈ M , then δ = sup I is absolute and so is the ∆1-
statement otp (I) = ω. Moreover, by absolutenss of the satisfaction relation, we obtain
that (Th(Lδ[a]I))
M = Th(Lδ[a]I). In particular, this implies absoluteness of the syntac-
tical properties asserting that I is a set of indiscernibles for Lδ[a] and that Th(Lδ[a]I) is
remarkable. Now since the well-ordering <L[a] is absolute, we obtain absoluteness of the
Skolem functions, yielding
(HLδ[a](I))M = HLδ[a](I).
The last property in question is well-foundedness. Note that the relation “〈N, e〉 is well-
founded” is ∆1.
3 Now let γ ≥ ω be an ordinal. Note that if 〈Nγ, Iγ〉 ∈ M is the
corresponding γ-model, then
• if it is well-founded, then it is of the form Lλ[a] for some limit ordinal λ and hence
it is also the γ-model in V;
• if it is not well-founded, then by absoluteness of well-foundedness we also obtain a
counterexample in V.
Thus we have verified that the properties defining a# listed in Definition 5.2.23 are abso-
lute.
Now assume (ZFC−)# + V = HC. We iterate the construction of sharps as follows.
#α = (
⋃
β<α
#β)# for α ∈ Ord,
# =
⋃
α∈Ord
#α.
2see [Kan09, Theorem 3.3]
3see [Jec03, Lemma 13.11]
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Remark 5.2.28. If α < β, then for all x ∈ #α and y ∈ #β we have x < y. This is clear
by definition of #β, since #β = a# for some a ⊆ Ord and #α ⊆ a. In particular, x is a
constant in 〈L[a], a, γ〉γ≤sup a.
Then define
L#α = Lα[#] and L
# = L[#].
In particular, this means that L# |= ZFC−. We claim that L# is closed under sharps. In
order to prove this, we require some crucial results concerning sharps which are provable
in ZFC. The proofs can all be found in [Jec03] or [Kan09].
Lemma 5.2.29 (ZFC). If Σ = Th(Lβ[a]I) for some β > supA and a set I ⊆ Ord of
indiscernibles for Lβ[a], then the following statements are equivalent.
(1) For every α ∈ Ord, the α-model is well-founded.
(2) Fore some α ≥ ω1, the α-model is well-founded.
(3) For every α < ω1, the α-model is well-founded.
Lemma 5.2.30 (ZFC). Let κ > ω be a cardinal. If there exists β ∈ Lim such that Lβ[a]
has a set of ordinal indiscernibles of order type κ, then there is γ ∈ Lim and a set I ⊆ γ
of order type κ such that Th(Lγ[a]I) is remarkable.
Theorem 5.2.31 (ZFC). If a# exists and I¯ is the corresponding closed unbounded class
of indiscernibles for L[a], then every uncountable cardinal κ > sup a lies in I¯ and the
κ-model is Lκ[a].
Now we are ready to prove that L# is closed under sharps provided that the Π11-perfect
set property holds.
Theorem 5.2.32. Assume (ZFC−)#+V = HC+Π11-PSP. Then L
# |= ∀a ⊆ Ord(a# exists).
Proof. Let a ∈ L# be a set of ordinals. Let α be a limit ordinal such that a ∈ L#α and #
is cofinal in α. The existence of such α is guaranteed by Remark 5.2.28. Then
# ∩ α =
⋃
ξ<γ
#ξ
for some γ ∈ Ord. Consider b = # ∩ α. Then b# = #γ ∈ L#. Using the observation
that b# can be coded by a real and the Π11-PSP we may conclude that L[b
#] |= ZFC + b#
exists. Work in L[b#]. By absoluteness of sharps and since L[b#] ⊆ L#, it is sufficient to
prove that a# exists in L[b#]. Set ζ = sup b#. Then b# is a set of indiscernibles for Lζ [b]
of ordertype ω and Th(Lζ [b]b#) is well-founded and remarkable. Now since L[b
#] |= ZFC,
ℵL[b#]1 exists. By well-foundedness of Th(Lζ [b]b#), the ω1-model is of the form Lµ[b] with
a set I of indiscernibles of order type ω1 and H
Lµ[b](I) = Lµ[b]. Observe that since µ > ζ
we obtain that a ∈ Lµ[b], so we can write a as
a = tLµ[b](~x)
for some Skolem term t and ~x ∈ I. Put J = I \ sup ~x and note that J is a set of
indiscernibles of ordertype ω1 for all Lb-formulae with parameter a. Now since L[b] |= ZFC
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and Lµ[b] ≺ L[b] we obtain that Lµ[b] |= ZFC. We would like to verify that J is a set of
indiscernibles for Lµ[a]. Let ϕ(a,~v,~γ) be a formula with parameters a, ~γ where ~γ ≤ sup a.
We need to check that
Lµ[a] |= ϕ(a, ~y,~γ)↔ ϕ(a, ~z,~γ)(5.4)
for all ~y, ~z ∈ J . We work in Lµ[b]. By indiscernibility we obtain that
Lµ[b] |= “L[a] |= ϕ(a, ~y,~γ)↔ L[a] |= ϕ(a, ~z,~γ)”.
By absoluteness of satisfaction this shows that (L[a])Lµ[b] |= ϕ(a, ~y,~γ) ↔ ϕ(a, ~z,~γ). Since
(L[a])Lµ[b] = Lµ[a], this proves (5.4). Now we can apply Lemma 5.2.30 in order to obtain
ν ∈ Ord and a set K ⊆ ν of indiscernibles of order type ω1 for Lν [a] such that Th(Lν [a]K)
is remarkable. Using Lemma 5.2.29 we can conclude that Th(Lν [a]K) is well-founded and
remarkable. In particular, a# exists and a# is the initial segment of K of order type
ω.
Theorem 5.2.33. The classes ωω ∩ L# and <# ∩ (ωω × ωω) are Σ13, where <# denotes
the canonical well-order of L#.
Proof. We follow the detailed proof given in [Koe78]. We outline briefly the idea of the
proof. If x ∈ L# there exists a countable ordinal α such that x ∈ L#α and # ∩ α is cofinal
in α, and hence there exists γ ∈ Ord such that
# ∩ α =
⋃
ξ<γ
#ξ.
Since L#α is countable, it can be represented by a model of the form 〈ω, e, s〉, where e is a
well-ordering of ω and s is the predicate coding #∩α. Its Mostowski collapse is given by
pi : 〈ω, e, s〉 → 〈L#α ,∈,# ∩ α〉 with pi′′s = # ∩ α and pi(n) = x for some n ∈ ω. This can
be formalized in the following way.
∃1e∃1s∃0n [e ∈WO ∧ 〈ω, e, s〉 |= σ ∧ s is cofinal in Ord〈ω,e,s〉∧
∃γ ∈ Ord(pi′′s =
⋃
δ<γ
#δ) ∧ pi(n) = x],(5.5)
where σ is the sentence in the language LA such that for any transitive class M and
any class A, 〈M,∈, A ∩M〉 |= σ iff there exists γ such that M = Lγ[A], and where the
quantifiers ∃1,∀1 range over reals and ∃0,∀0 range over natural numbers.
We need to check that all statements occurring in (5.5) are Σ13 in the parameters e and
s. Since WO is Π11, the satisfaction relation is ∆
1
1 and {〈n,m〉 | pi(n) = m} is arithmetical
in e, s, it remains to verify that
∃γ ∈ Ord (pi′′S =
⋃
ξ<γ
#ξ)
is a Σ13[e, s]-statement.
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To see this, note that γ being a countable ordinal we can code it by some real y ∈WO
and we can realize the #ξ-construction using a recursive function f : ω → ω such that
s =
⋃
m∈ω f(m) and pi(f(n)) = (pi(
⋃
m<yn
f(m)))#. It therefore suffices to show that
〈ω, e, s〉 |= pi(n) = pi(m)# for n,m ∈ ω is Π12 in the parameters e, s. This can be found
in [Kan09, Theorem 14.11]. The only part whose complexity attains Π12[e, s] is well-
foundedness.
Using this it is straightforward to check that <# ∩( ωω × ωω) is also Σ13:
x <# y ↔∃1e∃1s [〈ω, e, s〉 satisfies all properties in (5.5) ∧
∃0n∃0m(pi(n) = x ∧ pi(m) = y ∧ 〈ω, e, s〉 |= θ(n,m))],
where θ(v0, v1) is a formula in L# – the language containing a unary predicate to denote
membership in the class # – such that x <# y iff there is a limit ordinal δ such that δ > ω
and L#δ |= θ(x, y).4
Theorem 5.2.34. Assume (ZFC−)# + V = HC + Σ13-PSP. Then L
# |= ZFC#.
Proof. It is clear that L# |= ZFC−. Moreover, Theorem 5.2.32 implies that L# |= (ZFC−)#.
This means that it only remains to show that power sets exist in L#. Consider the class
C of reals given by
x ∈ C ⇐⇒ x ∈ L# ∧ x ∈WO ∧ ∀y (y ∈WO ∧ y ≺# x→ y 6=WO x).
Using the same arguments as in the proof of Lemma 5.2.8, we can show that C is Σ13.
Now we proceed exactly as in the proof that Π11-PSP implies that L[x] |= ZFC for every
real x to conclude that L# |= ZFC. More explicitly, C is unbounded in L# but due to
Σ11-boundedness, it has no perfect subclass. This shows that C is countable and thus, as
in the proof of Theorem 5.2.10, the power set of ω exists in L#. To prove that for every
α ∈ Ord, P(α)L# exists, take a real x which codes a well-order of ordertype α. It is easy
to check that there is a relativized version L[x]# of L#, given by the stipulating
#x0 = x#
#xα = (
⋃
β<α
#xβ)# for α > 0,
#x =
⋃
α∈Ord
#xα.
Then P(ω)L[x]# exists in L[x]# = L[#x] by the same argument as above and using Σ13[x]-
PSP. Now we proceed in the same way as in the proof of Theorem 5.2.11 to conclude that
the the power set of L#α exists in L
# using the fact that Lα[x] is countable in L[x]
#.
The next theorem shows that we can further improve the complexity of the perfect set
property assumption in Theorem 5.2.34. Its proof is similar to the proof that if ωL1 = ω1,
there is a Π11-set of reals without the perfect set property (see [Kan09, Theorem 13.12]).
Theorem 5.2.35. Assume (ZFC−)# + V = HC. Then Π12-PSP fails in L
#.
4see [Kan09, Theorem 3.3 (b)]
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Proof. We already know that the class C presented in the proof of Theorem 5.2.34 is a
witness to the failure of Σ13-PSP in L
#, so we have to improve on that attempt in order to
obtain a Π12-witness. The idea is to proceed as follows: We want to code ordinals which
are countable in L#. Again, we will use countable well-orderings to achieve this. Now
given some α ∈ Ord such that α is countable in L#, there is x0 ∈ WO ∩ L# such that
‖x0‖ = α. But x0 ∈WO∩ L# is Σ13; instead there is a least limit ordinal δ > ω such that
# ∩ α is cofinal in α and x0 ∈ L#δ . We can code δ and also L#δ by a well-ordering x1 and
iterate this process, thus obtaining a real x such that (x)i = xi for all i ∈ ω. We will now
do this formally and show that the class of reals x given as above is Π12.
Observe that we can use a real x to code a sequence of reals 〈(x)i | i ∈ ω〉, such that
each (x)i in turn codes a model of the form M(x)i = 〈ω, e(x)i , s(x)i , y(x)i〉, where e(x)i is
a well-order on ω (so that 〈ω, e(x)i〉 will code 〈L#α ,∈〉 for some α), s(x)i is a subset of ω
(which will be used to code # ∩ α) and y(x)i is a well-order on ω (which we need to code
the recursive construction of sharps). Let A ⊆ ωω denote the class of reals defined in the
following way:
x ∈ A↔x(0) ∈WO ∧ ∀0i [M(x)i+1 is well-founded and extensional ∧M(x)i+1 |= σ
∧ s(x)i+1 is cofinal in OrdM(x)i+1 ∧ pi′′(x)i+1s(x)i+1 =
⋃
ξ<||y||x(i+1)
#ξ
∧ (x)i ∈ tr(M(x)i+1) ∧ ∀0k (M(x)i+1  k |= σ ∧ (x)i ∈ tr(M(x)i+1  k
→ s(x)i+1  k is not cofinal in OrdM(x)i+1 k) ∧ ∀1z∀0n∀0m (pi(x)i+1(n) = z
∧ pi(x)i+1 = (x)i ∧M(x)i+1 |= θ(n,m)→Mz M(x)i)].
Using our computations in the proof of Theorem 5.2.33, it is straightforward to check that
A is in fact Π12. It remains to verify that it is uncountable in L
# but does not contain
a perfect subclass. For the first claim, let x be a real in A. Then there is a sequence
〈αxi | i ∈ ω〉 of ordinals countable in L# with the following properties.
(a) M(x)0 has ordertype α
x
0 and for each i ∈ ω, M(x)i+1 ∼= L#αxi+1 and αxi+1 is the least limit
ordinal > αi such that (x)i ∈ L#αxi+1 .
(b) For each i ∈ ω, if z <L#
αx
i+1
(x)i then Mz M(x)i .
Now observe that for every ordinal α which is countable in L# there is x ∈ A with αx0 = α.
This shows that A has cardinality ωL
#
1 .
In order to prove the second claim, suppose that P ⊆ A is a perfect subclass of A.
Then P is closed and hence Σ11. Hence so is the projection P
′ = {(x)0 | x ∈ P} onto
the first coordinate. But then Theorem 5.2.7 implies that P ′ is ordertype bounded and
in particular countable, a contradiction.
By combining Theorem 5.2.35 and the arguments in the proof of Theorem 5.2.34 we
obtain the following improvement of Theorem 5.2.34.
Corollary 5.2.36. If Π12-PSP holds, then ℵL#1 exists. In particular, (ZFC−)# + V =
HC + Π12-PSP implies that L
# |= ZFC#.
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Remark 5.2.37. In Lemma 5.2.46 we will prove that Π12 is the optimal (boldface) complex-
ity for which we require the perfect set property to hold in order to prove that L# |= ZFC#.
5.2.3 Π11-determinacy in SOA
We consider infinite games for two players with perfect information. The idea is that in
each round one of the players chooses a natural number and this is repeated ω many times
such that one obtains a sequence of natural numbers, i.e. a real in the Baire space. For
notational convenience, we work in ZFC− + V = HC.
Definition 5.2.38. For a class A ⊆ ωω of reals the game G(A) is defined in the following
way. To start with, Player I chooses a natural number k0 ∈ ω. Assuming that k0, . . . , kn
have been selected, in the case that n is even, kn+1 ∈ ω is chosen by Player II, in the
odd case by Player I. If the resulting x ∈ ωω given by x(n) = kn is an element of A (the
so-called payoff class), Player I wins G(A), else Player II wins. A winning strategy for
Player I is a function σ :
⋃
n∈ω ω
2n → ω such that Player I wins G(A), if he plays as
follows.
(1) k0 = σ(∅).
(2) Given k0, . . . , k2n+1, Player I plays k2n+2 = σ(〈k0, . . . , k2n+1〉).
Similarly, a winning strategy for Player II is of the form σ :
⋃
n∈ω ω
2n+1 → ω.
A is said to be determined , if either Player I or Player II has a winning strategy.
Remark 5.2.39. If A is a Σ1n-class of reals, then the statment “σ is a winning strategy for
A” is Π1n+1 in the parameter σ.
Definition 5.2.40. Let Γ be a class of formulas. We define Γ-Det to be the axiom scheme
that every class of reals definable by a formula in Γ is determined.
Note that it is equivalent to consider games with payoff classes in the Cantor space ω2
instead of the Baire space ωω. The following classical result was first proved in [Dav64].
For the benefit of the reader, we will provide its proof following [Kan09, Proposition 27.5].
Lemma 5.2.41. For any class Γ of L2-formulae, Γ-Det implies Γ-PSP.
Proof. Let A ⊆ ω2 be a Γ-class of reals. Consider the game
Player I: s0 s2 s4 . . .
Player II: k1 k3 . . .
where each si ∈ <ω2 and ki ∈ ω. Then Player I wins iff x = s0 a 〈k1〉 a s2 a 〈k3〉 a . . . is in
A, otherwise Player II wins. We will show the following.
(1) If Player I has a winning strategy, then A has a perfect subclass.
(2) If Player II has a winning strategy, then A is countable.
For (1) consider a winning strategy σ for Player I. Let T be the tree consisting of partial
plays of the game G(A) where Player I plays according to σ, i.e. the closure under initial
segments of the set of possible positions when Player I plays according to σ. Then T is
obviously perfect and [T ] ⊆ A.
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In order to prove (2), assume that Player II has a winning strategy τ . Consider a
position p = 〈s0, k1, · · · , s2n, k2n+1〉 in G(A), i.e. k1 = τ(s0), k3 = τ(s0 a 〈k1〉 a s2) and so
on.
Claim 1. For every x ∈ A there exists a position p such that p ⊆ x and for every s ∈ <ω2,
p a s a τ(p a s) * x.
Proof. If not, take x ∈ A witnessing the contrary. We define a strategy σ for Player I
as follows: For every position p in the game G(A) such that p ⊆ x let σ(p) = s with
the property that p a s a τ(p a s) ⊆ x, otherwise let σ(p) = 0. Consider the play where
Player I plays according to σ and Player II according to τ . Then the resulting real is x,
contradicting the assumption that τ is a winning strategy.
Claim 2. For every position p there exists at most one x ∈ A such that p ⊆ x and for
every s ∈ <ω2, p a s a τ(p a s) * x.
Proof. By contradiction, take a position p and x, y ∈ A witnessing the contrary. Let q
be the longest sequence in <ω2 such that x  lh(q) = y  lh(q). Then obviously p ⊆ q
and by assumption q a τ(q) * x, y. But then q a 〈1 − τ(q)〉 ⊆ x, y which contradicts the
maximality of q.
Claims 1 and 2 imply that there is an injection from A into the set of positions in the
game G(A), and hence A is countable.
We will now consider the axiom of Π11-determinacy. In ZFC, this can be characterized
in the following way.
Theorem 5.2.42 (ZFC, Martin-Harrington, [Mar70, Har78]). For any real x, Π11[x]-
determinacy holds if and only if x# exists.
Harrington’s proof that Π11[x]-determinacy implies the existence of x
# applies determi-
nacy to a Σ11[x]-class A[x], where it is shown that Player II cannot have a winning strategy
in the game G(A[x]). Now since Π11[x]-determinacy is equivalent to Σ11[x]-determinacy,
Π11[x]-determinacy implies that A[x] is determined. In SOA, we have the following.
Lemma 5.2.43. If Π11-Det + Π
1
1-PSP holds, then 0
# exists.
Proof. Let A denote the Σ11-class of reals considered in Harrington’s proof. By assumption,
A is determined. Suppose first that there is a winning strategy τ for Player II. Since τ
can be coded by a real, the Π11-PSP implies that L[τ ] is a model of ZFC which contains
a winning strategy for Player II. However, this is impossible by the proof of Harrington’s
Theorem. It follows that Player I has a winning strategy σ. By assumption, L[σ] |=
ZFC. Now since the statement “σ is a winning strategy for Player I” is Π21, Shoenfield
absoluteness implies that σ is a winning strategy in L[σ] and so 0# exists in L[σ]. But
then 0# exists by Theorem 5.2.27.
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However, it is an open question whether in second-order arithmetic the existence of
0# follows from Π11-determinacy. Harrington’s proof of the existence of 0
# is based on the
following principle, usually called Harrington’s Principle.
(HP) ∃x∀α ∈ Ord (α is X-admissible → α is a cardinal in L).
i.e. Harrington showed in [Har78] that analytic determinacy entails (HP) and then applied
a theorem of Silver stating that (HP) implies the existence of 0#. However, Yong and
Schindler [CS15] ruled out the possibility of transferring this proof to SOA by showing
that SOA + HP is equiconsistent with ZFC. In particular, this implies that a positive
answer to the question above would yield a new proof of Harrington’s Theorem.
Lemma 5.2.44. If (ZFC−)# holds, then L[x] |= ZFC for every real x.
Proof. By the proof of Theorems 5.2.10 and Theorem 5.2.11 it is enough to check that
ωω ∩ L[x] is countable for every real x. By assumption, x# exists. Every real y ∈ L[x]
is of the form t(x0, · · · , xn−1) for some Skolem term t(v0, · · · , vn−1) and indiscernibles
x0, · · · , xn−1 ∈ x#. In particular, in L[x#] we can define a real
z = {〈k, pt(c0, · · · , cn−1q〉 | L[x] |= k ∈ t(x0, · · · , xn−1)}.
But then z codes every real in ωω∩L[x], proving that there are only countably many reals
which are constructible from x.
Theorem 5.2.45. Π11-determinacy holds if and only if a
# exists for every set of ordinals
a ⊆ Ord.
Proof. Suppose first that Π11-Det holds and let a ⊆ Ord be a set of ordinals. By V = HC,
a is countable and hence we can enumerate a as a = {αn | n ∈ ω}. Countable ordinals
correspond to well-orderings of ω, so we can find a real x such that for every n ∈ ω,
‖(x)n‖ = αn. In particular, a ∈ L[x]. We show that x# exists. Consider the game
G(A[x]). By Π11-Det, G(A[x]) is determined. As in the proof of Lemma 5.2.43, Player
II cannot have a winning strategy, so there is a winning strategy σ for Player I. Since
Π11-Det implies Π
1
1-PSP, L[x, σ] |= ZFC and by Shoenfield Absoluteness, σ is a winning
strategy in G(A[x]) in L[x, σ]. But this implies that x# exists in L[x, σ]. Work in L[x, σ].
There is a closed unbounded class of indiscernibles I¯ for L[x] containing all uncountable
cardinals. In particular, by Theorem 5.2.31, there is a cardinal κ > ω such that a ∈ Lκ[x]
and Iκ = I¯ ∩ κ is a set of indiscernibles of order type κ for Lκ[x]. Now we can write
a = tLκ[x](~u) for a Skolem term t and indiscernibles ~u ∈ Iκ. But then J = Iκ \ sup ~u is a
set of indiscernibles for Lκ[a] of order type κ. Therefore, Lemma 5.2.30 implies that a
#
exists in L[x, σ]. Now by Theorem 5.2.27, a# exists.
Conversely, suppose that every set of ordinals has a sharp. Let ϕ be a Π11-formula
containing the parameter x and let A be the class defined by ϕ. By Lemma 5.2.44,
L[x#] |= ZFC + x# exists. But by the Martin-Harrington Theorem this implies that
L[x#] |= ZFC + Π11[x]-Det. So in L[x#] the game G(A) is determined. But by Shoenfield
absoluteness every winning strategy for G(A) in L[x#] already exists in V, proving that
G(A) is determined.
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It follows from Theoerems 5.2.45 and 5.2.35 that SOA+Π11-Det+Π
1
2-PSP implies that
L# is a model of ZFC#. The next lemma shows that we cannot drop the Π12-PSP.
Lemma 5.2.46. SOA + Π11-Det does not imply that L
# |= ZFC#.
Proof. Suppose the contrary. We start with a modelM of ZFC#. ThenM2 = 〈ωM ,P(ω)M〉
is a model of SOA + Π11-Det with M
2 ∈ M . Iteratively, we can construct an ∈-sequence
〈Ni | i ∈ ω〉 in M of models of SOA + Π11-Det as follows.
• Let N0 = M2.
• Suppose that Ni is given. Then (L#)Ni |= ZFC#. We set Ni+1 = ((L#)Ni)2, the
analytical part of (L#)Ni . Then Ni+1 is a model of SOA + Π
1
1-Det with Ni+1 ∈
(L#)Ni ⊆ Ni.
But the existence of such a sequence of models contradicts the axiom of foundation in
M .
5.3 Collapsing the ordinals
Starting with a countable transitive model M of ZFC, we will use the class version of
the Le´vy collapse (see Section 1.3.4) in order to produce a model of ZFC− + V = HC+
full topological regularity, i.e. where all projective classes satisfy the perfect set property,
the Baire property and are Lebesgue measurable. If M is in fact a model of ZFC# then
the generic extension will additionally satisfy Π11-determinacy. Combining this with the
results from Sections 5.2 and 5.2 we obtain new equiconsistency results.
We fix a countable transitive model M |= ZFC and the corresponding GBc-model
M = 〈M,Def(M)〉. Let P denote Col(ω,< Ord)M , the class-sized Le´vy collapse. We have
already observed in Section 1.3.4 that the power set axiom fails in every P-generic exten-
sion of M. Since P is pretame (see Examples 2.2.10 and 4.1.9), every P-generic extension
M[G] satisfies GBc−. Moreover, by Lemma 1.3.10, every set in M [G] is countable. We
show that the proof of the perfect set property in the Solovay model (see [Sol70]) can be
transferred to our setting.
Notation. For δ an ordinal in OrdM , we define the following variants of collapse forcing
notions:
Col(ω, δ) = {p ∈ Col(ω,< Ord)M | dom(p) ⊆ ω × {δ}}
Col(ω,≥ δ) = {p ∈ Col(ω,< Ord)M | dom(p) ⊆ ω ×OrdM \ δ}.
Lemma 5.3.1. The following properties hold.
(1) Let α ∈ OrdM be an ordinal and P0 = Col(ω,< α) and P1 = Col(ω,≥ α). Then a
filter G is P-generic over M if and only if G = {p ∪ q | p ∈ G0 ∧ q ∈ G1}, where G0
is P0-generic over M and G1 is P1-generic over M [G0].
(2) Suppose that G is P-generic and f : γ → OrdM is a function in M [G]. Then there
is an ordinal δ such that x ∈M [G ∩ Col(ω,< δ)].
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Proof. (1) This is a direct consequence of the product Lemma 2.1.11, since
p 7→ 〈p ∩ Col(ω,< α), p ∩ Col(ω,≥ α)〉
defines an isomorphism between P and P0 × P1.
(2) Let f˙ ∈ MP be a name for f and p ∈ G such that p MP “ f˙ : γˇ → OrdM”. For each
α < γ, let
Dα = {q ≤P p | ∃ξ ∈ OrdM (q MP f˙(αˇ) = ξˇ)}.
Then each Dα is M -definable and dense below p, so by pretameness there are q ≤P p
in G and 〈dα | α < γ〉 ∈ M such that dα ⊆ Dα and dα is predense below q for each
α < γ. Now choose an antichain aα ⊆ dα which is maximal in dα. Let δ ∈ OrdM be
an ordinal such that for every r ∈ ⋃α<γ aα, dom(r) ⊆ δ × ω. Then we have
f(α) = ξ ⇐⇒ r MP f˙(αˇ) = ξˇ,
where r is the unique element in aα ∩ G. In particular, this implies that f ∈ G ∩
Col(ω,< δ).
We need the following standard result for set forcing.
Lemma 5.3.2. [Kan09, Proposition 10.20] Let δ ∈ OrdM be an ordinal and Q a set-sized
separative partial order such that |Q| ≤ |δ| and
1Q MQ “∃f (f : ωˇ → δˇ surjective ∧ f /∈ Mˇ)”.
Then there is an injective dense embedding of a dense subset of Col(ω, δ) into Q.
The following lemma shows that the Le´vy collapse absorbs every forcing notion which
adds a single real. The set version of this result was first proved by Solovay in [Sol70].
We follow [Kan09, Proposition 10.21].
Lemma 5.3.3. If G is P-generic over M , then for every x ∈ M [G] with x : ω → OrdM
there is a P-generic filter H over 〈M [x],Def(M [x])〉 such that M [G] = M [x][H], where
M [x] is the smallest model of ZFC containing M ∪ {x}.
Proof. By Lemma 5.3.1 (2) there is an ordinal δ such that x ∈ M [G ∩ Col(ω,< δ)].
Consider the following filters.
G0 = G ∩ Col(ω,< δ),
G1 = G ∩ Col(ω, δ),
G2 = G ∩ Col(ω,≥ (δ + 1)).
It follows from 5.3.1 (1) that G0 is Col(ω,< δ)-generic over M. Since Col(ω,< δ) is a
set-sized partial order, by [Kan09, Proposition 10.10] there is a set-sized partial order
Q and a Q-generic filter H0 over M [x] such that M [x][H0] = M [G0]. Since set-sized
forcing notions always have a separative quotient which is forcing equivalent to the original
forcing notion, we may additionally assume that Q is separative. We work in M [x] and
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set R = Q×Col(ω, δ). By the product lemma for set-sized forcing notions it follows that
M [x][H0][G1] is an R-generic extension of M [x]. Observe that |R| ≤ |Col(ω,< δ+1)| = |δ|
and R adds a surjective function from ω onto δ, since Col(ω, δ) does so. By Lemma
5.3.2 there is a Col(ω, δ)-generic filter H1 over M [x] such that M [x][H1] = M [x][H0][G1].
Moreover, a further application of Lemma 5.3.2 yields that Col(ω, δ) and Col(ω,< δ + 1)
are forcing equivalent, so there is a Col(ω,< δ+1)-generic filter H2 such that M [x][H2] =
M [x][H1]. Applying Lemma 5.3.1 (1) several times, we obtain
M [G] = M [G0][G1][G2] = M [x][H0][G1][G2] = M [x][H2][G2]
and H2 ×G2 is P-generic over 〈M [x],Def(M [x])〉.
The following definition generalizes the concept of weak homogeniety to class-sized
forcing notions.
Definition 5.3.4. A notion of class forcing Q is said to be weakly homogeneous over a
model N = 〈N, C〉 of GB−, if for all p, q ∈ Q there is an automorphism pi of Q in C such
that pi(p) and q are compatible.
The next lemmata show that, as in the case of set forcing, the maximal element
of a weakly homegeneous forcing notion already decides all statements in the forcing
language which involve only canonical names and that the class-sized Le´vy collapse is
weakly homogeneous. The proofs are standard and their set-sized counterparts can be
found in [Kan09, Proposition 10.19]
Lemma 5.3.5. If a notion of class forcing Q for N = 〈N, C〉 |= GB− is weakly homoge-
neous and satisfies the forcing theorem over N then for any L∈-formula ϕ(v0, . . . , vn−1) and
for all sets x0, . . . , xn−1 ∈ N either 1Q NQ ϕ(xˇ0, . . . , xˇn−1) or 1Q MQ ¬ϕ(xˇ0, . . . , xˇn−1).
Proof. Suppose the contrary. Since Q satisfies the forcing theorem, there are p, q ∈ Q
such that p NQ ϕ(xˇ0, . . . , xˇn−1) and q NQ ¬ϕ(xˇ0, . . . , xˇn−1). Now let pi : Q → Q be an
automorphism with the property that pi(p) ‖Q q. Since pi∗(xˇi) = xˇi for all i < n, we have
pi(p) NQ ϕ(xˇ0, . . . , xˇn−1) contradicting that pi(p) is compatible with q.
Lemma 5.3.6. The Le´vy collapse P = Col(ω,< Ord)M is weakly homogeneous.
Proof. Given p, q ∈ P, let f : ω → ω be a bijection such that for all 〈n, α〉 ∈ dom(p),
〈f(n), α〉 /∈ dom(q). Let pi be the automorphism on P given by
pi(r) = {〈〈f(n), α〉, γ〉 | 〈〈n, α〉, γ〉 ∈ r}.
Then dom(pi(p)) and dom(q) are disjoint, and so pi(p) and q are compatible.
We are now ready to prove that in every P-generic extension, every projective class
of reals satisfies the perfect set property. We follow the arguments of [Kan09, Theorem
11.11].
Theorem 5.3.7. If G is P-generic over M then M[G] |= projective PSP.
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Proof. We consider the class of reals to be the Cantor space ω2. Let C be a class of reals
definable by y ∈ C if and only if ϕ(x, y) for some real parameter x ∈ M [G]. Without
loss of generality, we assume that C is uncountable in M [G]. We prove that C contains
a perfect subclass. Since C is uncountable and ω2 ∩M [x] is countable in M [G], there
must be some y ∈ C \M [x]. By Lemma 5.3.3 there is a P-generic filter H over M [x]
such that M [x][H] = M [G]. Moreover, by Lemma 5.3.1 (2) there is an ordinal δ such
that y ∈ M [x][H ∩ Col(ω,< δ)]. Let Q denote the set-sized partial order Col(ω,< δ).
A further application of Lemma 5.3.3 yields a P-generic filter I over M [x][y] such that
M [x][y][I] = M [x][H]. Moreover, M [x][y][I] |= ϕ(x, y), so using Lemmata 5.3.5 and 5.3.6
we obtain that M [x][y] |= ϕ˜(x, y), where ϕ˜(u, v) is the formula defined by 1P P ϕ(uˇ, vˇ).
Let uˆ denote the canonical name of u ∈M [x] with respect to Q; and analogously we will
use the notation Cˆ for classes which are definable over M [x]. Since Q satisfies the forcing
theorem, there are p ∈ Q and a Q-name y˙ for y such that
p MQ y˙ ∈ ω2 \ M̂ [x] ∧ M̂ [x][y˙] |= ϕ˜(xˆ, y˙).
Observe that PM [x](Q) is countable in M [G], so we can enumerate the dense subsets of
Q in M [x] by 〈Dn | n ∈ ω〉 in M [G]. Now the idea is to approximate y in such a way
that we obtain a perfect class of different possible reals. We define a condition pt ≤Q p
for each t ∈ <ω2 in the following way.
• Choose p∅ ≤Q p such that p∅ ∈ D0.
• Given pt such that lh(t) = n, let k ∈ ω be minimal such that pt does not decide y˙(k).
Then by density of Dn+1 we can find pta 〈0〉, pta 〈1〉 ≤Q pt with pta 〈0〉, pta 〈1〉 ∈ Dn+1
which decide distinct values of y˙(k).
Now for every real z ∈ ω2, we obtain a P-generic filter by setting
Gz = {q ∈ Q | ∃n ∈ ω (pzn ≤Q q)} ∈M [G].
Thus by construction we obtain that the reals given by x˙Gz , z ∈ ω2, are all distinct. Now
consider the subclass of C given by P = {y˙Gz | x ∈ ω2}. Note that P = [T ], where T is
the perfect tree consisting of all finite sequences s ∈ <ω2 such that pt MQ y˙  nˇ = sˇ for
some n ∈ ω and some t ∈ <ω2. By Lemma 5.3.3, we have that [T ] ⊆ C. This proves that
C has the perfect set property.
We denote the property that all projective classes of reals are Lebesgue measurable,
satisfy the Baire property and the perfect set property by projective topological regularity.
Note that we can also prove – as in the Solovay model constructed in [Sol70] (see also
[Kan09, Chapter 11]) – that in every P-generic extension projective topological regularity
holds. By combining this observation with Theorems 5.2.11 and 5.3.7 we obtain the
following equiconsistency result.
Corollary 5.3.8. The following theories are equiconsistent.
(1) SOA + Π11-PSP,
(2) SOA + Σ12-PSP,
(3) SOA+ projective topological regularity,
(4) ZFC.
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The next step is to show that the Le´vy collapse does not affect the existence of sharps.
For this we will apply the following characterization which is provable in ZFC. Its proof
can be found in [Jec03, Theorem 18.12].
Theorem 5.3.9 (Kunen). Suppose that M is a model of ZFC. For a set a ⊆ OrdM the
following statements are equivalent.
(1) a# exists.
(2) There is a non-trivial elementary embedding 〈L[a], a, ξ〉ξ≤sup a → 〈L[a], a, ξ〉ξ≤sup a.
Theorem 5.3.10. Suppose that M |= ZFC# and δ ∈ OrdM . If G is Col(ω,< δ)-generic
over M , then M [G] |= ZFC#.
Proof. Let P = Col(ω,< δ) and a ⊆ OrdM [G] a set of ordinals in M [G]. Without loss of
generality, we may assume that δ ∈ OrdM is minimal such that a is in a Col(ω,< δ)-generic
extension of M (otherwise we show the existence of a# in an intermediate model).
Choose a nice P-name σ ∈MP for a. Clearly, we can code σ by a set of ordinals. Let
γ = supσ, where we identify σ with its ordinal code. By minimality of δ we may assume
that δ ≤ γ. Since M |= ZFC#, there exists an elementary embedding
j : 〈L[σ], σ, ξ〉ξ≤γ ≺ 〈L[σ], σ, ξ〉ξ≤γ.
We want to use this to construct an elementary embedding j¯ : L[a] ≺ L[a]. Note that
since P ⊆ L, G is also P-generic over L[σ]. We now consider the forcing extension L[σ] ⊆
L[a] ⊆ L[σ][G]. Work in M [G] and define
j¯ : 〈L[a], a, ξ〉ξ≤α → 〈L[a], a, ξ〉ξ≤α, j¯(τG) = (j(τ))G,
where α = sup a. Now to show that j¯ is well-defined, note that since δ ≤ γ, we have
j(p) = p for every p ∈ P. In particular, P-names are always mapped to P-names under
j. Secondly, we have to check that if τ, pi are P-names in L[σ], then τG = piG in L[σ][G].
Using the truth lemma, we can pick p ∈ G such that in L[σ], p MP τ = pi. By elementarity
of j, this implies that L[σ] |= “p MP j(τ) = j(pi)”.
It remains to check that that j¯ is an elementary elembedding. Suppose that L[a] |=
ϕ(x, a, ~ξ) for some x ∈ L[a] and ~ξ a finite sequence of ordinals ≤ α. Then there exist a
P-name τ ∈ L[σ]P and a condition p ∈ G such that x = τG and
p L[σ]P ϕL[σ](τ, σ,
~ˇξ).
By elementarity of j we obtain
p = j(p) L[σ]P ϕL[σ](j(τ), σ,
~ˇξ)
and hence L[σ][G] |= ϕL[a](j(τ)G, a, ~ξ). But this means that L[a] |= ϕ(j(x), a, ~ξ) proving
elementarity of j.
Corollary 5.3.11. Suppose that M |= ZFC# and let G be Col(ω,< Ord)M -generic over
〈M,Def(M)〉. Then M [G] |= (ZFC−)#.
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Proof. Let a ∈ M [G] be a set of ordinals. By Lemma 5.3.1 (2) there exists δ ∈ OrdM
such that a ∈ M [G ∩ Col(ω,< δ)]. But since G ∩ Col(ω,< δ) is Col(ω,< δ)-generic over
M , we have that M [G ∩ Col(ω,< δ)] |= ZFC# by Theorem 5.3.10. Hence a# exists in
M [G ∩ Col(ω,< δ)]. By absoluteness of a#, this implies that a# exists in M [G].
Finally, we can state the main result. It is a direct consequence of Theorems 5.2.35,
5.2.45, 5.3.7 and Corollary 5.3.11.
Theorem 5.3.12. The following theories are equiconsistent:
(1) SOA + Π11-Det + Π
1
2-PSP,
(2) SOA + Π11-Det + Σ
1
3-PSP,
(3) SOA + Π11-Det+ projective topological regularity,
(4) ZFC#.
5.4 Class forcing over models of SOA
In this section, we outline a simple approach to class forcing over models of second-order
arithmetic. Since the natural numbers are always preserved under class forcing, and we
are only interested in modifying the reals, we will allow just nice names for real numbers.
This approach has the advantage that the forcing theorem is provable for all notions of
class forcing. In the case of nice pretame forcing notions, this turns out to be the same
as performing class forcing in the classical way. In particular, this applies to many tree
forcing notions such as random forcing, Sacks forcing and Laver forcing, if the ground
model additionally satisfies dependent choice.
Furthermore, using results from Philipp Schlicht and Fabiana Castiblanco (see [CS16]),
we can see that all above-mentioned forcing notions preserve the Π11-perfect set property.
However, this does not hold in general; for example using reshaping and almost disjoint
coding we can force a failure of the Π11-PSP.
5.4.1 The basic setup
As we have seen, SOA and ZFC− are bi-interpretable. Hence class forcing over models of
SOA can be done in the same way as over models of ZFC−. However, there are several
obstacles: It is still an open question whether in ZFC− all pretame class forcings satisfy
the forcing theorem. Moreover, since the proof of Collection in generic extensions by
pretame class forcings makes use of the forcing theorem, it is unclear whether ZFC− is
preserved under pretame class forcing. One way to solve this problem, is to add a global
well-order by a < Ord-closed forcing notion and then code the generic well-order using
reshaping and almost disjoint coding. This approach was followed by Carolin Antos in
[Ant15]. This is problematic for various reasons. Firstly, this modifies the ground model in
an unintended way; instead of performing one forcing, we are in fact performing multiple
forcings. Secondly, some properties of forcing notions can get lost if we change the ground
model. One example is the Ord-cc (see Lemma 4.1.4). The solution that we propose here
is to modify the setting of class forcing by allowing only names for reals, and taking the
natural numbers as constants. This has the advantage that it is very easy to prove the
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forcing theorem. Moreover, this approach is more intuitive, since we do not wish to change
the natural numbers of an SOA-model by forcing anyway. Our approach resembles the
one proposed by Victoria Gitman in the blog posts [Git13b] and [Git13a] for forcing over
models of GBC.
A notion of class forcing for a model A = 〈N,R〉 |= SOA is a pair P = 〈P ,≤P〉5 such
that P is a definable class of reals and ≤P a definable preorder on P . As in the context
of GB−, we will usually identify P with its domain.
Let P = 〈P ,≤P,1P〉 be a fixed notion of class forcing. A P-name is a real Γ such that
each (Γ)n is of the form 〈m,P 〉 for some m ∈ N and P ∈ P, where 〈m,P 〉 is a real coding
the pair m,P in a canonical way. A definable subclass D ⊆ P is said to be dense, if for
every P ∈ P there is Q ≤P P with Q ∈ D. A filter G ⊆ P is said to be P-generic over A,
if it meets every dense subclass of P which is definable over A. Given such a P-generic
filter and a P-name Γ, we define
ΓG = {n ∈ N | ∃P ∈ G (〈n, P 〉 ∈ Γ)}
the G-evaluation of Γ and R[G] = {ΓG | Γ a P-name}. Then the model A[G] = 〈N,R[G]〉 is
called a P-generic extension ofA. The forcing relation and the forcing theorem are defined
as in Chapter 1, where the classes are simply the definable ones. As in our class-theoretic
setting, we write
P AP ϕ(n0, . . . , nk−1,Γ0, . . . ,Γl−1)
for n0, . . . , nk−1 ∈ N and P-names Γ0, . . . ,Γl−1, if for every P-generic filter G over A,
A[G] |= ϕ(n0, . . . , nk−1,Γ0, . . . ,Γl−1). The forcing theorem is defined as in the context
of class forcing over GB− (see Definition 2.1.1) and, moreover, one can see that for the
forcing theorem to hold it suffices to prove the definability lemma for atomic formula of
the form n ∈ Γ for n ∈ N and P-names Γ.
Lemma 5.4.1. Let A = 〈N,R〉 |= SOA and let P be a notion of class forcing for A. Then
P satisfies the forcing theorem over A.
Proof. We claim that for every P ∈ P, for every n ∈ N and for every P-name Γ,
P AP n ∈ Γ⇐⇒ DP,Γ = {Q ≤P P | ∃R (〈n,R〉 ∈ Γ ∧Q ≤P R)} is dense below P.
Suppose first that P AP n ∈ Γ and Q ≤P P . Take a P-generic filter G with Q ∈ G. Then
P ∈ G and so n ∈ ΓG. But this means that there is 〈n,R〉 ∈ Γ such that R ∈ G. Since
G is a filter, we have that R and Q are compatible, so there is S ∈ G with S ≤P Q,R.
In particular, S ∈ DP,Γ. Conversely, assume that the right-hand side holds and let G be
P-generic over M with P ∈ G. By assumption, there is Q ∈ G ∩ DP,Γ. Take R such that
〈n,R〉 ∈ Γ and Q ≤P R. Then R ∈ G and so n ∈ ΓG.
The notion of pretameness is defined in the same way as in Definition 2.2.1 and, as
expected, has the property that it implies the preservation of SOA.
Lemma 5.4.2. Let A = 〈N,R〉 |= SOA and let P be a pretame notion of class forcing for
A. If G is P-generic over A then A[G] |= SOA.
5Usually, P will have a maximal element denoted by 1P.
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Proof. The only problematic axiom is the axiom of comprehension. For this, let ϕ be
an L2-formula (possibly with parameters). The proof is a simple version of the proof of
collection being preserved by pretame notions of class forcing over models of GB−. Let G
be P-generic over A. For each n ∈ N, consider
Dn = {P ∈ P | P AP ϕ(n) ∨ P AP ¬ϕ(n)}.
Using pretameness, we can take P ∈ G and reals Dn which code an enumeration of a
dense subset of Dn of order type ω such that Dn is predense below P . Then
Γ = {〈n,Q〉 | ∃k [Q = (Dn)k ∧Q AP ϕ(n)]}
is a P-name for {n ∈ N | ϕ(n)} in A[G].
The designation “class forcing” in the context of second-order arithmetic may seem
somewhat misleading: If we conceive a model M = 〈N,R〉 of SOA as a second-order
model, then the “classes” should be the reals, and so a notion of class forcing would
simply be a real. However, we are interested in forcing with classes of reals which in this
sense then corresponds to so-called hyperclass forcing. This has been studied by Antos
and Friedman in [AF15] in the setting of KM. Nevertheless, we do not wish to view the
reals as classes, but rather the definable classes of reals; this is closer to our intuition of
natural numbers and reals. As Section 5.1 suggests, definable class forcing over models
of SOA is closely related to definable class forcing over ZFC− + V = HC. Given a forcing
notion P over A defined by P ∈ P iff ϕ(P,X) for some parameter X ∈ R, we can code the
elements of P ∈ P by well-founded trees P ∗ and then consider the notion of class forcing
P∗ for A∈ given by p ∈ P∗ ⇐⇒ ϕ∗(p,X∗), where ϕ∗ is the L∈-formula corresponding to ϕ
as defined in Section 5.1. Now if G∗ is P∗-generic over A∈ = 〈A∈,Def(A∈)〉 then we can
consider G ⊆ P to be the filter containing all P ∈ P such that P ∗ ∈ G∗. By the results
in Section 5.1, it follows that G∗ is P∗-generic over A∈ if and only if G is P-generic over
A. This is essentially the approach that has been pursued in [AF15] to define hyperclass
forcing over models of KM.
However, where our version of class forcing over SOA diverges from this approach
which uses our previous results about class forcing over models of ZFC−, is that we
restrict ourselves to nice names and can therefore prove the forcing theorem for all L2-
formulae. Our results in Section 2.5 suggest that this is problematic in GB−. On the other
hand, since we want to preserve SOA – and GB− respectively – we are only interested in
those forcing notions which (both over SOA and GB−) are pretame and satisfy the forcing
theorem. It follows from the argument presented in Example 4.6.4 (2) that every pretame
forcing notion which satisfies the forcing theorem is nice, so for such forcing notions both
the approach to class forcing in SOA presented in the beginning of this section and the
approach of forcing over the corresponding model of ZFC− coincide. Since all the tools
that we have developed in the previous chapters about class forcing are set up in the
context of (extensions of) GB−, we will for the rest of this section consider class forcing
over models of the form M = 〈M,Def(M)〉, where M |= ZFC− + V = HC.
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5.4.2 Some tree forcings
Over models of second-order arithmetic, some canonical forcing notions to consider are the
so-called arboreal forcing notions, i.e. partial orders whose conditions are trees. Prominent
examples are Cohen forcing, random forcing, Sacks forcing, Laver forcing, Silver forcing,
Miller forcing and Mathias forcing. A property that these examples have in common is
Axiom A.
For this section, we fix a countable transitive model M = 〈M, C〉 of GB− + V = HC.
The example that we are mostly interested in is, of course, when M |= ZFC− + V = HC
and C = Def(M), which corresponds to forcing over a model of SOA as discussed above.
Definition 5.4.3. A notion of class forcing P = 〈P,≤P〉 for M satisfies Axiom A over M,
if there is a sequence 〈≤n| n ∈ ω〉 in C of partial orders on P with the following properties.
(1) For all p, q ∈ P, p ≤0 q implis p ≤P q and for all n ∈ ω, p ≤n+1 q implies p ≤n q.
(2) Whenever 〈pn | n ∈ ω〉 is a sequence of conditions with pn+1 ≤n pn for all n ∈ ω,
then there is q ∈ P such that q ≤n p for all n ∈ ω.
(3) If A ⊆ P is an antichain in C and p ∈ P, then for every n ∈ ω there is q ≤n p such
that {a ∈ A | q ‖P a} is a set.
Sequences 〈pn | n ∈ ω〉 as in (2) are called fusion sequences .
It is easy to check that if C contains a global well-order of M , then every forcing
notion P which satisfies Axiom A over M is pretame. However, in the absence of a global
well-order, Axiom A forcing notions need not be pretame – even if the ground model
additionally satisfies dependent choice.
Remark 5.4.4. Let M |= ZFC such that there is no global choice function for M which
is definable over M . If G is P = Col(ω,< Ord)M -generic over M then there is no global
choice function for M [G] in C[G]. To see this, suppose otherwise and let F˙ ∈ CP and
p ∈ G such that
p MP “ F˙ is a global choice function”.
Then we can define a global choice function for M as follows. It is easy to see that P
can be well-ordered canonically by some well-order ≺, since it essentially consists of finite
sets of ordinals. If x ∈ M \ {∅} then let F (x) be the set y such that q MP F˙ (xˇ) = yˇ
for the ≺-least q ≤P p which decides F˙ (xˇ). This shows that the Solovay model satisfies
GBc−+V = HC, has a hierarchy but global choice fails. In fact, it will follow from Lemma
5.4.7 that it even satisfies GBdc−. By Lemma 4.1.7 there is a forcing notion which satisfies
the Ord-cc but is not pretame for 〈M,Def(M)〉. In particular, this forcing notion satisfies
Axiom A.
This suggests that we should modify slightly our definition of Axiom A and consider
dense classes instead of antichains.
Definition 5.4.5. A notion of class forcing P = 〈P,≤P〉 for M satisfies Axiom D over M,
if there is a sequence 〈≤n| n ∈ ω〉 ∈ C of partial orders on P with the following properties.
(1) For all p, q ∈ P, p ≤0 q implies p ≤P q and for all n ∈ ω, p ≤n+1 q implies p ≤n q.
(2) Whenever 〈pn | n ∈ ω〉 is a sequence of conditions with pn+1 ≤n pn for all n ∈ ω,
then there is q ∈ P such that q ≤n pn for all n ∈ ω.
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(3) If D ⊆ P is a dense class in C and p ∈ P, then for every n ∈ ω there is q ≤n p and a
set d ⊆ D in M which is predense below q.
Notice that Axiom D implies Axiom A. All aforementioned tree forcings satisfy Axiom
D; however, in some cases, its proof requires dependent choice. The following observation
suggests that GBdc− + V = HC is actually more natural than GB− + V = HC.
Lemma 5.4.6. Let M = 〈M, C〉 be a countable transitive model of GBdc− and let P be a
notion of class forcing which satisfies Axiom D over M. Then P is pretame for M.
Proof. Suppose that 〈Di | i ∈ I〉 is a sequence of dense classes in C and p ∈ P. Since M
satisfies the axiom of choice, we may assume that I = κ is an M -cardinal. Using DC we
can take sequences 〈pn | n ∈ ω〉 ∈ M of conditions in P and 〈dn | n ∈ ω〉 ∈ M of subsets
dn ⊆ Dn with p0 = p and such that for each n ∈ ω, pn+1 ≤n pn and dn ⊆ Dn is predense
below pn+1. Now using property (1) in Definition 5.4.5, there is q ∈ P with q ≤n pn for
all n ∈ ω. In particular, each dn is predense below q.
Moreover, dependent choice holds in the Solovay model.
Lemma 5.4.7. Let G be Col(ω,< Ord)M -generic over M , where M is a model of ZFC.
Then M [G] |= DC.
Proof. Let P denote Col(ω,< Ord)M . Let x ∈ M [G] be an arbitary set. Without loss
of generality, we may assume that x ∈ M (otherwise we can do the same arguments in
some intermediate model). We construct a sequence 〈αn | n ∈ ω〉 ∈ M as follows. Let
α0 = rnk(x). Suppose that
p MP ∀~x∃y ϕ(~x, y).
Hence p MP ∃yϕ(xˇ, y). Since P satisfies the Ord-cc by Example 4.1.9, it also satisfies the
maximality principle by Lemma 4.2.7. Note that we do not require a global well-order,
since P can be canonically well-ordered. Using the maximality principle, we can take
α1 ≥ α0 such that there is σ ∈ MP ∩ Vα1 with p MP ϕ(xˇ, σ). Given 〈αi | i ≤ n〉 let αn+1
be the least ordinal α ≥ αn such that there is a sequence 〈σi | i ≤ n+ 1〉 ∈ Vα of P-names
with σ0 = xˇ and p MP ϕ(〈σ0, . . . , σn〉, σn+1). Now let α = sup{αn | n ∈ ω} + 1. Now
using dependent choice in M , there is a sequence of names 〈σn | n ∈ ω〉 ∈ Vα such that for
all n ∈ ω, p MP ϕ(〈σ0, . . . , σn〉, σn+1〉) with σ0 = xˇ. In particular, in M [G], 〈σGn | n ∈ ω〉
witness that DC holds.
Example 5.4.8. Let M = 〈M, C〉 be a countable transitive model of GB− + V = HC.
Then Sacks forcing S satisfies Axiom D over M. The proof is the same as the proof that
in ZFC Sacks forcing satisfies Axiom A. Recall that the conditions of S are simply perfect
trees in the Cantor space, ordered by inclusion. Let p ∈ S be a perfect tree. We say that
a node s ∈ p is a splitting node, if both s a 0 and s a 1 are in p. We say that s is an n-th
splitting node, if there are are exactly n splitting nodes t ∈ p with t ⊆ s. For n ∈ ω we
define
p ≤n q ⇐⇒ p ≤S q and every n-th splitting node of q is an n-th splitting node of p.
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If s ∈ p then we denote by p  s the perfect tree given by
p  s = {t ∈ p | t ⊆ s ∨ s ⊆ t}.
Moreover, if x is a set of incompatible nodes in p and qs ≤S p  s for each s ∈ x then the
amalgamation of {qs | s ∈ x} into p is the perfect tree given by
{t ∈ p | ∀s ∈ x (t ⊆ s→ t ∈ qs)}.
We check that S and 〈≤n| n ∈ ω〉 satisfy the desired properties. The first condition is
obvious. For (2), let 〈pn | n ∈ ω〉 be a fusion sequence in S and let p =
⋂
n∈ω pn. We check
that p ∈ S. Let s ∈ p and let n be the number of splitting nodes in p0 below s. Then the
number of splitting nodes below s in pn+1 is at most n, so the next splitting node above
s in pn+1 is also in p.
For condition (3), let p ∈ S be a perfect tree, n ∈ ω and D ⊆ S be a dense class in
C. Let 〈si | i < 2n−1〉 be the set of all n-th splitting nodes in p. For each i < 2n−1, let
qi ≤S p  si with qi ∈ D and let q ∈ S be the amalgamation of {qi | i < 2n−1} into p. By
construction, q ≤n p and d = {qi | i < 2n−1} is predense below q.
Note that in the above example the witnessing subset d of the dense class D as in
condition (2) of Definition 5.4.5 is a finite set, and we do not need to construct a fusion
sequence in order to obtain d. In other cases, the situation is more complicated. The
following example shows that sometimes we have to make use of fusion sequences to
verify the aforementioned property. In particular, for this we require dependent choice.
Example 5.4.9. If M = 〈M, C〉 is a countable transitive model of GBdc− + V = HC,
then Laver forcing satisfies Axiom D over M. Recall that a Laver tree is a tree p in <ωω
with a stem sp and the property that every node t ⊇ sp has infinitely many immediate
successors. Laver forcing L is the partial order consisting of all laver trees, ordered by
inclusion. Note that we can enumerate <ωω in a canonical way such that whenever s ⊂ t,
then s appears before t and s a n appears before s a (n+ 1) for each n ∈ ω. In particular,
we can enumerate in the same way all t ∈ p with t ⊇ sp as sp0 = sp, sp1, sp2, . . . . For n ∈ ω,
we define
p ≤n q ⇐⇒ p ≤L q ∧ ∀i ≤ n (spi = sqi ).
We verify that L satisfies Axiom D following [Jec03, Lemma 28.16 and Lemma 28.17].
Again, the first property is clear by definition of ≤n. Secondly, let 〈pn | n ∈ ω〉 be a fusion
sequence in L and p =
⋂
n∈ω pn. Clearly, sp = sp0 . Now let s ∈ p be an arbitrary node
and let k ∈ ω. We have to find l ≥ k such that s a l ∈ p. Take n sufficently large such
that there is some l ≥ k with s a l = spni for some i ≤ n. Then s a l = spi is in p. This
proves that p is a condition in L.
For the last property, let p ∈ L, n ∈ ω and D ⊆ L a dense class in C. For each i ≤ n,
let
pi =
⋃
{p  spi a k | spi a k ∈ p \ {spj | j ≤ n}}.
We call each pi an n-component of p. Note that {p0, . . . , pn} forms a maximal antichain
below p. Fix i ≤ n. Using DC, we define a fusion sequence 〈qik | k ∈ ω〉 with qi0 = pi.
Suppose that the sequence has been defined up to k. Let ri0, . . . , r
i
k be k-components of
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qik. For each l ≤ k, choose r¯i,kl ≤0 ri,kl such that r¯i,kl ∈ D, otherwise put r¯i,kl = ri,kl . Let
dik = {r¯i,kl | l ≤ k} ∩D. Finally, let qk+1 =
⋃
l≤k r¯l. Now clearly q
i =
⋂
k∈ω q
i
k ≤0 pi. Put
q =
⋃
i≤n qi. Note that q ≤n p and d =
⋃{dik | i ≤ n, k ∈ ω} is predense below q.
Similar arguments work for Miller forcing, Mathias forcing and Silver forcing. We
will now show that all of the examples that we have considered so far satisfy the forcing
theorem. This follows from the general observation that each of them has a pre-Boolean
completion.
Let B denote the collection of all Borel classes of reals, i.e. the smallest collection of
classes of reals containing all open classes which is closed under taking complements and
countable unions. As described in [Jec03, pp. 504-507], each Borel class of reals can be
coded by a real. Moreover, if c ∈ ωω is a Borel code, then it describes how the corre-
sponding Borel class Bc is constructed from standard open sets by taking complements
and countable unions.
Definition 5.4.10. Let I ⊆ B be a definable σ-ideal6 of Borel classes of reals. Then we
can define a quasi-complete Boolean algebra BI whose conditions are Borel codes, where
for two Borel codes c and d, c ∧ d is the canonical Borel code for Bc ∩ Bd, c ∨ d is the
canonical Borel code for Bc ∪ Bd, ¬c is the Borel code for ωω \ Bc, 1BI is the Borel code
for ωω, 0BI is the Borel code for the empty set. Moreover, the equivalence relation ≈BI is
given by
c ≈BI d⇐⇒ Bc4Bd ∈ I
for all c, d ∈ BI .
Example 5.4.11. The following examples are well-known. For further examples, consult
[Kho12] and [Zap08].
(1) Random forcing is the forcing notion B∗null, where null is the σ-ideal of classes of reals
of Lebesgue measure zero. Moreover, since every Borel class of positive measure
contains a closed class of positive measure, R is forcing equivalent to the subforcing
of Bnull consisting of Borel codes for closed classes of reals.
(2) Consider Sacks forcing S. Let ctbl denote the ideal of countable sets of reals. Then BI
is a pre-Boolean completion of S. To see this, let i : S → B∗ctbl be given by mapping
a perfect tree p to the canonical Borel code of [p]. This map is clearly injective, and
it is dense because every Borel class of reals satisfies the perfect set property.
(3) We say that a class of reals X ⊆ ωω is strongly dominating , if for every y ∈ ωω
there is x ∈ X such that y ≤∗ x, i.e. for all but finitely many n ∈ ω, y(n) ≤ x(n).
Furthermore, we define the Laver ideal IL to be the ideal of all classes of reals which
are not strongly dominating. Then there is an injective dense embedding L → B∗IL
by [GRSS95, Lemma 2.3].
Further examples include Mathias forcing, Silver forcing and Miller forcing (see [Kho12,
Example 2.15]). In particular, by Theorem 3.2.6, all above mentioned forcing notions
satisfy the forcing theorem. Moreover, since they satisfy Axiom D, they are also nice by
Lemma 5.4.6 and Example 4.6.4.
6Recall that a σ-ideal of B is a subclass of B which contains ∅ and is closed under intersections and
countable unions.
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5.4.3 Preservation of the perfect set property
Let M be a fixed countable transitive model of ZFC− + V = HC. We show that all tree
forcing notions presented in the previous section preserve the Π11-PSP. The case of Cohen
forcing is very simple, since Cohen forcing is contained in L.
Lemma 5.4.12. Let C denote Cohen forcing. If M satisfies Π11-PSP and G is C-generic
over M , then so does M [G]. Moreover, if every set of ordinals in M has a sharp, then so
does every set of ordinals in M [G].
Proof. Let x ∈ M [G] be a real and σ ∈ MC a name such that x = σG. Clearly, we may
assume that σ is a real. Since M |= Π11-PSP, L[σ] |= ZFC. Moreover, as C ⊆ L, G is
also C-generic over L[σ]. In particular, L[σ][G] |= ZFC. But this implies that there are
only countably many reals constructible from σ and the generic Cohen real, and hence
Theorem 5.2.10, M [G] |= Π11[x]-PSP.
For the second assertion, suppose that σ ∈ MC is a name for a set of ordinals in
M [G]. As before, we may assume that σ is a real. By assumption, σ# exists in M
and L[σ#] |= ZFC + σ# exists. So in L[σ#] there is a non-trivial elementary embedding
j : L[σ]→ L[σ]. But as in the proof of Theorem 5.3.10, we obtain an elementary embedding
j¯ : L[σG]→ L[σG] given by mapping j¯(τG) to (j(τ))G.
For the other examples, it follows from unpublished work by Fabiana Castiblanco and
Philipp Schlicht in [CS16] that Mathias forcing, Sacks forcing, Silver forcing, Laver forcing
and Miller forcing preserve the Π11-PSP and the existence of sharps.
Theorem 5.4.13. [CS16] The following statements hold.
(1) Let r ∈ ωω be a real in M . Then for every Mathias-generic real x over M there exists
y ∈M such that x is Mathias-generic over L[r, y].
(2) Let r ∈ ωω be a real in M . Then every Sacks real over M is Mathias-generic over
L[r, y] for some real y ∈M .
(3) Let y˙ be the canonical name for a Silver real, x ∈ ωω a real in M and p be a condition
in Silver forcing U. Then there is q ≤U p such that
q MU “ y˙ is C-generic over L[xˇ, pˇ]”.
(4) Let x˙ denote the canonical name for a Laver real, p ∈ L and r ∈ ωω. Then there is
q ≤L p such that
q ML “ x˙ is equivalent to a Mathias-generic real over L[rˇ, pˇ]”.
Moreover, an analogous result holds for Miller forcing.
We can now apply the above statements to prove that all tree forcings that we have
discussed so far preserve the Π11-PSP. However, it is an open question whether this can
be generalized to all forcing notions which satisfy Axiom D.
Corollary 5.4.14. If M satisfies Π11-PSP (resp. M |= ∃#), then so does every P-generic
extension of M , where P is either Mathias forcing, Sacks forcing, Silver forcing, Laver
forcing or Miller forcing.
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Proof. All proofs are essentially the same as the proof of Lemma 5.4.12 by making use of
Theorem 5.4.13.
Even though we have seen that many canonical forcing notions preserve the perfect set
property for Π11-classes of reals, this does not hold in general. We give a counterexample
by adjoining first an Ord-Cohen subclass A of OrdM since this yields that the generic
extension is of the form L[A]. Using reshaping and almost disjoint coding, we then code
A by a real x so that the generic extension is of the form L[x]. Our characterization of
the perfect set property presented in Theorem 5.2.10 shows then that the Π11-PSP fails
in L[x]. This was pointed out to me by Ralf Schindler.
Lemma 5.4.15. Suppose that M = 〈M, C〉 is a countable transitive model of GBdc−+V =
HC. Then there is a notion of class forcing P for M such that every P-generic extension
of M is of the form L[A] for some class A ⊆ OrdM which is definable from G.
Proof. Let P denote Ord-Cohen forcing, i.e. conditions are of the form p : α → 2 for
some α ∈ OrdM , ordered by end-extension. It is clear that P is < Ord-closed and hence
it does not add any new sets and satisfies the forcing theorem. Since M |= DC, Example
2.2.9 implies that P is pretame. Now if G is P-generic over M then F =
⋃
G is a function
OrdM → 2 by standard density arguments. Moreover, A = {α ∈ OrdM | F (α) = 1} has
the desired properties: If x ∈ M is a set, then using the axiom of choice it can be coded
by a set of ordinals a ⊆ α for some α ∈ OrdM . Now by genericity there is β ∈ OrdM such
that for i < α, F (β + i) = 1 if and only if i ∈ a. Thus A codes all sets of ordinals and
hence M = L[A].
Theorem 5.4.16. Let M = 〈M, C〉 |= GBdc− + V = HC such that there is A ∈ C with
M = L[A]. Then there is a pretame notion of class forcing P for M such that every
P-generic extension is of the form L[x] for some real x.
Proof. Our desired forcing notion will be the two-step iteration of a reshaping forcing and
almost disjoint coding. Note first that since M has a hierarchy, by the characterization
of pretameness given in Corollary 4.3.6, the two-step iteration of two pretame notions of
class forcing is again pretame.
The reshaping partial order is defined as follows. Conditions in P are functions of
the form p : α → 2 for some ordinal α ≥ ω with the property that for all β ≤ α,
L[A ∩ β, p  β] |= |β| ≤ ω, ordered by end-extension.
Claim 1. For every α ∈ OrdM , the class
Dα = {p ∈ P | α ≤ dom(p)} ∈ C
is dense in P.
Proof. Suppose that p ∈ P is an arbitrary condition. If dom(p) < α, then let x ⊆ ω code
a well-order of ordertype α. Now let q ≤P p be the condition with dom(q) = dom(p) + ω
given by q(dom(p)+n) = 1 iff n ∈ x. If dom(q) < α then let r ≤P q be the condition with
dom(r) = α with r(β) = 0 for all dom(q) ≤ β < α. Since L[A ∩ dom(q), q] |= |α| = ω, it
is clear that r is in fact a condition in Dα.
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Note that in the same way as above, for every x ∈ L[A] we can always extend a
condition p ∈ P to some q ≤P p which codes x: Since x can be coded by a real, we can
code x into the interval [dom(p), dom(p) + ω).
Claim 2. P satisfies the set decision property.
Proof. Let a ⊆ P be a set in M of conditions in P and let p ∈ P. Using V = HC, we
can write a = {pn | n ∈ ω}. Now we define a sequence 〈qn | n ∈ ω〉 in the following
way. Let q0 ≤P p be a condition which codes the set a. This can be done using the
previous claim. Given qn, let qn+1 be the least – with respect to the canonical well-
order of L[A] – condition below qn which decides pn. Finally, let q =
⋃
n∈ω qn. Let
α = dom(q) =
⋃
n∈ω dom(pn). Note that if β < α, there is n ∈ ω such that β ≤ dom(qn).
In particular, L[A ∩ β, q  β] = L[A ∩ β, qn  β] |= |β| ≤ ω, since qn is a condition in P.
Moreover, observe that by our construction above 〈qn | n ∈ ω〉 is definable over Lα[A∩α, q]
and hence so is 〈dom(qn) | n ∈ ω〉. But then α is countable in L[A ∩ α, q], since it is the
union of ω-many countable sets. This proves that q is indeed a condition in P which
decides a.
Claim 3. P is pretame for M.
Proof. By Example 2.2.7 suffices to show that P is distributive over M. We follow the
proof of [AF15, Claim 24]. Since the axiom of choice holds in M , it is enough to consider
sequences of open dense classes of the form 〈Dn | n ∈ ω〉 ∈ C. Fix a condition p ∈ P.
Suppose that 〈Dn | n ∈ ω〉 is Σk+1-definable over M with parameter x ∈M . We define a
≤P-descending sequence 〈pn | n ∈ ω〉 of conditions below p such that pn+1 ∈ Dn for each
n ∈ ω in the following way.
• Since x can be coded by a real and using Claim 1, we can find an extension p0 ≤P p
such that p0 codes x.
• Suppose that pn has already been defined. Now using the global well-order of L[A],
we can choose the least pair 〈qn, yn〉 such that yn witnesses the Πk-property that
qn ∈ Dn. Since this property may not be absolute, we further strengthen qn futher
in the following way. Let Lαn [A∩αn] be the transitive collapse of the Σk-Skolem hull
of {qn, yn} in L[A] with respect to the canonical Skolem functions. Now we extend
qn to a condition pn+1 ∈ P with domain αn by adding 0’s.
Finally, let q =
⋃
n∈ω pn and β = sup{αn | n ∈ ω}. Note that the sequence of Skolem
hulls and 〈pn | n ∈ ω〉 are elements of Lβ[A], since Lβ[A] is a Σk-elementary substructure
of L[A]. Moreover, dom(q) = β and so L[A ∩ β, q] |= |β| = ω. Hence q is a condition in P
which lies in
⋂
n∈ωDn.
Suppose now that G is P-generic over M. Then
⋃
G is a function defined on all
ordinals as a consequence of Claim 1. Let B ⊆ OrdM be a predicate in C[G] which codes
both A and {α ∈ OrdM | ∃p ∈ G (α ∈ dom(p) ∧ p(α) = 1)}. This enables us to choose
a sequence 〈xα | α ∈ OrdM〉 of reals as follows. Given the sequence 〈xβ | β < α〉 for
some ordinal α, we can choose xα ⊆ ω to be the least real x ∈ L[B ∩ α] with respect
to the canonical well-order such that x /∈ {xβ | β < α}. Such a real exists since α is
countable in L[B ∩ α]. These reals may, however, still not be almost disjoint. For each
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ordinal α, let aα = {h(xα ∩n) | n ∈ ω}, where h : [ω]<ω → ω is a suitable bijection. Then
〈aα | α ∈ OrdM〉 is a sequence of almost disjoint reals, i.e they have the property that
|aα ∩ aβ| < ω for α 6= β.
The second step is to perform almost disjoint coding with the help of the sequence
〈aα | α ∈ OrdM〉. The conditions of Q are given by pairs p = 〈sp, tp〉 such that sp ∈ [ω]<ω
and tp ∈ [B]<ω. The ordering is defined by p ≤P q if the following conditions hold:
(a) sp ⊇ sq and min(sp \ sq) > max sq,
(b) tp ⊇ tq,
(c) sp \ sq ∩
⋃
α∈tq aα = ∅.
Clearly, if p, q ∈ Q with the same first component sp = sq then r = 〈sr, tr〉 with sr = sp
and tr = tp∪tq is in Q and strengthens both p and q. Since there are only countably many
possible first components, it follows that Q satisfies the Ord-cc over M. In particular, P
is pretame.
Now let H be Q-generic over M. Consider the real
x =
⋃
{sp | p ∈ H} ⊆ ω.
The next claim shows that x codes B.
Claim 4. Let α be an ordinal in M . Then α ∈ B if and only if x ∩ aα is finite.
Proof. Suppose first that α ∈ B. Note that the class Dα = {p ∈ Q | α ∈ tp} ∈ C[G] is a
dense subclass of Q. If p ∈ Dα ∩H, then x ∩ aα = sp ∩ aα is finite. Conversely, assume
that α /∈ B and let n ∈ ω. Then the class
Enα = {p ∈ Q | ∃m ≥ n (m ∈ sp ∩ aα)}
is dense in Q. To see this, let p ∈ Q be an arbitrary condition. Since the aβ’s are
almost disjoint and tp is finite, there is m ≥ max sp, n such that m ∈ aα \
⋃
β∈tq aβ. Then
q = 〈sp ∪ {m}, tp〉 ≤Q p is in Enα. Now let p ∈ Enα ∩ H. Then there is m ≥ n with
m ∈ sp ∩ aα ⊆ x ∩ aα. Since n was arbitrary, this shows that x ∩ aα is infinite.
Note that since H can be recovered from x as H = {p ∈ Q | sp ⊆ x} and using Claim
4, it follows that L[B][H] = L[x]. But this shows that the Π11[x]-PSP fails, since otherwise
by Theorem 5.2.10 there would be only countably many x-constructible reals.
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Open questions
In the following, we present a selection of open questions related to the topics covered in
this thesis. Many of them are mentioned already in our joint papers [HKL+16], [HKS16b]
and [HKS16a]. For further interesting open problems, consult the aforementioned papers.
Firstly, there are many interesting open questions related to the forcing theorem. As
shown in Theorem 2.2.2, if M has a hierarchy then every pretame notion of class forcing
for M satisfies the forcing theorem. Moreover, if C contains a global well-order, then by
Lemma 4.1.2, the Ord-cc implies the forcing theorem. Thus we are interested whether
these assumptions are necessary.
Question 1. If M is a countable transitve model of GB−, does every pretame notion of
class forcing for M satisfy the forcing theorem? Does every notion of class forcing which
satisfies the Ord-cc over M satisfy the forcing theorem?
In Theorem 4.2.3 we show how to extend a non-pretame notion of class forcing to
one which does not satisfy the forcing theorem. However, the proof makes use of the
non-existence of a first-order truth predicate in the ground model. Thus the following
question arises.
Question 2. If M = 〈M, C〉 is a countable transitive model of GB− and N is a model
of th form 〈M,Def(C ∪ {T})〉, where T is a first-order truth predicate for M , does every
notion of class forcing for M satisfy the forcing theorem over N?
Our counterexample of the truth lemma given by Theorem 2.5.11 and Example 2.5.13
uses a two-step iteration, where the first iterand is pretame and the second iterand is the
forcing notion F as defined in 1.3.5. However, since we do not know whether the two-step
iteration of notions of class forcing satisfying the truth lemma, where the first forcing
notion is pretame, again satisfies the truth lemma.
Question 3. Does the forcing notion F satisfy the truth lemma over all (some) models
of ZF−?
Another question related to the forcing theorem is the following.
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Question 4. If P satisfies the forcing theorem over some countable transitive model M
of GB−, does P still satisfy the forcing theorem over some class-generic extension of M?
Does the product of two forcing notions which satisfy the forcing theorem still satisfy the
forcing theorem?
Note that a positive answer to the first question above would also yield a postive
answer to the second question. Similarly, it is not clear whether pretameness or the
preservation of GB− of some forcing notion holds in class-generic extensions.
Question 5. Suppose that P is a notion of class forcing for some countable transitive
model M of GB− which is pretame for M (preserves the axioms of GB−). Is P still
pretame for (does P still preserve GB− over) some class-generic extension of M?
This is particularly interesting, since it would yield that the characterization of pre-
tameness of some forcing notion P in terms of the preservation of GB− over models
M = 〈M, C〉 with a hierarchy (see Corollary 4.3.6) could be lifted to arbitrary models
of GB− under the assumption that P satisfies the forcing theorem. This relies on a simple
argument which makes use of the product P×WM and the product lemma.
Question 6. Let M be a countable transitive model of GB− and let P be a notion of class
forcing for M. Does it hold that P is pretame for M if and only if for every p ∈ P there
is a P-generic filter G over M with p ∈ G such that M[G] |= GB−?
The characterization of pretameness in terms of the axiom of GB− (resp. the preser-
vation of separation) as stated in Corollary 4.3.7 relies heavily on the forcing theorem. In
the case of separation, this makes use of Theorem 4.3.4 and hence we additionally assume
the existence of a set-like well-order. This motivates the following question.
Question 7. If M is a countable transitive model of GB−, does every notion of class
forcing for M which preserves GB− satisfy the forcing theorem? Does every notion of
class forcing for M which preserves separation satisfy the forcing theorem?
Concerning separation, we are also interested in which particular instances can fail
in class forcing extensions. It is shown in [HKS16b, Lemma 8.5] that given a nice name
σ ∈MP for a subset of ω2, where P is a notion of class forcing for M which is closed under
meets1, that in every P-generic extension the complement ω2 \ σG exists. Furthermore,
we proved in Lemma 4.6.5 that if σ, τ ∈ MP are nice names, then there is a name for
the intersection of σ and τ . However, we do not know whether this also holds for names
which are not nice.
Question 8. Suppose that M is a countable transitive model of GB− and P is a notion
of class forcing for M. If σ, τ are P-names, is there always a P-name for the complement
σ\τ? Is there a P-name for the intersection of σ and τ? More generally, are class generic
extensions always rudimentarily closed?
1i.e. every finite set of conditions in P has a lower bound in P
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Concerning the question above, note that we have proved in Lemma 3.2.4 that class-
generic extensions obtained by forcing with an M -complete Boolean algebra are always
rudimentarily closed. Furthermore, it is easy to generalize this to M -complete pre-Boolean
algebras. However, we do not know whether this holds for all forcing notions.
Note that in the proof of Lemma 1.2.9 we have considered weak union, i.e. the existence
of a superset of
⋃
x for every set x, instead of the usual axiom of union. This makes sense,
since the axiom of union obviously follows from separation and weak union. Nevertheless,
the following open question is still of interest to us.
Question 9. Does every notion of class forcing preserve the axiom of union?
Notice that every notion of class forcing P which has the property that for every p, q ∈ P
which are compatible there is a set-sized predense subset of conditions strengthening both
p and q preserves the axiom of union. If we drop this assumption, we do not know whether
this holds.
As we have already mentioned above regarding the forcing theorem, all of our char-
acterizations of pretameness and the Ord-cc require additional assumptions such as the
existence of a set-like well-order of the ground model or even class recursion. It would
therefore be desirable to investigate whether these assumptions can be dropped.
Question 10. Can be pretameness be characterized in terms of the existence of nice
names for sets of ordinals over models of GB− (or any other theory which does not allow
class recursion)? Can we characterize the Ord-cc in terms of very niceness over models
of GB−?
Analogous questions can be posed for all other properties under consideration in Chap-
ter 4. Theorem 4.2.3 shows how pretameness can be characterized in terms of the forcing
theorem. The proof shows that if P is non-pretame over some model of GB− without
a first-order truth predicate then there is a dense embedding from P into some forcing
notion which doesn’t satisfy the definability lemma. It is therefore natural to ask whether
a similar statement holds for the truth lemma.
Question 11. Does it hold in (some extension of) GB− that a forcing notion is pretame
if and only if it densely satisfies the truth lemma?
Another topic concerns the equiconsistency results between models of (extensions of)
SOA+ Π11-PSP and (extensions of) ZFC. We conjecture that this can be lifted to charac-
terize further large cardinal properties.
Question 12. Can models of ZFC with a measurable cardinal be characterized by models of
SOA with some additional hypotheses? If M is a model of SOA+ projective determinacy,
does M have any inner models of ZFC with infinitely many Woodin cardinals? Does
projective absoluteness hold for all notions of class forcing which satisfy Axiom D?
As we have seen in Section 5.2.3, one can easily prove in second-order arithmetic that
Π11-Det + Π
1
1-PSP implies the existence of 0
#. However, the following is an interesting
open question which was formulated in [CS15].
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Question 13. Can one prove in second-order arithmetic that Π11-determinacy implies the
existence of 0#?
As we have already pointed out before, a positive answer would provide a new prove of
the existence of 0# from Π11-determinacy. Regarding 0
#, recall that 0# is not set-generic
over any model M with 0# /∈M . For class forcing, this is, however, still an open question.
Question 14. Is it consistent that there is a countable transitive model M of ZFC with
0# /∈M and a class-generic extension N of M with 0# ∈ N?
Partial results on this topic have been elaborated by Stanley in [Sta98]. Notably, he
shows that 0# can be invisibly generic over some model of the form Lκ, where invisible
genericity is a weaking of class genericity which only requires Lκ[G] to be a model of
collection rather than the corresponding second-order model. On the other hand, an easy
argument shows that 0# does not lie in any class-generic extension of L, since otherwise
one could use the forcing theorem to define truth over L.
In Section 5.4.3 we have shown examples of class forcing notions over models of SOA+
DC which preserve the Π11-PSP and such which do not.
Question 15. Does every notion of class forcing which satisfies Axiom D over a model of
SOA+DC preserve the Π11-PSP? How can one characterize those notions of class forcing
which preserve the Π11-PSP over models of SOA + DC?
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